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FORUM CHOICE FOR  
TERRORISM SUSPECTS 
AZIZ Z. HUQ† 
ABSTRACT 
  What forum should be used to adjudicate the status of persons 
suspected of involvement in terrorism? Recent clashes between 
Congress and the president as to whether the status of terrorism 
suspects should be determined via Article III courts or military 
commissions have revived the debate about this venue question. The 
problem is typically framed as a matter of legal doctrine, with 
statutory and doctrinal rules invoked as dispositive guides for sorting 
suspects into either civilian or military venues. This Article takes issue 
with the utility of that framing of the problem. It argues that the forum 
question can more profitably be analyzed through an institutional-
design lens. A key institutional-design decision is whether and when 
to create jurisdictional redundancy. When, that is, should the existence 
of overlapping jurisdictions vest the government with a threshold 
choice of forums or an option to retry a suspect who has been 
acquitted in an initial process? Jurisdictional redundancy is pervasive. 
But conventional wisdom suggests that it is unwise. This Article 
demonstrates, however, that overlap among forums has complex 
direct and indirect effects on the accuracy and cost of terrorism-
related adjudication. The Article presents a comprehensive 
framework for analyzing redundancy by exploring how redundancy 
influences error rates, system-maintenance costs, externalities, 
information production, and incentives. Applying this framework, I 
contend that the conventional wisdom is flawed. Pervasive 
redundancy has surprising merit in contrast to two leading reform 
proposals that would eliminate most jurisdictional overlap. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A central, seemingly intractable controversy in national-security 
law is the choice of forum for adjudicating the status of terrorism 
suspects. Consider the arrest of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame. An 
alleged liaison between al Qaeda and the al Shabaab organization of 
Somalia, Warsame was seized in April 2011 aboard a fishing skiff in 
the Gulf of Aden.1 After two months’ imprisonment on a Navy vessel, 
the Somali national was moved to Manhattan for a criminal trial in 
federal district court.2 Instead of inspiring praise, news of his capture 
and pending prosecution drew criticism from those who argued that 
Warsame belonged in a military forum.3 The Warsame case is only 
the latest installment in an increasingly heated debate about forum 
choice for terrorism suspects. That debate has proved particularly 
vexing because suspects linked to al Qaeda and other transnational 
groups are seized in a bewildering variety of circumstances, leading to 
puzzles not only about the relevant forum but also about the relevant 
facts on which forum choice should turn. Imagine, for example, that 
Warsame had been captured off the coast of Florida, just outside U.S. 
territorial waters. Or that he had been arrested upon entering the 
country at Miami International Airport, with explosives on his 
person. Or that, upon being pulled from a Yemeni fishing vessel, 
Warsame had fished from his pocket a U.S. passport. In each case, the 
geography of capture, the suspect’s citizenship, and his or her alleged 
actions could vary in ways that are potentially relevant to the forum-
choice question. 
There is scant domestic consensus on how to allocate suspects 
among venues to evaluate their long-term detentions.4 President 
 
 1. Ken Gude, Conservatives Outraged over Prosecution of Terror Suspect, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (July 6, 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/07/warsame_trial.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Charlie Savage, U.S. Tests New Approach to Terrorism Cases on Somali Suspect, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 7, 2011, at A10. 
 4. I use the terms “forum” and “venue” interchangeably in this Article without intending 
to draw on their technical legal meanings.  
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Obama and his opponents in Congress have disagreed sharply on 
forum choice not only for suspects seized extraterritorially, such as 
Warsame, but also for those arrested in the United States.5 The 
Obama administration has endorsed criminal prosecution in Article 
III courts for some suspects6 and at one point even threatened to veto 
defense appropriations bills containing riders that would limit such 
proceedings.7 By contrast, many in Congress favor either the use of 
military commissions as authorized by a 2009 statute8 or detention in 
military custody without any criminal process.9 These disagreements 
initially yielded a protracted interbranch stalemate.10 In late 2011, 
 
 5. See, e.g., Halimah Abdullah, McConnell Says Kentucky Could Face Attack if Terror 
Suspects Are Held Here, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, June 15, 2011, http://www.kentucky
.com/2011/06/14/1774656/mcconnell-says-kentucky-could.html (describing Senator. Mitch 
McConnell’s argument that terrorism suspects arrested in the United States should not be tried 
in the United States); Mitch McConnell, Op-Ed., The Right Place To Try Terrorists, WASH. 
POST, June 22, 2011, at A17; Charlie Savage, Attorney General and Senator Clash on Where To 
Try Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at A20 (discussing an argument between the 
Obama administration and Senator McConnell over whether suspects captured on American 
soil should be prosecuted in America or at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base); Charlie Savage, 
Developments Rekindle Debate over Best Approach for Terrorist Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2011, at A14 (noting some arguments between conservatives and President Obama over forum 
choice). 
 6. The Obama administration has taken this position with respect to at least those 
suspects who are detained inside the United States. See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to 
Our Values and Laws, Remarks at Harvard Law School (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-
adhering-our-values-an (“[I]t is the firm position of the Obama Administration that suspected 
terrorists arrested inside the United States will—in keeping with long-standing tradition—be 
processed through our Article III courts.”).  
 7. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 1540—NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 2–3 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr1540r_20110524.pdf (“The Administration strongly objects to 
the provisions that limit the use of authorized funds . . . regarding prosecution of 
detainees. . . . If the final bill presented to the President includes these provisions . . . , the 
President’s senior advisors would recommend a veto.”); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: S. 1867—NATIONAL 
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 2–3 (2011), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saps1867s_20111117.pdf (repeating the 
veto threat).  
 8. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2574 
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a–950t (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 9. See, e.g., Walter E. Kuhn, The Terrorist Detention Reform Act: Detention Policy and 
Political Reality, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 221, 269–70 (2011) (endorsing continued use of 
military detention); see also infra Parts I.C–D, IV.A–B.  
 10. The executive branch has made two failed attempts to resolve the stalemate. First, on 
November 13, 2009, the Departments of Justice and Defense announced charges against five 
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Congress enacted a series of ambiguously worded provisions in a 
military appropriations bill.11 These novel provisions might make the 
executive’s use of Article III forums more difficult, but they do not 
conclusively resolve the forum-choice debate.12 Throughout these 
controversies, however, one point of general agreement has persisted: 
a belief that the jurisdictional arrangements that had long obtained in 
the post-9/11 decade were “dysfunctional.”13 
The question of forum choice typically is framed as a question of 
law. In particular, the inquiry is framed as turning upon whether, 
under international or domestic law, a suspect can or should be 
categorized as a “criminal” or a “combatant”.14 Those who read the 
law to categorize alleged terrorists such as Warsame as combatants 
 
Guantánamo detainees in federal court and against five others in military commissions. Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Departments of Justice and Defense Announce Forum Decisions 
for Ten Guantánamo Bay Detainees (Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2009/November/09-ag-1224.html. The decision to use Article III courts was so controversial that 
the administration backed down. See Editorial, Cowardice Blocks the 9/11 Trial, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 5, 2011, at A22. (“That retreat [from trying Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in New York City] 
was a victory for Congressional pandering and an embarrassment for the Obama 
administration, which failed to stand up for it.”). Second, on January 22, 2010, an interagency 
task force on Guantánamo announced a series of forum choices. GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK 
FORCE, FINAL REPORT, at ii (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-
final-report.pdf. Its judgment has never been operationalized.  
 11. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA 2012), Pub. L. 
No. 112-81, §§ 1021–1034 125 Stat. 1298 (2011). This law is discussed infra at text accompanying 
notes 312–22.  
 12. See infra Part IV.  
 13. Editorial, What To Do with Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, July 5, 2011, at A10.  
 14. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the 
Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 770–71 (2011) (noting the distinction between possible 
categories for suspected terrorists); see also Gregory Maggs, Assessing the Legality of Law 
Enforcement Measures Without Characterizing Them as Law Enforcement or Military Action, 80 
TEMP. L. REV. 661, 663 (2006) (noting questions about whether military or criminal law applies 
to certain defendants); Benjamin J. Priester, Who Is a Terrorist? Drawing the Line Between 
Criminal Defendants and Military Enemies, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1255, 1257 (distinguishing 
between criminal defendants and military enemies); Karl S. Chang, Enemy Status and Military 
Detention in the War Against al-Qaeda, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (arguing that the 
type distinction in international law is not combatancy but enmity). International law, however, 
is more complex than this dichotomy suggests: “[t]reaties long have recognized that a state may 
detain without trial not only opposing armed forces, but also civilians and others who pose 
threats to its security.” Ashley S. Deeks, Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict, 40 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 403, 403 (2009); see also Monica Hakimi, International Standards for 
Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 369, 373–74 (2008) (arguing that the debate about the combatant/civilian line is “stale” 
and arguing that human-rights law provides a new perspective on the proper scope of 
permissible detention authority under international law). 
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see military jurisdiction as proper.15 Those who insist that 
“[t]errorism . . . is a crime [that] has historically been addressed 
through criminal prosecution,” by contrast, view Article III courts as 
the appropriate forum as a matter of law.16 On both sides, legal 
categories are invoked as guideposts for matching suspects such as 
Warsame exclusively to one or another forum.17 The literature 
therefore focuses closely on the procedural rules and substantive law 
employed in a given venue.18 But the ensuing legal line-drawing 
exercises have proved divisive and inconclusive. Conventional legal 
analysis has failed to supply clear answers.19 This failure is not 
surprising. The legal categories of “combatant,” “criminal,” and 
 
 15. See, e.g., Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307, 351 (2003) (arguing that if the “military approach” to anti-
terrorism prevails, the United States “will understand that religious fundamentalists who attack 
military targets in the Middle East or elsewhere and defend their homeland are, in essence, 
soldiers”); Josh Tyrangiel, And Justice For . . ., TIME, Nov. 26, 2001, at 66 (describing President 
Bush’s characterization of terrorists as soldiers as a justification for the use of military 
commissions).  
 16. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 
97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 728 (2009); see also RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., 
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS (2008) (discussing the history of cases addressing terrorism in Article III 
courts); Michael Ratner & Jules Lobel, Comment, Don’t Repackage Gitmo!, NATION, Dec. 25, 
2008, at 8 (criticizing arguments “that holding some terror suspects without trial or charges is 
necessary”); Jameel Jaffer & Ben Wizner, Don’t Replace the Old Guantánamo with a New One, 
SALON (Dec. 9, 2008, 6:58 AM EST), http://www.salon.com/2008/12/09/guantanamo_3/singleton. 
(“The class of people who cannot be prosecuted [in Article III courts] but are too dangerous to 
let go is either very small or nonexistent.”). 
 17. Not all scholars and commentators draw absolute positions. Some make fine-grained 
distinctions between suspects based on the locus of capture or the substance of accusations to 
ascertain who is a “criminal” and who is a “combatant.” Professors Gabriella Blum and Philip 
Heymann allocate suspects to criminal or military venues based on their locus of capture. 
GABRIELLA BLUM & PHILIP B. HEYMANN, LAWS, OUTLAWS, AND TERRORISTS: LESSONS 
FROM THE WAR ON TERRORISM 105 (2010). Benjamin Wittes, by contrast, relies on a suspect’s 
status and behavior. BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE 
IN THE AGE OF TERROR 146 (2008). 
 18. For recent examples of excellent treatments of substantive and procedural issues, see, 
respectively, Chesney, supra note 14, at 805–48; and Matthew C. Waxman, Guantánamo, 
Habeas Corpus, and Standards of Proof: Viewing the Law Through Multiple Lenses, 42 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 245 (2009). For a review of the uses of law enforcement by a former assistant 
attorney general for national security, see David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a 
Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1 (2011). 
 19. See, e.g., Tom Toles, Editorial, A Framework for Detainees, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 
2011, at A20 (“Just days after President Obama issued an executive order to govern long-term 
detentions at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Republican members of the 
House and Senate shot back by offering their own, strikingly different proposals.”); Jack 
Goldsmith, Op-Ed., A Way Past the Terrorist Detention Gridlock, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2010, 
at A25 (identifying the political deadlock).  
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“terrorist” are not natural classifications. Their boundaries have 
turned out to be controversial on normative and legal grounds—
probably irredeemably so. The utility of static legal rules is also 
vulnerable to erosion by fast-moving circumstances. For instance, 
rapid changes to al Qaeda’s organizational structure have cast doubt 
on the durability of longstanding legal typologies.20 Ultimately, 
substantive legal categories are unlikely to generate clear 
jurisdictional lines that will enable the allocation of different suspects 
to distinct venues.21 
This Article presents an alternative approach to the problem of 
forum choice for terrorism suspects. Its central premise is that the 
decision about how to adjudicate the status of suspected terrorists can 
be approached as a problem of institutional design rather than as a 
matter of pure legal doctrine. An institutional-design perspective asks 
how to “divid[e] the government into units that will provide the best 
possible set of public policies and government services.”22 It treats 
policy outcomes as a function of the architecture of adjudicative 
institutions.23 The pivotal difference between the doctrinal and 
institutional-design approaches can be captured pithily in the 
following way: legal analysis hinges on how a particular suspect should 
be categorized. Is Warsame a criminal or a combatant? By contrast, 
an institutional-design analysis takes a step backward in time from the 
 
 20. See Leah Farrall, How al Qaeda Works: What the Organization’s Subsidiaries Say 
About Its Strengths, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2011, at 128, 136–37 (describing changes to al 
Qaeda); Keith Johnson, Officials Spotlight Domestic Terrorism Threat, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 
2011, at A5 (“[L]one-wolf extremists with little or no formal connection to al Qaeda have 
proliferated and are potentially plotting small-scale attacks in the U.S[.], officials said.”). 
 21. This difficulty is quite apart from the problem of how to sort suspects prior to any 
threshold adjudication of status. That is, are suspects to be slotted into different venues based 
on what the suspect has conceded or what the government has alleged? Surprisingly, there is no 
crisp judicial treatment of this nettlesome question.  
 22. David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 
113 YALE L.J. 955, 958 (2004). Institutions can be defined broadly as “clusters of norms with 
strong but variable mechanisms of support and enforcement that regulate and sustain an 
important area of social life.” DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER, USABLE THEORY: ANALYTIC 
TOOLS FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RESEARCH 210 (2009). I use the term here to refer to 
“formal institutions that are legally binding.” Id. at 212. 
 23. See Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems: 
Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 716, 716–17 (1986) (arguing that the 
institutional architecture of complex institutions, and in particular their use of functional 
redundancies, influences outcomes); see also Todd L. LaPorte & Paula M. Consolini, Working 
in Practice but Not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of “High-Reliability Organizations,” 1 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 19, 21–22 (1991) (describing research into optimal organizational 
form in contexts in which system failures are associated with unacceptably high costs). 
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moment of capture. It looks instead at how the government’s choice 
should be structured ex ante to elicit the best outcomes—a question 
that is peripheral to dominant doctrinal modes of analysis. An 
institutional-design inquiry, unlike a doctrinal analysis, thereby aims 
to capture both direct and indirect connections between forum choice 
and policy goals. By refocusing the debate away from legal doctrine 
onto the causal consequences of unexamined architectural choices, an 
institutional-design lens usefully sidelines highly disputed normative 
questions about the character of terrorism as either war or crime. It 
instead generates a set of metrics that all sides of the debate should 
find acceptable and brings to the surface issues and mechanisms that 
have been obscured by a relentless focus on existing doctrine. 
More specifically, I contend that a central institutional-design 
choice is whether or not to create jurisdictional redundancy in forum 
choice for terrorism suspects. Redundancy, as I use the term in this 
Article, means that for any suspect, the government has an 
overlapping set of venue options. Redundancy can take two forms. 
First, when a suspect such as Warsame is seized, the law could vest 
the government with a choice between different forums initially. 
Second, it could give the government an option to invoke a substitute 
venue should an initial forum fail to validate the government’s 
threshold detention. For example, if Warsame is acquitted in an 
Article III court, the law might allow him to be tried subsequently by 
a military commission. In other words, redundancy can be either 
simultaneous or sequential. Jurisdictional redundancy of both stripes 
is ubiquitous in the existing institutional framework for terrorist 
detention. Leading reform proposals, however, aim to eliminate most 
redundancy in favor of jurisdictional parsimony.24 One conclusion of 
my analysis is that the wholesale elimination of redundancy may be 
undesirable, although the effects of more modest jurisdictional 
modifications are far less clear. 
Legal and institutional studies in other contexts have identified 
the value of redundancy as an element in institutional design.25 
 
 24. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 25. For a model of political redundancy, see Michael M. Ting, A Strategic Theory of 
Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 274 (2003). For an analysis of redundancy in a 
different national-security context, see Scott D. Sagan, The Problem of Redundancy Problem: 
Why More Nuclear Security Forces May Produce Less Nuclear Security, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 935 
(2004). For analysis in the corporate-form context, see generally Eric Maskin, Yingyi Qian & 
Chenggang Xu, Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form, 67 REV. ECON. STUD. 359 
(2000); and Yingyi Qian, Gérard Roland & Chenggang Xu, Coordination and Experimentation 
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Analysis of redundancy is also familiar to public-law scholars, some of 
whom, because of their exposure to the legal-process school, have 
been acclimatized to think about the law in terms of interactions 
among diverse government institutions.26 In the 1960s and 1970s, 
jurisdictional overlap provided a lens for assessing the overlap of state 
criminal adjudication and postconviction collateral review in habeas 
corpus by federal courts.27 More recently, scholars of the federal 
administrative state have remarked upon the ubiquity of jurisdictional 
redundancy in the regulatory state, giving rise to literature on the 
effects of overlapping jurisdictions.28 Collectively, these streams of 
scholarship provide rich tools for thinking about the institutional-
design problem in terrorist detention. But although some scholars 
have exploited these tools to think in innovative ways about the 
national-security bureaucracy,29 no one has applied them to the 
specific forum-choice question respecting terrorism suspects. 
 
in M-Form and U-Form Organizations, 114 J. POL. ECON. 366 (2006). Redundancy of a 
different kind has been explored in the criminal-law literature on overcriminalization. See, e.g., 
Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 230 (2007) 
(discussing redundancy in the coverage of state and federal criminal law). 
 26. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction 
to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at lx (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994) (“In a government seeking to advance the public interest, each organ has a special 
competence or expertise, and the key to good government is not just figuring out what is the 
best policy, but figuring out which institutions should be making which decisions and how all the 
institutions should interrelate.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, 
and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981) (defending the existence of jurisdictional 
overlap).  
 28. The most recent contributions in the law literature are Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping 
and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201 [hereinafter 
Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction]; Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 
VA. L. REV. 301, 315–23 (2010) [hereinafter Gersen, Unbundled Powers]; and Jason Marisam, 
Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 185, 218–44 (2011). See also Jody Freeman & 
Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012). For an excellent survey of the political-science literature, see JONATHAN B. BENDOR, 
PARALLEL SYSTEMS: REDUNDANCY IN GOVERNMENT 24–65 (1985). For examples of the 
important work done on redundancy in other contexts, compare Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax 
and Spending Programs, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (2006) (cautiously endorsing a role for 
redundancy in institutional design), with Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 22, at 999–1006 
(arguing that economies of scale make consolidation of some social-welfare programs in the 
Internal Revenue Service valuable).  
 29. See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring 
and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1684–91 (2006) 
(focusing on how centralized the intelligence function should be).  
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The dearth of scholarship on the terrorist-detention question is a 
further reason to attend to overlap in institutional design. 
Jurisdictional redundancy turns out to be a unifying variable that is 
uniquely positioned to explain how forum choice influences policy 
outcomes. Moreover, most or all pending reform ideas concerning 
terrorism forum choice are, in effect, suggested adjustments to the 
quantum of extant jurisdictional redundancy in the terrorist-detention 
system. Bills that preclude the transfer of detainees at the 
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base for trial in the United States, for 
example, narrow jurisdictional overlap.30 Adding conspiracy offenses 
to the list of substantive crimes that can be tried by a military 
commission,31 by contrast, increases the overlap between military and 
civilian systems. Changes to procedural rules will also increase or 
decrease the executive’s choice between forums and can therefore be 
recharacterized as adjustments to jurisdictional overlap.32 
Overlap among venues appears at first blush a peculiar, even 
counterintuitive, design choice that reformers would be wise to oust—
as many indeed hope to do. Redundancy might be taken as an 
invitation to the government to engage in abusive behavior. Or it 
might be attacked as a waste of resources. Why establish a 
multiplicity of forums when a single forum could be modified to 
account for the new policy demands of post-9/11 national security? 
Perhaps the answer is simply that increasingly outdated and irrelevant 
constitutional rules have guarded some forums from reform while 
placing no constraints on the creation of new forums.33 Perhaps as a 
result of such perverse jurisdictional entrenchment, creating a new 
forum is easier than altering the rules of an existing one. Perhaps the 
 
 30. See, e.g., Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. 
No. 111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351 (prohibiting the expenditure of Pentagon funds on 
detainee transfers). 
 31. See 10 U.S.C. § 950t(29) (Supp. IV 2010) (allowing conspiracy prosecutions in military 
commissions). 
 32. Some scholars have made the distinct point that the military and Article III criminal 
systems are converging in substantive predicates and procedural constraints. Robert Chesney & 
Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1080–81 (2008). Convergence entails common procedural and substantive 
standards, conditions that are neither necessary nor sufficient to establish jurisdictional overlap. 
Professors Chesney and Goldsmith’s useful article, as a result, does not discuss overlap as that 
term is used here.  
 33. That is, redundancy is the product of “institutional development rather than 
institutional choice.” PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL 
ANALYSIS 15 (2004).  
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net effect is a costly and needless multiplicity of forums that ought to 
be extinguished. 
This story contains a grain of truth, but not much more. Path-
dependent historical developments likely play a role in shaping forum 
choice, and overlapping jurisdictions create some risk of abuse. But 
this story also radically oversimplifies. It fails to capture important 
benefits of redundancy and elides important tradeoffs in the choice 
between jurisdictional parsimony and redundancy. Channeling the 
government into one forum, I argue, results in policy outcomes that 
are very different from the outcomes of jurisdictional redundancy, 
and it is far from clear that the ensuing changes would all be for the 
better. A central task in institutional design is analyzing, rather than 
taking for granted, the complex and multiple mechanisms that 
connect jurisdictional choice to policy outcomes. In this endeavor, my 
analysis takes the central policy goals in terrorist detention to be 
captured by labels of accuracy and cost minimization—an assumption 
that I defend at greater length in Part III. Within this framework of 
analysis, the government wishes to detain the correct people, however 
defined, by applying the law correctly to the facts, and it wishes to do 
so with a minimum of transaction costs. Beyond transaction costs, 
detaining the wrong people has two potential downstream costs: the 
dissipated liberty interests of the incorrectly detained and the 
marginal increase in the risk of terrorism imposed when the 
government fails to detain the correct person. 
This Article argues that jurisdictional redundancy has both direct 
and indirect costs, only some of which are accuracy related. Changes 
to jurisdictional specifications induce immediate changes to error 
rates, marginal government expenditures, and public externalities. 
But they also have indirect effects of a lesser magnitude: they 
influence the principal-agent relationship between Congress and 
government officials and change the way information about terrorism 
is gathered and disseminated. Compounded over time, even indirect 
effects may work major reallocations in national-security policy. 
By examining the direct and indirect links between jurisdictional 
redundancy and policy outcomes, this Article provides a generally 
applicable framework for the analysis of the forum-choice question 
for terrorism suspects. It does so, moreover, without reliance on 
contested assumptions about the relative priority of liberty or 
security. Nor does it draw on controversial legal assumptions about 
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the content of constitutional norms.34 I make no claims here, for 
example, about the proper measure of due process, the necessary 
allocation of authority among the branches, or the appropriate moral 
censure to be directed at those accused of terrorism. Such claims 
would be necessarily controversial. The constitutional norms at issue 
are generally poorly defined.35 The basic normative issues are highly 
divisive. Yet even bracketing these issues, it is still possible to capture 
many of the relevant normative concerns by focusing parsimoniously 
on questions of accuracy and other costs.36 
Applying this analytic framework to pending reform proposals, I 
reach a conclusion that is at odds with the conventional wisdom. 
Rather than deploring overlap and celebrating singularity, I argue 
that the status quo will be hard to improve upon solely by eliminating 
any quantum of systemic redundancy. Counterterrorism, I conclude, 
is a domain in which redundancy is likely to have far more benefits 
than costs.37 
The Article is organized as follows. Part I motivates the analysis 
by specifying the historically plural pathways for terrorist detention. 
Part II explains why jurisdictional redundancy is an appropriate lens 
for the analysis. It provides a precise and intuitive definition of 
“jurisdictional redundancy” and demonstrates the ubiquity, 
 
 34. I bracket the question of who should make the choice of institutional design, Congress 
or the executive. That is a separate inquiry that raises distinct and complex questions.  
 35. Further, as I argue elsewhere, abstract principles of structural constitutionalism supply 
unreliable guides for current policymaking. See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as 
Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2012) (arguing against the use of 
structural inferences from separation-of-powers principles to policy outcomes in the 
counterterrorism domain). 
 36. I do not intend to suggest that normative considerations of fairness, justice, and 
reciprocity are unimportant, only that it is far more useful to analyze institutional-design choices 
in quantifiable metrics of accuracy and costs. Arguments couched in terms of normative 
terminology in the counterterrorism domain risk lapsing into declamatory solecisms with almost 
no tractable analytic content.  
 37. There is a related set of problems about duplication and exceptionalism. For example, 
rather than creating interjurisdictional redundancy, an institutional designer might wish to 
create jurisdictional redundancy within a specific court system by establishing a specialized 
Article III bench for terrorism cases or by increasing the number of levels of appellate review. 
Cf. Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 
379, 381 (1995) (arguing for investments in appellate review rather than a better trial process 
because “litigants possess information about the occurrence of error and appeals courts can 
frequently verify it”). Or the institutional designer might think it preferable to opt out of current 
jurisdictional arrangements entirely by the simple expedient of transferring suspects to third 
countries. To maintain tractability in the analysis, I have chosen not to address these extensions. 
My aim here is more narrow; I identify redundancy as an important parameter, and I nudge 
readers toward a more positive assessment of redundancy than is standard in the literature.  
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pervasiveness, and durability of such redundancy. Part III is the core 
of the Article. It presents a comprehensive typology of redundancy’s 
effects on policy outcomes. By systematically exploring mechanisms 
that link redundancy to policy outcomes, I provide a vocabulary for 
identifying the downstream consequences of changing forum-choice 
rules. I begin by focusing on the direct effects of jurisdictional 
specifications on accuracy and cost. I then consider indirect effects. 
Finally, Part IV applies the analytic framework developed in Part III 
to two popular reform ideas. The reform proposals I address are 
extreme in the sense that they wholly militate against the existence of 
any redundancy. Whatever uncertainty exists about more modest 
marginal changes to jurisdictional specifications, I contend that the 
wholesale elimination of redundancy is unlikely to have desirable 
effects. 
I.  PLURAL PATHWAYS IN TERRORIST DETENTION 
Imagine that federal authorities have identified, and wish to 
detain for a protracted period, a person they suspect is linked to a 
terrorist group. Perhaps, like Warsame, the person was detained 
overseas in a place over which no functioning state exercises legal 
control.38 Perhaps he was detained on U.S. soil upon arrival at an 
international entry point after having attempted to commit an act of 
terrorism en route.39 Or perhaps he was arrested in the Philadelphia 
suburbs for plotting attacks on Danish cartoonists perceived to have 
given religious insult.40 Whatever the circumstances of a suspect’s 
seizure, the government almost always has a range of venue choices. 
Depending on the available evidence about a suspect, the suspect’s 
nationality, the locus of capture, and other factors, federal authorities 
can select from the following forums to make determinations about 
the suspect’s potential long-term detention: Article III criminal 
 
 38. This is not an implausible scenario given the al Qaeda presence in both Yemen and 
Somalia. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 111TH CONG., AL QAEDA 
IN YEMEN AND SOMALIA: A TICKING TIME BOMB (Comm. Print 2010) (chronicling the 
movement of al Qaeda militants to Yemen and Somalia, areas with weak central governments). 
 39. See, e.g., Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, White House Review 
Summary Regarding 12/25/2009 Attempted Terrorist Attack (Jan. 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/white-house-review-summary-regarding-12252009-
attempted-terrorist-attack (describing an attempt by the Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab 
to explode a bomb on a Detroit-bound airplane). 
 40. Charlie Savage, American Indicted on Terror Charges in Plot To Kill Swedish 
Cartoonist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at A14 (describing the arrest of Colleen LaRose, a.k.a. 
“JihadJane”).  
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detention, material-witness detention, immigration-related detention, 
military detention for the purpose of prosecution in a military 
commission, and detention as an “enemy combatant.”41 
This Part maps these options as a prelude to defining and 
exploring the effects of jurisdictional redundancy.42 The government’s 
choice set can be reduced to two dimensions: First, should a detention 
be civilian or military? Second, should a detention turn on a criminal 
conviction or not? Table 1 summarizes the ensuing choice set. 
 
Table 1.  The Government’s Choice Set in Terrorist Detention 
 
 
 
 41. The government’s choice set is likely to be smallest when the suspect is a U.S. citizen 
detained in the United States. But even here, noncriminal detention under the material-witness 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006), and perhaps military detention may be available as a matter of 
current law.  
 42. I do not include venue options employed by other nations but not by the United States, 
such as a civilian system specifically designed for terrorist detention. I also do not address the 
question of why the government should use process at all. The government currently does not 
use process in all cases. For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan, no formal process external to the 
detaining entities is used. The U.S. targeted-killing program also operates without external 
oversight. Yet a wholesale move away from some degree of process seems unlikely. Process 
seems desirable as a sorting device to minimize errors, as a way to ensure internal discipline 
within the government, and as a means of minimizing reputational harms and maintaining rule-
of-law values.  
 43. The forum-choice analysis here is artificially cabined to American options. It would be 
possible to expand the analysis by including the possibility of opt-outs to other jurisdictions. 
Such transfers, however, seem to me to be relatively rare—or at least I have seen little evidence 
that they are occurring. To speculate, this may be because some states, such as those in Europe, 
demand compliance with costly legal rules to effect a transfer whereas others, such as Syria, 
Jordan, and other historical partners in intelligence cooperation, are not necessarily reliable or 
stable partners given the changes to Arab political regimes since the beginning of 2011.  
 44. There is a second military venue—the courts-martial system established under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. See 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2006) (vesting courts-martial with 
general jurisdiction over any person amenable to trial under the laws of war). But this possibility 
has not been raised seriously in ongoing debates about terrorist detention, and so it is not 
analyzed here. 
 Non-Criminal Criminal 
Civilian  Immigration-related detention 
 Material-witness detention 
 Article III criminal prosecution 
for a terrorism offense 
 Article III prosecution for non-
terrorism offenses 
 Extradition43 
Military  Enemy-combatant detention  Military commission44 
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The pathways identified in Table 1 differ along several 
dimensions. First, each has a different jurisdictional trigger.45 
Immigration detention, for example, is available only for noncitizens, 
whereas the criminal law can be applied to both citizens and 
noncitizens. Second, each venue is also linked to distinct substantive 
grounds for detention. The reach of federal criminal law or 
immigration law46 is, for instance, distinct from that of the military 
commissions.47 Third, each venue employs different procedural rules. 
Criminal processes tend to give more robust protections to detainees 
than noncriminal processes—for example, through the imposition of a 
higher burden of proof on the government, the defendant’s 
constitutional right to counsel, and the application of more stringent 
evidentiary rules regarding hearsay.48 
The procedural and substantive differences among pathways, 
however, should not be exaggerated. Professors Robert Chesney and 
Jack Goldsmith cogently argue that the gaps have narrowed such that 
a focus on the incremental differences in procedural and substantive-
law frameworks may obscure more significant functional congruence 
among the various bundles of procedural and substantive rules 
employed in different forums.49 Professors Chesney and Goldsmith 
are surely right to some degree, although significant procedural 
differences still distinguish venues. Extending their insight, I argue 
that it is profitable to focus on the institutional architecture of forum 
choice rather than on discrete procedural or substantive differences. 
A threshold caveat to the analysis is in order. As Table 1 
indicates, my focus in this Article is the government’s forum-choice 
architecture and its relationship to officials’ incentives and behavior. 
The analysis might be extended in two ways: First, I could account for 
the possibility of officials’ ultra vires options, such as the use of 
clearly illegal forms of detention or transfer. For the purposes of this 
 
 45. For example, the statutory authority for immigration courts is provided in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1329 (2006), for military commissions in 10 U.S.C. § 817 (2006), and for criminal trials in 18 
U.S.C. § 3231 (2006).  
 46. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006) (listing the grounds for deportation). 
 47. See 10 U.S.C. § 950t (Supp. IV 2010) (listing offenses). 
 48. Article III courts also provide more robust protections than military commissions. For 
a helpful primer on the procedural differences between military commissions and Article III 
courts, see JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40932, COMPARISON OF RIGHTS IN 
MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS AND TRIALS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURT 8–24 (2010). 
 49. Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 1800–01; see also ELSEA, supra note 48, at 1–7 
(noting the remaining differences). 
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analysis, however, I have chosen to make the assumption that officials 
are relatively law-abiding. Second, I could incorporate the detainee’s 
choice set. At first blush, it might appear that detainees have little 
freedom of choice because they never select the forum used for their 
status adjudication. Nevertheless, several forms of strategic behavior 
by detainees are conceivable. First, they might attempt to evade 
military jurisdiction by seeking injunctive relief in federal court.50 
Second, they might invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction to relitigate 
previously rendered status determinations following a release.51 Third, 
the availability of habeas corpus review of military detention might 
itself be seen as a form of redundancy that allows detainees to 
allocate resources strategically between first-round and second-round 
reviews.52 In light of these possibilities, one could imagine 
jurisdictional schemes that vest detainees with a wider range of 
options as a means of encouraging Pareto-optimal deals. Consider, 
for example, the operation of plea agreements in counterterrorism 
cases in which leniency is exchanged for valuable information.53 Could 
that model be extended to allow trades of information for procedural 
protection? Or would such a system have perverse and undesirable 
outcomes? Although I recognize the importance of these questions, I 
do not address them here. I focus on interactions between 
institutional design and government behavior, interactions that are 
both less studied and arguably more consequential for the basic 
architecture of forum choice. 
 
 50. See, e.g., Khadr v. Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 (D.D.C. 2008) (rejecting a detainee’s 
request for a stay of military-commission proceedings). 
 51. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 771 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (rejecting damages actions 
on qualified-immunity grounds).  
 52. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2270 (2008) (discussing a detainee’s right 
on review to supplement the record with exculpatory evidence not previously presented in prior 
proceedings). Given the stakes for individual defendants, however, I am skeptical that adding 
civilian court review to a military hearing would have much marginal effect on a defendant’s 
efforts in a first-round review process.  
 53. One study found that 59.8 percent of terrorism prosecutions between 2001 and 2009 
ended in plea deals. See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS 
FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
2009 UPDATE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, at 9 fig.7.  
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A. Article III Criminal Prosecutions 
Notwithstanding controversy over its continued use in the 
terrorism context,54 the criminal-justice system has been the most 
numerically significant terrorist-detention tool outside of the active 
battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan. One empirical study identifies 
998 defendants who were indicted in what the U.S. Department of 
Justice characterized as “terrorism prosecutions” between September 
2001 and September 2010.55 Of that number, 87 percent of the 
defendants were convicted on at least one charge.56 Another study, 
analyzing data from the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, 
identifies 8896 individuals referred for terrorism-related prosecution 
between fiscal years 2004 and 2008.57 The frequency of terrorism 
trials, however, has not been constant across time, as Figure 1 
illustrates.  
Figure 1.  Terrorism Prosecutions Filed in Federal Court58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54. See, e.g., Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen. of the U.S., Statement of the Attorney 
General on the Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://www.
justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110404.html (noting opposition to the use of 
Article III courts in certain high-profile cases). For a perspective on battlefield detentions in 
Iraq, see Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand Perspectives 
from the Other War, 2003–2010, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 549 (2011). My own experience as counsel for 
U.S. detainees in Iraq is not wholly consistent with Professor Chesney’s presentation, but his 
article nonetheless contains many valuable insights. 
 55. CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001–SEPTEMBER 11, 2010, at 4 (2010), available at http://www.lawandsecurity
.org/Portals/0/documents/01_TTRC2010Final1.pdf. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Who Is a Terrorist?: Government Failure To Define Terrorism Undermines 
Enforcement, Puts Civil Liberties at Risk, TRAC REP. (Sept. 28, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/trac
reports/terrorism/215. 
 58. As Terrorism Prosecutions Decline, Extent of Threat Remains Unclear, TRAC REP. 
(May 18, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/231. 
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Use of the criminal system for counterterrorism peaked in 2002 
and declined sharply thereafter. Nevertheless, the volume of 
prosecutions in 2012 is still about three times pre-2001 levels. 
What offenses are charged in these prosecutions? Material-
support offenses play a major role.59 One analysis of “the [fifty] 
highest-profile non-financial” terrorism cases in the post-9/11 decade 
finds that 80 percent of convictions involved one of the four federal 
material-support offenses.60 Congress first enacted a material-support 
prohibition in 1994 to criminalize knowingly aiding or abetting 
enumerated terrorist acts, which were defined in relation to offenses 
that were already enumerated in the U.S. Code.61 Congress added a 
second material-support crime in the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996.62 This second material-support offense 
applies to knowingly aiding foreign organizations designated as 
“terrorist” by the secretary of state.63 After being whittled down 
through First Amendment challenges,64 the provision that prohibits 
providing material support to designated groups survived a 
constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court in 2010.65 After the 
September 11 attacks, Congress further amended the material-
 
 59. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the 
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 446–92 (2007) (reviewing the use of 
material-support statutes).  
 60. CTR. ON LAW & SEC., supra note 55, at 6, 13 fig.14.  
 61. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec. 
120005(a), § 2339A, 108 Stat. 1796, 2022–23 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006)). 
The statute defines terrorist acts by reference to other provisions in the U.S. Code. A common 
material-support theory will allege violations of 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2006), which criminalizes the 
conspiracy to murder, maim, or injure persons in a foreign country. E.g., Indictment at 1, United 
States v. Mohamed, No. 0:09-cr-00352-RHK-JJG (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 2009) (charging material 
support under 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1)(2006)). 
 62. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, sec. 
303(a), § 2339B, 110 Stat. 1214, 1250 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B). 
 63. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1), (d)(4) (2006) (vesting the secretary of state with designation 
authority). 
 64. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(invalidating two varieties of material support as impermissibly vague). 
 65. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2010) (rejecting the 
plaintiff’s challenge to the applications of 29 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006), one of several material-
support provisions); cf. Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (exploring the difficulty of reconciling Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
130 S. Ct. 2705, with standard First Amendment doctrine).  
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support statute to extend its reach to terrorism financing66 and 
attendance at foreign terrorist training camps.67 By expanding the 
statute along these dimensions, Congress ensured that the material-
support prohibition—like prohibitions dealing with other terrorism-
related offenses—applies without regard to citizenship68 or 
geography.69 Thus, a May 2011 indictment lodged in the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Kentucky charged two noncitizens 
with raising money in Kentucky and planting explosives in Iraq—all 
under a material-support rubric.70 This indictment suggests how 
varied the actus reus requirement for material support can be. In 
addition, it is very difficult to challenge the designations of 
organizations as “terrorist” for the purpose of the material-support 
statutes.71 
Absent evidence of a terrorism offense, prosecutors also exploit 
the wide array of regulatory and financial offenses that are available 
under federal law to secure what some have called “pretextual” 
convictions.72 Like the famous tax prosecution of Al Capone, 
pretextual prosecutions employ one of the federal law’s diverse 
semiregulatory offenses, such as wire fraud or making 
misrepresentations to a federal official, to impose hefty penalties on 
 
 66. Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-197, tit. II, sec. 202(a), § 2339C, 116 Stat. 724, 724–27 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2339C (2006)). 
 67. Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Enhancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
458, tit. VI, subtit. G, sec. 6602, § 2339D, 118 Stat. 3761, 3761–62 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339D 
(2006)). 
 68. The offense of treason may be limited by citizenship. But see Carlton F.W. Larson, The 
Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 863, 877–78 (2006) (suggesting English precedent for the prosecution of aliens for 
treason). Even if treason is limited to citizens, the substantively cognate sedition conspiracy, 18 
U.S.C. § 2384 (2006), can be used against noncitizens. See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 
103, 111–16 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (discussing the relation of treason to seditious 
conspiracy). 
 69. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(d), 2339C(b)(2), 2339D(b) (2006).  
 70. Indictment at 1–4, United States v. Alwan, No. 1:11 CR-13-R (W.D. Ky. Apr. 14, 2011), 
available at http://assets.nationaljournal.com/pdf/Unsealed_Alwan_Hammadi_Indictment.pdf; 
see also McConnell, supra note 5 (noting the nationalities of the defendants). 
 71. See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (rejecting a challenge to the designation). But see People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. 
Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d 220, 225–28 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding in favor of a designated 
organization).  
 72. E.g., Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Essay, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on 
the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 618–24 (2005). 
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defendants.73 Warsame, for example, was charged with use or 
possession of a firearm in connection to a crime of violence, an 
offense with a mandatory minimum sentence of thirty years.74 
Because the substance of federal criminal law is expansively defined,75 
pretextual prosecutions are easy to gin up.76 Factoring in terrorism-
related sentencing enhancements, the resulting penalties can be 
daunting.77 
B. Noncriminal Civil Detention 
Even in the absence of criminal culpability, Article III courts can 
be tools for detention based on federal immigration powers or the 
statutory authority to detain “material witnesses.” These forms of 
civil detention do not entail the searching burdens of proof imposed 
by the criminal law but also do not permit imprisonment for years—
as opposed to mere days or months.78 Both were employed 
extensively after September 2001. A Department of Justice inspector 
general’s report found that at least 1182 noncitizens had been held 
under immigration powers in relation to post-9/11 investigations.79 
This expansive use of immigration powers was facilitated by both the 
existence of reserve capacity within what was then the Immigration 
 
 73. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (prohibiting efforts to conceal material facts). 
 74. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Accused al Shabaab 
Leader Charged with Providing Material Support to al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula 3 (July 5, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July11/
warsameindictmentpr.pdf (describing the indictment).  
 75. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 507 (2001) (“American criminal law, federal and state, is very broad; it covers far more 
conduct than any jurisdiction could possibly punish.”). 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Arnaout, 282 F. Supp. 2d 838, 843 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (discussing 
a plea agreement to wire-fraud charges after material-support charges were dropped). 
 77. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2011) (describing a 
terrorism-related sentencing enhancement). 
 78. Unlike in the United Kingdom, technological restraints are not used as substitutes for 
detention in the security context. Compare Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 
1321, 1328–45 (2008) (discussing such restraints), with Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. AF, 
[2010] A.C. 2 (H.L.) [64] (appeal taken from Eng.) (establishing a balancing test to determine 
whether detainees have the right to information about the reasons for their detention).  
 79. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 1 & n.2 (2003), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf; see also Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 99 n.7 (D.D.C. 2002) (“On November 5, 2001, [the 
Department of Justice] indicated that 1,182 people had been detained.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  
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and Naturalization Service as well as by a series of regulatory 
changes. These regulatory changes included loosening the 
requirement that immigration detainees be charged within forty-eight 
hours of their arrest80 and expanding the use of closed deportation 
hearings.81 The immigration-detention power has not been applied as 
extensively since 2002, but the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) has developed a supplemental suite of terrorism-related tools 
to integrate into routine immigration law enforcement. These tools 
include a targeting of general enforcement resources toward certain 
nationalities,82 a “voluntary” program of call-in interviews that has led 
to 3216 noncitizens’ being questioned on national-security matters,83 
and a tracking-and-registration program that requires nationals of 
twenty-five majority-Muslim countries to register their entries and 
exits and report for periodic interviews.84 
The relative desuetude of emergency-detention powers does not 
mean that immigration powers have run their course as 
counterterrorism tools. To the contrary, tools developed after 2001 
remain on the rack for later use.85 In April 2011, the DHS announced 
the termination of its tracking-and-registration program but 
cautioned that “the underlying . . . regulation . . . remain[s] in place in 
 
 80. See Disposition of Cases of Aliens Arrested Without Warrant, 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) 
(2011) (providing an exception to the forty-eight-hour requirement for “emergenc[ies] or other 
extraordinary circumstance[s]”). These expansions of immigration powers allow the negative 
inference that there was unused legal authority and institutional capacity within the immigration 
system before September 2001.  
 81. Memorandum from Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to All Immigration 
Judges & Court Adm’rs 4 (Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://www.cnss.org/creppy%20memo
.pdf. 
 82. Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen. of the U.S., to Comm’r, 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Dir., U.S. Marshals 
Serv., & U.S. Attorneys 1 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/
abscndr012502mem.pdf.  
 83. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-459, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S PROJECT TO 
INTERVIEW ALIENS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, at 5 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03459.pdf. 
 84. The National Security Entry and Exit Registration System (NSEERS) was initially 
applied only to nationals of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria, but was extended through three 
subsequent regulations. See Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated 
Countries, 68 Fed. Reg. 2363, 2364 (Jan. 16, 2003) (enumerating previous iterations of the 
policy).  
 85. For examples of post-9/11 regulatory changes that remain in effect, see, for example, 8 
C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2011) (allowing noncitizens to be arrested without being charged, provided 
that an immigration charge is lodged within a “reasonable period of time”); and id. 
§ 10003.19(i)(2) (allowing for automatic stays of release orders when immigration authorities 
appeal a grant of release on bond).  
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the event a special registration program is needed again.”86 
Constitutional constraints on the conscription of immigration law as 
an emergency-detention power are also weak. In two cases in 2001 
and 2003, respectively, the Supreme Court endorsed limited 
postadjudicative detention of noncitizens deemed removable and 
preadjudicative detention in the absence of individualized bond 
determinations.87 Since then, a majority of the Court has expressed 
“no surprise” that security-related immigration measures have “a 
disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims.”88 Such implicit 
endorsement of disparate impact, coupled with the Court’s default 
reluctance to probe officials’ motives,89 eliminates most equality-
related constraints on the use of immigration powers. 
Unlike immigration powers, the federal courts’ authority to 
detain witnesses with “material” evidence related to a “criminal 
proceeding” extends across citizenship boundaries and might 
conceivably be applied extraterritorially.90 After September 2001, it 
was used to detain at least seventy persons in alleged relation to 
criminal trials or grand-jury investigations.91 Developing 
jurisprudence casts some doubt on the breadth of material-witness 
 
 86. Letter from Margo Schlanger, Officer for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., to Colleagues (Apr. 27, 2011) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 87. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Court endorsed the detention for up to 
six months of an alien found deportable, id. at 705, whereas in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 
(2003), the Court authorized preadjudication detention without individualized determinations 
of flight risk, id. at 557–58. 
 88. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct 1937, 1951 (2009).  
 89. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2011) (stating, in a challenge to the 
allegedly racially discriminatory use of the material-witness statute, that the Court “has almost 
uniformly rejected invitations to probe subjective intent,” and declining to do so in that case). 
 90. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006) (stating that “the testimony of a person is material in a 
criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence 
of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person”); cf. Judiciary 
Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (granting like power). Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, “[a] witness . . . detained under 18 U.S.C. § 3144 [2006] may request to be deposed 
by filing a written motion and giving notice to the parties,” after which the court “may discharge 
the witness.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15. There is no obvious reason that Ahmed Warsame, for example, 
could not have been held as a material witness for some period of time, perhaps in relation to 
criminal cases against other members of al Qaeda.  
 91. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS TO ABUSE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER THE 
MATERIAL WITNESS LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, at 1–5 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/
reports/2005/us0605/us0605.pdf; see also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 52–60 (2d Cir. 
2003) (holding that the material-witness power extends to grand juries as well as criminal trials). 
In Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011), the material-witness statute was applied to a U.S. 
citizen. Although I am not aware of any extraterritorial use of the statute, no clear reason 
suggests that it could not be used extraterritorially.  
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detention for future national-security ends. Hearing a Fourth 
Amendment challenge in 2011, the Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that allegations of pretextual use of the material-witness 
statute could be sufficient to overcome the qualified immunity of 
cabinet-level officials.92 But four Justices expressed concerns about 
what Justice Kennedy framed as the question of “when material 
witness arrests might be consistent with statutory and constitutional 
requirements.”93 
C. Military Commissions 
In November 2001, President Bush established unusual 
adjudicative bodies called military commissions and vested them with 
trial jurisdiction over noncitizen members of al Qaeda and others who 
had “engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of 
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have 
caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or 
adverse effects on the United States.”94 Proceedings were slow to 
begin.95 In June 2006, after a desultory number of commission 
hearings, the Supreme Court invalidated the president’s executive 
order authorizing the military commissions on the ground that it 
exceeded the limited statutory authority for such commissions in the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice.96 Congress responded in 2006 with 
a new legislative authorization for the commissions, albeit one that 
contained more robust procedural protections for defendants.97 In 
2009, Congress followed up with further rules that were even more 
 
 92. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079, 2085 (dismissing the petitioner’s action under Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) on this basis). 
 93. Id. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“Whether the Fourth Amendment permits the pretextual use of a material witness warrant for 
preventive detention of an individual whom the Government has no intention of using at trial 
is . . . a closer question than the majority’s opinion suggests.”). 
 94. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 3 C.F.R. 918, 919 (2002), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. 
app. at 856, 857 (2006).  
 95. See generally David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil 
over the Guantánamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 147–68 (2008) 
(describing the promulgation of rules and initial hearings). 
 96. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006); see also Glazier, supra note 95, at 173 
(listing ongoing proceedings in June 2006). 
 97. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2010)); see also Robert 
Chesney, The Least Worst Venue, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.foreign
policy.com/articles/2011/01/21/the_least_worst_venue (noting “substantially greater” procedural 
protections). 
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hospitable to defendants.98 The progressive melioration of defendants’ 
entitlements within the commission structure means that the gap 
between criminal procedural rights available in Article III courts and 
those of the commissions has diminished. The principal remaining 
procedural gaps concern the potential admission of some hearsay 
evidence—including, at least potentially, the use of evidence derived 
from torture or degrading treatment—and the possible admission of 
defendants’ involuntary statements.99 
Like immigration detention under Article III, the military-
commission route is not universally available. The 2009 statute limits 
commission jurisdiction to any “unprivileged enemy belligerent.”100 
This category is defined to include persons who are “part of al 
Qaeda” or who “engaged in hostilities against the United States.”101 
Congress has further specified that offenses can be tried by 
commission only “if . . . committed in the context of and associated 
with hostilities.”102 One odd consequence of this jurisdictional rule is 
that it forces military prosecutors to provide proof of a defendant’s 
connections to a terrorist group in every case, a requirement that a 
civilian prosecutor using the tools described in Part I.A would often 
not have to satisfy. Somewhat counterintuitively, a military 
commission may sometimes require the introduction of more 
classified evidence than would a parallel civilian prosecution. 
Despite their potential jurisdictional breadth, military 
commissions have been used to process only a trivial number of 
suspected terrorists. Between 2006 and 2009, only six individuals were 
sentenced in the statutory military commissions—four after plea 
bargains.103 Despite this less-than-stellar record, enthusiasm for 
commissions is unflagging. In April 2011, under pressure from 
Congress, Attorney General Eric Holder referred six more cases 
 
 98. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 118-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2574 
(codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 99. See ELSEA, supra note 48, at 10–11, 19–20 (comparing procedural safeguards among 
the different courts concerning the right to remain silent and the right to examine adverse 
witnesses); see also 10 U.S.C. § 949a (Supp. IV 2010) (granting the secretary of defense the 
authority to promulgate procedural rules for the commissions that deviate from general courts-
martial rules, but also constraining such authority).  
 100. 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a).  
 101. Id. §§ 948a(7)(A), (C), 948c.  
 102. Id. § 950p(c). The statute further defines hostilities to include “any conflict subject to 
the laws of war.” Id. § 948a(9). 
 103. Carol Rosenberg, Terror Trainer Admits Role in al Qaeda Conspiracy, MIAMI 
HERALD, Feb. 16, 2011, at A4. 
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involving alleged high-level al Qaeda leaders and the perpetrators of 
the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole to military commissions.104 A June 
2011 decision from a military appeals court endorsed the use of 
material-support offenses in a military context.105 If upheld on appeal, 
this ruling would mean that the substance of military-commission 
jurisdiction and criminal terrorism prosecution would be close to 
coextensive in some ways.106 
D. Military Detention of Enemy Combatants 
In contrast to its sparing use of military commissions, the 
government initially relied heavily on military detention under the 
September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).107 
Until 2008, AUMF-related detentions of so-called enemy combatants 
were conducted without judicial process.108 Many military detainees 
were held at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba.109 From 2002 
to 2004, it is unclear whether detainees obtained meaningful judicial 
process beyond what was accorded on the battlefield. In 2004, when 
judicial review appeared imminent, the military began convening 
internal hearings called “Combatant Status Review Tribunals” 
(CSRTs) to review individual cases.110 By then, Guantánamo had 
 
 104. Holder, supra note 54 (listing five referrals); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., DOD 
Announces Charges Sworn Against Detainee Nashiri (Apr. 20, 2011), available at http://www.
defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14424. 
 105. Defendants convicted under the 2006 military-commissions statute on material-support 
grounds challenged their convictions by arguing that the law of war contained no such offense. 
In June 2011, the en banc United States Court of Military Commission Review—issuing its very 
first opinion—rejected those arguments, drawing on evidence of the criminalization of 
analogous conduct through international conventions and by international criminal tribunals. 
United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1312–13 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. 2011); see also 
United States v. Al Bahlul, No. CMCR 09-001, 2011 WL 4916373, at *38 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. 
Sept. 9, 2011) (upholding a second conviction on material-support grounds). 
 106. Military commissions, like civilian criminal trials, allow for the death penalty. Carol 
Rosenberg, No Plans Yet for Detainee Executions, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 11, 2011, at A5. 
 107. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). See generally Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26 
CONST. COMMENT. 385 (2010) (summarizing the history of Guantánamo detentions).  
 108. The first adjudication on the merits of the status of a Guantánamo detainee was in 
Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
 109. A global network of other facilities also existed. For a useful survey, see JONATHAN 
HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S NEW GLOBAL DETENTION 
SYSTEM 31–45 (2010).  
 110. See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy 
(July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf 
(relaying an “Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal”). The Wolfowitz 
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already attracted much public criticism, and the Supreme Court had 
issued opinions that allowed detainees there to bring habeas corpus 
challenges to their detentions.111 The establishment of CSRTs did not 
stanch criticism. To the contrary, criticism continued on the ground 
that the CSRTs had been organized to produce the results that 
government officials sought ex ante.112 Since 2008, pursuant to 
procedural rules crafted by the district courts, litigation has 
proceeded in Washington, D.C., federal courts respecting the legality 
of those detentions.113 
The extension of habeas corpus jurisdiction to Guantánamo and 
a plethora of challenges in the lower courts have not, however, 
meaningfully changed patterns of detentions at the Cuban base in the 
way some hoped and others feared.114 In the aggregate, 779 people 
have been detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, of whom 600 
have been released.115 That is, military detention—at least outside the 
formal theaters of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan—has not been as 
numerically significant as Article III criminal prosecutions, even if it 
has received much more media attention. Figure 2 illustrates 
 
memorandum was a preemptive response to the possibility of judicial review created by Rasul v. 
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).  
 111. In Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that detainees at the Cuban base could employ 
statutory habeas jurisdiction to challenge the lawfulness of their detentions. 542 U.S. at 480. In 
2005 and 2006, Congress attempted to extinguish that jurisdiction, only to have the Court reject 
those efforts on Suspension Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, grounds. Boumediene v. Bush, 
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).  
 112. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantanamo: The Boumediene 
Decision, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 43 (noting the concern that CSRTs were organized to produce 
specific results); see also Reply to Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Al Odah v. 
United States, 127 S. Ct. 3067 (2007) (mem.) (No. 06-1196), 2007 WL 922261, at *2 (arguing that 
“[a]ny review process . . . that limits the court to determining whether the jailor has followed its 
own rules, and precludes an inquiry into whether the rules themselves are adequate and more 
than an empty shell, cannot be an adequate or effective substitute for habeas”).  
 113. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-0442 (TFH), Civil Action Nos. 
02-cv-0828 et al., 2008 WL 4858241 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008) (setting out the procedural 
framework for the litigation), amended by Zadran v. Bush, Civil No. 05-CV-2367 (RWR), 2009 
WL 498083 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2009). 
 114. Huq, supra note 107, at 402–04. The fruitlessness of judicial review is unlikely to change 
soon. One judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit—which has 
become the de facto final court of review in detainee cases—has cautioned that, whatever legal 
standards are used, he “doubt[ed] any of [his] colleagues [would] vote to grant a petition if he or 
she believe[d] that it [were] somewhat likely that the petitioner [was] an al Qaeda adherent or 
an active supporter.” Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., 
concurring). 
 115. The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (last 
updated Feb. 15, 2012). 
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Guantánamo’s changing population. Like criminal and immigration 
law, military detention saw its greatest use in 2002 and experienced a 
decline in popularity thereafter. 
 
Figure 2.  Number of Prisoners Reported at Guantánamo116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although courts have not changed the aggregate dynamics of 
military detention, politics has. In January 2009, President Obama 
promulgated an executive order that envisaged an eventual end to 
detention operations at Guantánamo.117 Political opposition to his 
proposal was distilled into appropriations riders that prohibited 
transfers of prisoners from the base.118 And Obama’s meliorist 
procedural changes, such as a new system of periodic internal review, 
have had scant impact on the release rate so far.119 
 
 116. This chart reports biannual changes in the Guantánamo detainee population based on 
Pentagon press statements. That is, I have taken Pentagon statements from the beginning and 
the middle of each calendar year—or as close as are available—and reported the detainee 
population on these dates. For more details on data, including sources and more detailed 
reporting of the same data, see Huq, supra note 107, at 402–04. 
 117. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 3 C.F.R. 203, 203 (2010).  
 118. See, e.g., Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. 
No. 111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351 (prohibiting the expenditure of Pentagon funds on 
detainee transfers); Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103, 123 
Stat. 1859, 1920 (same). See generally Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, How the White House 
Lost on Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2011, at A1 (describing efforts in Congress to 
oppose detainee transfer). 
 119. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277, 13,277–79 (Mar. 7, 2011) (establishing 
“Periodic Review Board[s]” to conduct counseled annual status hearings). Since Congress has 
prohibited transfers from the base, see supra note 118 and accompanying text, the executive 
order has not had any effect on releases.  
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The future substantive breadth of military detention is not clear. 
It is settled that the AUMF allows detention of both citizens and 
noncitizens.120 Some circuit court precedent also endorses detention of 
citizens seized in the United States.121 Since March 2009, the 
Department of Justice has argued that it is lawful to detain 
persons that the President determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, . . . persons who harbored those responsible for 
those attacks[, and] . . . persons who were part of, or substantially 
supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are 
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners.122  
That definition was reiterated in the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (2012 NDAA), which “affirm[ed]” the 
executive’s authority to detain, inter alia, persons “who planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided” the September 11 attacks and 
anyone who “was a part of or substantially supported al Qaeda, the 
Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities in aid of 
such enemy forces.”123 The “substantially supported” language of the 
2012 NDAA creates broad latitude for military detention. Before the 
 
 120. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517–19 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Congress has 
in fact authorized [a citizen’s] detention, through the AUMF.”). 
 121. See, e.g., Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 393–95 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that the AUMF 
authorizes the president to detain a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant even if the citizen is 
arrested on U.S. soil). 
 122. Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Respondent’s Revised Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority 
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 3, In Re: Guantanamo Bay Litigation, 613 F. 
Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009) (Nos. 05-1347 (GK), 05-1601 (GK), OS-1678 (GK), and 06-1684 
(GK)), ECF No. 174). 
 123. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA 2012), Pub. L. No. 
112-81, § 1021(b)(1)–(2) (2011), PL 112-81 (Westlaw). The provision goes on to disclaim any 
attempt “to limit or expand the authority of the President or the scope of the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force” or to “affect existing laws or authorities relating to the detention of 
United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any other persons who are 
captured or arrested in the United States.” Id. § 1021(d)–(e). There is an obvious puzzle as to 
how these caveats can be squared with the statute’s new definition of military-detention 
authority. One way of reconciling the different parts of the statute is to observe that Congress 
basically codified the judiciary’s construction of the 2001 AUMF as applied to overseas captures 
and detentions, including judges’ reliance on “the law of war,” id. § 1021(c), while leaving open 
those question that have divided federal courts, such as the scope of military-detention authority 
in the United States. This was not the only proposed change to detention authority. See, e.g., 
Enemy Belligerent Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of 2010, S. 3081, 111th Cong. 
§ 5 (2010) (proposing expansion of the enemy combatant category to include citizens). 
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2012 NDAA’s enactment, the D.C. Circuit suggested that it would 
accept even more ambitious claims of detention authority.124 The D.C. 
Circuit also suggested that it would demand only a preponderance of 
the evidence to uphold the government’s decisions to detain 
suspects.125 
*          *          * 
In sum, the government’s choice set with respect to terrorist 
detention can be separated into the four quadrants illustrated in 
Table 1 for the purpose of analysis. Empirical data suggests that 
Article III criminal prosecution has been the workhorse, although 
military detention of enemy combatants frequently has been used. 
Overall, the volume of detention has declined as 9/11 has receded in 
time. 
II.  THE UBIQUITY OF JURISDICTIONAL REDUNDANCY 
Part I emphasizes the heterogeneity of long-term terrorist-
detention options. This Part identifies jurisdictional redundancy as a 
common thread weaving together those multiple pathways of terrorist 
detention. 
A. Defining Jurisdictional Redundancy 
As used in this Article, the term “jurisdictional redundancy” 
refers to the government’s option to subject the same individual to 
two or more different adjudicative venues for the purpose of 
determining the legality of continued detention. I also assume here 
that forums behave independently of each other. It is a sign of 
redundancy that the government must decide which of multiple 
venues to use to adjudicate the status of a suspected terrorist.126 
 
 124. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (suggesting that the 
AUMF allows the detention of any person who can be tried in a military commission); see also 
Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (suggesting that anyone who 
“purposefully and materially support[s]” al Qaeda can be detained); accord Hatim v. Gates, 632 
F.3d 720, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Case law in the D.C. Circuit defining the scope of 
AUMF-related detention has basically ignored the Fourth Circuit’s holdings in Padilla v. Hanft, 
423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), and Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 125. E.g., Uthman, 637 F.3d at 403 n.3; Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1104–05 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 126. This is not the only way to define overlap, but it is the definition most useful in the 
context. For instance, Professors Sah and Stiglitz distinguish between polyarchies, in which 
there are several competing decisionmakers, and hierarchies. Sah & Stiglitz, supra note 23, at 
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Redundancy can take two forms: simultaneous or sequential.127 First, 
two jurisdictional pathways can be simultaneous substitutes, such that 
the government must opt between them. For example, press reports 
suggested that when the government identified a group of suspected 
terrorists in Lackawanna, New York, in 2002, senior policymakers 
deliberated as to whether to channel them into the criminal-justice 
system or the military-detention system before the suspects had been 
arrested.128 Second, jurisdictional pathways can be sequential 
complements. In those situations, the government has the choice to 
use a second forum once a first adjudication comes to an unsuccessful 
close. Thus, if the initial forum does not yield the outcome sought by 
the government, government officials retain the option of switching to 
another jurisdictional pathway. Although I discuss some examples in 
the next Section, notice that if one of the Lackawanna suspects had 
been acquitted, the government might have invoked sequential 
redundancy by switching the suspect into military detention. 
Jurisdictional redundancy requires the government to have at its 
disposal multiple institutions capable of undertaking similar 
adjudicative functions. This requirement suggests that at any given 
time there is reserve capacity in the overall system that can be tapped 
even if it is not continuously in use.129 Stated differently, the use of 
jurisdictional redundancy suggests that the government has the power 
either to expand the use of existing forums or to create new ones to 
address emergent exigencies. 
B. Examples of Jurisdictional Redundancy 
Jurisdictional redundancy is a pervasive feature of the 
government’s choice set in dealing with a terrorist suspect. The 
ubiquity of jurisdictional redundancy can be documented by 
 
716. The design choices in this adjudicative context do not exactly map onto these categories, 
but they are similar. 
 127. See Allan W. Lerner, There Is More than One Way To Be Redundant: A Comparison of 
Alternatives for the Design and Use of Redundancy in Organizations, 18 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 334, 
336 (1986) (offering a typology of redundant institutional-design choices and comparing their 
advantages and disadvantages).  
 128. Michael Powell, No Choice but Guilty, WASH. POST, July 29, 2003, at A1 (describing 
how Article III criminal prosecution was chosen). 
 129. Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 
29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346, 349 (1969) (characterizing redundancy as the addition of “reserve 
power” that can act as a “safety-factor”). Not all forms of overlap lead to redundancy of this 
kind: it is possible to describe a mandatory hierarchical structure, such as a trial proceeding 
followed by a mandatory appeal, as containing redundancy. Sah & Stiglitz, supra note 23, at 716.  
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cataloging cases in which suspects have been moved from one 
jurisdictional channel to another—cases involving the sequential use 
of two forums. In all of these cases, it is worth emphasizing that the 
government had an initial choice between pathways as 
contemporaneous substitutes. Although this choice is implicit in the 
structure of the law, in most instances, no extrinsic evidence of active 
consideration of the various options is publicly available because of 
classification rules. 
1. From Article III Criminal Proceedings to Immigration Removal 
Proceedings.  Immigration authority has been invoked when a 
criminal prosecution against a noncitizen fails to produce a conviction 
and double-jeopardy rules preclude criminal retrial. Haitian national 
Lyglenson Lemorin, for example, was arrested based on allegations 
that he and five other members of a Moorish Science Temple sect had 
conspired to attack the Willis Tower in Chicago and various Federal 
Bureau of Investigation buildings nationally.130 After he was acquitted 
of criminal charges, Lemorin was placed in removal proceedings and 
then deported based on substantially the same factual allegations.131 
But the government does not always prevail in a second and 
subsequent proceeding of this sort. In another case, a University of 
South Florida student was charged with transporting explosives after 
being arrested with model-rocket propellant.132 After being acquitted 
of a material-support offense, the student was placed in deportation 
proceedings but ultimately was found not deportable.133 
2. From Immigration Detention to Article III Criminal 
Proceedings.  When immigration powers are employed as a first-
 
 130. After two mistrials, Lemorin’s five codefendants were convicted in 2009. Vanessa 
Blum, 5 of Liberty City 6 Guilty, CHI. TRIB., May 13, 2009, § 1, at 14. News reports refer to the 
Sears Tower, which has since been renamed. 
 131. See Lemorin v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 416 Fed. App’x 35, 38–39 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam) (finding Lemorin removable); Jay Weaver & Jacqueline Charles, Virtual Hookup 
Connects Grieving Haitian Father to Miami Family, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 16, 2011, at B4 
(“Although Lemorin was acquitted, immigration authorities still deemed him a ‘national 
security’ threat under the U.S. Patriot Act passed after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.”).  
 132. Jay Weaver, ‘Double Jeopardy’ for Accused, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 31, 2009, at B1.  
 133. Id. Another possible interaction between the criminal and immigration systems arises 
when deportation is part of a plea agreement. See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, Former Fla. Professor 
To Be Deported, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2006, at A3 (“Former Florida professor Sami al-Arian 
pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to provide support to a Palestinian terrorist 
organization and agreed to be deported from the United States in a deal with federal 
prosecutors . . . .”).  
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round response to a security emergency, a downstream method of 
dealing with those detained is Article III criminal prosecution. Given 
how well suited immigration powers might seem for pretextual 
temporary detention—at least of noncitizens—it is perhaps surprising 
how infrequently such pretextual detention occurs. After the 
immigration roundups that followed the September 2001 attacks, civil 
removal proceedings tended to be the principal alternative to release, 
and a June 2003 Department of Justice investigation into the 
detentions identified only twelve cases in which an immigration 
detainee had been charged criminally.134 
3. From Article III Criminal Proceedings to Enemy-Combatant 
Detention or Military-Commission Jurisdiction.  Persons originally 
seized in the United States on suspicion of terrorism were later 
detained as enemy combatants in only two cases. In both cases, the 
suspects, U.S. citizen José Padilla and Qatari national Ali Salah al-
Marri, were initially held in the criminal-justice system. Upon his 
arrival at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago, Padilla was first 
detained as a material witness in anticipation of an indictment but 
was then transferred into military custody as an “enemy 
combatant.”135 Similarly, after his arrest in Peoria, Illinois, al-Marri 
was subject to multiple, superseding federal indictments, first in 
Illinois and then in New York, before being designated an “enemy 
combatant.” Following this designation, the indictment against him 
was dismissed with prejudice.136 As of 2012, the Padilla and al-Marri 
cases were outliers. Nevertheless, the government has the option, at 
least on paper, to follow the precedent set by those cases. Operative 
precedent in the five states that make up the Fourth Circuit permits 
the government to detain citizens, at least in some circumstances, as 
enemy combatants even within the United States.137 
 
 134. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 79, at 30. 
 135. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426 
(2004). 
 136. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 165 (4th Cir. 2007) (recounting the charging history 
and dismissal). The author of this Article was counsel to al-Marri. 
 137. See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 391 (4th Cir. 2005) (concluding, by analogy to the 
facts in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion), that Padilla’s detention was 
authorized). Depending on which facts in Padilla are emphasized, the opinion might be read to 
apply narrowly to a small class of cases in which a suspect arrives after having been on a foreign 
battlefield, or broadly, whenever someone enters the United States with instructions from a 
proscribed terrorist organization.  
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A variant on this move is the shift from Article III indictments to 
charges before a military commission. The so-called 9/11 
coconspirators were initially indicted in the Southern District of New 
York. In April 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder filed a nolle 
prosequi motion seeking dismissal of those indictments in light of 
legislative restrictions on transfers of Guantánamo detainees for trial 
in federal court.138 In effect, the five detainees covered by his motion 
were plucked out of pending Article III criminal adjudication with the 
expectation that they would eventually be placed into military-
commission proceedings. The potential for such transfers was 
amplified by a June 2011 ruling from the U.S. Court of Military 
Commission Review that the offense of material support, although 
never charged previously in a war-crimes tribunal, furnished a lawful 
ground for a military conviction under Congress’s power to define 
and punish offenses against the law of nations.139 That ruling, although 
subject to appeal to the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court, is 
significant because it diminished the possibility that members of al 
Qaeda who are alleged to have participated indirectly in the 9/11 
attacks, but not traditional military operations, will be found to be 
beyond military-commission jurisdiction. 
4. From Enemy-Combatant Detention or Military-Commission 
Jurisdiction to Article III Criminal Proceedings.  The border between 
Article III criminal jurisdiction and military jurisdiction is permeable 
in both directions. After being classified as enemy combatants seized 
in the United States, Padilla and al-Marri both left military detention 
only upon indictment in federal court.140 Although al-Marri pled guilty 
to material-support charges, Padilla stood trial and was convicted of 
offenses related to a conspiracy to provide support for jihad in places 
outside the United States, such as Kosovo and Chechnya, throughout 
the 1990s.141 From 2009 to 2010, the Obama administration appeared 
 
 138. United States v. Mohammed, No. (S14) 93 Cr. 180 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2011), 
available at https://webspace.utexas.edu/rmc2289/Nolle%20and%20Unsealing%20Order%20-
%204-4-11.pdf.  
 139. United States v. Hamdan, No. CMCR 09-002, 2011 WL 2923945, at *15 (Ct. Mil. 
Comm’n Rev. June 24, 2011). 
 140. Al-Marri was charged on both material-support and conspiracy counts. Indictment, 
United States v. Al-Marri, No. 09-CR-10030 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://
graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/topics/budget/al-Marri.pdf. 
 141. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 584–85 (4th Cir. 2005). Padilla was later found guilty on 
all counts. United States v. Hassoun, No. 0:04-cr-60001-MGC, 2007 WL 2349148 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 
16, 2007).  
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poised to transfer a significant tranche of Guantánamo detainees to 
the continental United States for trial in federal court. Legislative and 
popular opposition, however, induced the Obama administration to 
change course.142 Only one detainee, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani of 
Tanzania, was eventually transferred from Cuba for an Article III 
criminal trial.143 
It is also worth noting that a detainee can be exposed to military-
commission jurisdiction and then shifted to enemy-combatant 
detention. Hence, the Supreme Court emphasized in the course of 
invalidating military commissions created by presidential order that 
dismissal of a commission proceeding did not impinge on the 
military’s authority to hold a detainee as an enemy combatant.144 In 
subsequent military-commission proceedings, the government has 
conspicuously emphasized its authority to continue holding even 
those defendants acquitted by the tribunals.145 
5. From Military Detention to Immigration Proceedings.  A 
noncitizen detained as an enemy combatant has never been exposed 
later to immigration proceedings. But one case—Yaser Hamdi’s—is a 
variant on this possibility. Hamdi, a U.S. citizen suspected of having 
fought for the Taliban in Afghanistan, initially was held in military 
detention as an enemy combatant. As part of his release agreement, 
he agreed to be stripped of citizenship and removed from the United 
 
 142. Finn & Kornblut, supra note 118. 
 143. Ghailani was convicted on one count of conspiring to destroy buildings and property of 
the United States and acquitted on 248 other counts. United States v. Ghailani, 761 F. Supp. 2d 
167, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting a postconviction challenge based on sufficiency of the 
evidence). 
 144. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006) (“It bears emphasizing that Hamdan 
does not challenge, and we do not today address, the Government’s power to detain him for the 
duration of active hostilities in order to prevent such harm.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Government Response to Defense Motion for Appropriate Relief To 
Determine if the Trial of This Case Is One from Which the Defendant May Be Meaningfully 
Acquitted at 6, United States v. Hussayn (Mil. Comm’n Oct. 27, 2011) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal) (“Should the accused be acquitted following a trial by military commission, the 
government could, as a legal matter, continue to detain the accused during hostilities . . . .”). 
This has the odd consequence of eliminating defendants’ incentives to participate in military-
commission proceedings. If military detention can continue after acquittal, it follows a fortiori 
that it can continue after the end of a commission sentence. Hence, the fact of being sentenced 
vel non may have no impact on a defendant’s expected liberty. Even from the government’s 
perspective, there is something perverse about this situation. In effect, the only social value of a 
relatively expensive and time-consuming commission proceeding may be symbolic, since it has 
no necessary effect on the duration of detention. Under these conditions, there is a legitimate 
question whether noncapital commissions have social value at all. 
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States.146 In effect, Hamdi traded military detention for expulsion and 
permanent exile from the United States. 
C. Legal Barriers to Jurisdictional Redundancy 
Both simultaneous and sequential forms of redundancy can arise 
only if legal obstacles to the availability of alternative jurisdictional 
pathways are dismantled. Three potential legal obstacles exist. None 
is robust. Rather, counterterrorism legal doctrine is structured so as 
to allow redundancy. 
A first barrier to redundancy might be found in the Fifth 
Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause.147 It is possible to imagine an 
expansion of that rule to preclude a second government effort to 
adjudicate terrorist status in a different forum. But in cases in which a 
previous federal criminal adjudication has occurred, courts have 
declined to find a double-jeopardy bar to subsequent federal 
immigration proceedings even if the first trial concerned the same 
primary conduct as the second.148 The same would likely hold true if 
an Article III proceeding were to be followed by enemy-combatant 
detention. There also seems to be no bar under double-jeopardy 
principles to employing military detention even after a prosecution—
whether civilian or military—has reached a final result that 
dissatisfies the government.149 
A variant on the double-jeopardy problem has arisen in cases in 
which detainees, such as Ali Salah al-Marri, were moved from the 
Article III criminal process to a military system after indictment. In 
those cases, the government has had to accept dismissal of an initial 
indictment with prejudice as the cost of transfer.150 This means that 
offenses included in the first indictment are no longer available 
 
 146. Motion of Defendant To Stay Proceedings at 8, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 2:02CV439 
(E.D. Va. Sept. 24, 2004). 
 147. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).  
 148. See, e.g., Lemorin v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 416 Fed. App’x 35, 40 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam) (rejecting the double-jeopardy argument against the use of immigration powers after 
criminal process). In some cases, counsel’s failure to advise a criminal defendant of the 
“automatic” immigration consequences of a plea agreement may constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478, 
1483 (2010). 
 149. See sources cited supra notes 144–45.  
 150. See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 674–75 (D.S.C. 2005) (noting dismissal 
with prejudice). 
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against the same defendant.151 Any such dilemma was evaded in al-
Marri’s case because the first indictment charged fraud-related 
offenses, whereas the later indictment charged material-support 
offenses.152 In other words, the breadth and redundancy of existing 
criminal law may mitigate the barrier imposed by prejudicial dismissal 
of a threshold indictment.153 Like other criminal-procedure 
entitlements, double-jeopardy protection has been effectively sapped 
by prosecutors’ growing ability to leverage the growing breadth of 
substantive criminal law.154 
Double jeopardy might have more bite when a military 
commission is employed after a defendant has been acquitted in an 
Article III criminal proceeding. But its application is unclear even in 
those situations. Although the statutory protection against retrial in a 
military commission is ambiguous,155 ordinary double-jeopardy 
principles at least suggest that a second trial by the same sovereign 
would be prohibited.156 The issue, however, has never been litigated, 
and its ultimate resolution is not free from doubt. It is not clear, for 
example, whether Fifth Amendment protections shelter noncitizens 
at Guantánamo, where the military commissions are currently 
located. D.C. Circuit precedent suggests that that tribunal will be 
inhospitable to such constitutional claims.157 It is thus likely that the 
 
 151. Cf. United States v. Welborn, 849 F.2d 980, 983–84 (5th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing the 
effect of a dismissal with prejudice from that of a dismissal without prejudice). The prejudicial 
effect of an earlier dismissal is distinct from double-jeopardy concerns. See United States v. 
Terry, 5 F.3d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The government contends that [the defendant] waived 
any jeopardy contention he may have had by acquiescing in the [FED. R. CIV. P.] 48(a) 
dismissal . . . . This dismissal did not bar retrial.”). 
 152. See ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 51 at 57 n.19 (describing both indictments and 
listing charges).  
 153. See Brown, supra note 25, at 230 (discussing redundancy in the criminal law).  
 154. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 72, at 592 (noting the expansion of prosecutorial 
power “whenever . . . multiple criminal offenses can be charged . . . and . . . the difference 
between the potential sentence for the potential top count and the sentence available for lesser 
charges is substantial”); id. at 618–24 (discussing the use of “pretextual” charges in terrorism 
cases). 
 155. The military-commissions statute provides that “[n]o person may, without his consent, 
be tried by a military commission under this chapter a second time for the same offense.” 10 
U.S.C. § 949h (2006). This provision is ambiguous because it might apply when the first 
adjudication was before a military commission, but not when the first adjudication was before 
an Article III court.  
 156. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197 (2004) (explaining the separate-sovereign 
requirement of double-jeopardy protection).  
 157. See Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he law of this 
circuit . . . holds that the Fifth Amendment does not extend to aliens or foreign entities without 
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government would be able to construe the military-commission 
statute as permitting relitigation of charges that have already been 
rejected by an Article III court or jury.158 
The second potential legal barrier pertains to physical or 
psychological mistreatment in the first forum. Criminal defendants 
have unsuccessfully asked courts to treat prolonged military 
detention, allegations of torture, or evidence of other forms of 
mistreatment during military or CIA custody as a bar to further 
adjudication. Ahmed Ghailani, the Tanzanian al Qaeda member 
alleged to have participated in the 1996 bombings in Nairobi and Dar-
es-Salaam, argued that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy 
trial precluded criminal prosecution after a five-year detention in 
CIA and military custody.159 The district court disagreed, although it 
distinguished between CIA detention and detention in military 
custody, holding that only the latter counted toward the speedy-trial 
clock.160 Ghailani also contended that his alleged torture while in CIA 
custody had been “so fundamentally unfair” that his indictment 
should be dismissed.161 The district court also rejected that 
argument.162 Similar efforts by enemy combatants to turn their 
treatment in military custody into a shield against future prosecution 
have been rebuffed.163 
 
presence or property in the United States.”). But see Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 
(2008) (holding that the Suspension Clause extends to the Cuban base). Rasul, however, did not 
concern private litigants who had at one point been in the United States and then had been 
moved to Guantánamo, a fact that might change the analysis. 
 158. Moreover, some evidence exists to show that the government takes the position that 
double-jeopardy protection does not prevent a person acquitted in an Article III criminal 
proceeding from being retried in a court-martial. See Nicholas Schmidle, Three Trials for 
Murder: In the Name of Justice, Did the Military Sidestep Double Jeopardy?, NEW YORKER, 
Nov. 14, 2011, at 56 (recounting one such case). 
 159. United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d 515, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
 160. Id. at 554–59; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972) (setting forth a four-
part balancing test for violations to the right to a speedy trial). In applying this analysis, the 
Court has endorsed delays of up to 7.5 years, suggesting that speedy-trial restraints are weak. 
See, e.g., United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315–17 (1986) (holding that the defendant 
had failed to bear the “heavy burden of showing an unreasonable delay” necessary to support 
his speedy-trial claim). The district court’s holding creates an odd and perhaps undesirable 
incentive for the government to resort to CIA detention in lieu of military detention when it 
wishes to employ the criminal process subsequently.  
 161. United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 162. Id.  
 163. See, e.g., United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 1079090, at *2–6 (S.D. 
Fla. Apr. 9, 2007) (rejecting a detainee’s motion to dismiss a federal indictment based upon the 
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Third, the Constitution might impose limits on jurisdictional 
redundancy by mandating the use of an Article III forum in a certain 
class of cases. The debate on this issue has focused on the border 
between Article III criminal jurisdiction and various forms of military 
jurisdiction in cases that arise within the United States.164 Yet courts 
have found it difficult to limn the boundary between Article III and 
military jurisdiction with precision. The Constitution’s criminal-
procedure rules are silent as to their zone of application. Textual 
arguments for limiting military jurisdiction are hence elusive. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court historically has seemed of two minds 
about limiting military jurisdiction. Some precedent seems to prohibit 
the use of military jurisdiction within the territory of the United 
States absent active hostilities, whereas other cases seem to endorse 
such a measure.165 Lower courts have drawn inconsistent and 
incompatible lessons from this precedent.166 Nor has the Supreme 
Court evinced any inclination to settle the matter. During the 2000s, 
the Supreme Court passed up three opportunities to provide a 
definitive gloss on the AUMF’s application within the United 
States.167 It seems unlikely that the Court will take up the issue any 
time soon. Thus, the boundaries between jurisdictional pathways are 
likely to remain unsettled. 
 
claim that he had been subjected to outrageous government conduct while in the custody of the 
military authorities so as to make his continued federal prosecution a violation of due process). 
 164. See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Motz, J., 
concurring) (developing an argument that some detentions in the United States must be 
accomplished by civilian, and not military, process), vacated as moot sub nom. Al-Marri v. 
Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009). 
 165. Compare Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 136 (1866) (purporting to limit military 
jurisdiction within the United States when civilian tribunals are open), with Ex parte Quirin, 317 
U.S. 1, 48 (1942) (allowing the exercise of military jurisdiction over a citizen seized within the 
United States). The permissible scope of martial law is another question that has not been 
settled. Compare Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946) (narrowly reading the 
authorization of wartime martial law in Hawaii), with Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909) 
(broadly endorsing the use of martial law). 
 166. For example, in the most recent merits consideration of the substantive law of domestic 
military detention, the en banc Fourth Circuit fragmented into seven separate opinions with no 
clear majority holding on the scope of appropriate detention authority. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 
216.  
 167. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008) (declining to define the limits of 
permissible detention authority); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 450–51 (2004) (declining to 
rule on the merits of an enemy-combatant detention); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 
(2004) (plurality opinion) (noting that “the permissible bounds of the [enemy-combatant] 
category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are presented to them”). 
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It is not simply that the law does not limit redundancy. Relevant 
statutory frameworks aid and abet it. The legislative framework for 
counterterrorism, for example, ensures a common focus on specific 
organizations. Congress has established a single mechanism for 
designating “foreign terrorism organizations” (FTOs).168 Pursuant to 
this mechanism, the secretary of state had designated forty-nine 
entities as of early 2012, including al Qaeda and the Taliban.169 FTO 
status establishes an element of both the crime of material support 
and grounds for security-related deportation.170 Both al Qaeda and 
the Taliban are also organizations encompassed by the September 
2001 AUMF. Their members, as well as some domain of affiliates, can 
be tried before a military commission—if they are noncitizens171—and 
detained as enemy combatants—perhaps regardless of their 
citizenship. All four jurisdictional pathways in Table 1 thus share a 
common factual element in terms of the particular entities Congress 
has singled out as terrorist organizations. Untangling the role of FTO 
designation across these systems would be costly and would entail 
simultaneous reworking of multiple regulatory frameworks. For this 
reason, FTO designation likely will remain a pivotal cog in the 
machinery of counterterrorism law, thereby promoting jurisdictional 
redundancy. 
Redundancy also is fostered by a growing convergence on the 
scope of primary conduct that permits detention. Courts in both 
civilian and military contexts have drawn a line between behavior that 
is coordinated with a designated entity—which can trigger 
detention—and behavior that is independent of such an entity—which 
cannot. On the civilian side, the Supreme Court has read the 
material-support statute to criminalize conduct coordinated with a 
designated entity, but not conduct undertaken independent of that 
entity.172 Glossing the AUMF, the D.C. Circuit has sketched a similar 
 
 168. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1), (d)(4) (2006) (granting the secretary of state, in consultation 
with the secretary of the treasury and the attorney general, authority to designate an 
organization an FTO upon finding that it is foreign, engages in “terrorist activity” or 
“terrorism,” and thereby “threatens the security of United States nationals or the national 
security of the United States”).  
 169. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.state
.gov/g/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
 170. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(II). Section 1182(a)(3)(B) contains several other terrorism-
related grounds of deportation. 
 171. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(1), 948b(a) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 172. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010). For further 
discussion of the line separating coordinated speech from independent speech, see Aziz Z. Huq, 
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outer boundary to enemy-combatant detention. In one case, it 
distinguished a person who was “part of” al Qaeda—and was hence 
amenable to detention—from someone who engaged in the “purely 
independent conduct of a freelancer”—who was not.173 Only 
immigration law sweeps more broadly. Title 8 of the U.S. Code 
enables the deportation of the “representative[s]” and “member[s]” 
of a terrorist organization174 without evidence of any coordinated 
action and also directs that the “spouse or child” of any alien found 
deportable on certain terrorism-related grounds be removed.175 It is 
unclear if this latter provision has ever been used. In practice, 
immigration law seems to employ roughly the same boundaries as the 
criminal law or enemy-combatant detention. 
*          *          * 
In sum, changes to the legal framework of terrorist detention in 
case law and at least some legislation have trended toward greater 
redundancy.176 The overlap among forums for terrorism suspects, as a 
result, is pervasive. 
III.  THE EFFECTS OF JURISDICTIONAL REDUNDANCY ON 
TERRORIST-DETENTION POLICY 
Jurisdictional redundancy may be ubiquitous, but is it desirable? 
Would it be better, as many believe, to channel particular classes of 
terrorism suspects instead into a single forum? These questions are 
not rhetorical. Commentators and legislators have proposed small 
and large changes that would reduce or eliminate swatches of 
 
Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16 (2012), 
http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/112/16_Huq.pdf. 
 173. Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 752–53 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); accord Hatim v. Gates, 632 F.3d 720, 
721 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 174. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)–(V) (2006). At least one court of appeals, ruling on a 
different provision of the code, has expressed concerns about the government’s use of “guilt by 
association” as a theory of removal. Yusupov v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 650 F.3d 968, 983 
(3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting the government’s theory as to why a noncitizen was not entitled to the 
withholding of removal based on his association with other suspected terrorists and citing 
constitutional concerns).  
 175. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX) (2006) (finding removable “the spouse or child of an 
alien who is inadmissible under [the terrorism-related part of the Code], if the activity causing 
the alien to be found inadmissible occurred within the last 5 years”). 
 176. One exception to this trend is the imposition of legislated restrictions on transfers from 
Guantánamo for criminal prosecution. See supra note 118.  
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jurisdictional overlap by channeling suspects into one venue or by 
creating a new and exclusive venue tailored to the terrorism 
context.177 These proposals reflect a pervasive but largely unexamined 
assumption that redundancy is undesirable. 
This Part provides a framework for analyzing how jurisdictional 
redundancy influences policy outcomes. It focuses on how such 
overlap influences, either directly or indirectly, two clumps of values 
related to accuracy and cost minimization. By “accuracy,” I mean to 
capture a detention system’s ability to reach particularized judgments 
as to specific detainees that are factually accurate applications of a 
governing legal standard.178 Accordingly, accuracy decreases as either 
the rate of false positives or the rate of false negatives increases. By 
“cost-minimization,” I mean a residual category of other government 
and private expenditures related to the operation of a detention 
system. Using these labels, I aim to capture in the analysis not only 
transaction costs immediately attendant to the ongoing management 
of various forums but also the potential downstream costs of false 
negatives and false positives that accrue to government or private 
parties. The latter category includes, for example, the cost to detained 
individuals of an erroneous deprivation of liberty and the cost to 
public safety from an erroneous release decision. By framing the 
analysis in terms of accuracy and cost minimization, I aim to tally in 
rough form the most important policy gains and losses related to the 
operation of a terrorist-detention system. 
My analysis focuses on accuracy and cost minimization on the 
assumption that these are generally uncontroversial and important 
goals. It is, to be sure, possible to posit other goals for a detention 
system. Some, for example, might prioritize fairness, individual 
constitutional rights, or the rule of law and so demand that legal rules 
be publicly and comprehensively specified in advance of their 
application. Others might view terrorism as so beyond the pale that 
the law should express without reservation the judgment that 
terrorists do not deserve the same rights and privileges as common 
criminals.179 Either way, the aspirations of detention law would be 
starkly normative. Claims about fairness, the rule of law, or 
 
 177. See infra Part IV.A–B.  
 178. My nomenclature is inexact insofar as “accuracy” more precisely means “accuracy-
related costs.” But I prefer inexactitude here to prolixity or verbal infelicity. 
 179. For a relatively mild statement of this position, see Andrew C. McCarthy, Terrorism on 
Trial: The Trials of al Qaeda, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 513, 518 (2004). 
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existential threats are not easily translated into analytically tractable 
forms. This uncertainty creates a temptation to use such concerns as 
trumps to forestall careful analysis. Even if nuanced normative 
analysis is possible, large disagreement about first principles means 
that such normative questions are not a useful starting point for 
policy analysis. Further, many normative qualities are captured in a 
consequentialist analysis of errors and costs. It is unclear whether 
much is added by recasting these concerns in overtly normative garb. 
In short, I take the goal of a terrorist-detention system with a low rate 
of errors and a low operating cost to be a plausible first-cut target for 
institutional-design analysis on the ground that any more specification 
of goals would be controversial and analytically opaque.180 
This Part therefore begins by asking how jurisdictional 
redundancy affects accuracy and cost directly in light of existing 
jurisdictional specifications. Using existing jurisdictional 
arrangements as a focus for analysis, it first demonstrates that the 
relationship of jurisdiction to error rates and costs is surprisingly 
complex. Hence, the shift from Article III exclusivity to jurisdictional 
plurality since the beginning of the twenty-first century has had more 
reticulated effects than have been generally perceived. After 
addressing direct effects, I turn to two secondary mechanisms through 
which jurisdictional redundancy indirectly influences accuracy and 
cost: its influence on agency costs and on information flows. 
Together, the analysis of both direct and indirect effects provides a 
general framework for analyzing the forum-choice question. This 
analysis demonstrates that “[s]pecific institutional arrangements 
invariably have multiple effects.”181 Conventional doctrinal 
approaches to the forum-choice question, by contrast, do not account 
for plural effects. 
Two threshold caveats are important to state here. First, as 
should be evident from my specification of policy goals, my analysis 
makes only weak assumptions about social welfare and government 
incentives. Thus, I assume it is desirable that some persons who pose 
some risk of violent harm should be detained on consequentialist 
 
 180. One potential concern is that I am stacking the analytic deck, so to speak, by omitting 
deontological concerns. But such concerns—much like accuracy and cost-minimization 
concerns—can cut strongly in both directions. It is therefore unlikely that a close focus on 
consensus-animated goals has a skewing effect on the analysis.  
 181. PIERSON, supra note 33, at 109; see also ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS: 
COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 3–12 (1997) (“In a system, the chains of 
consequences extend over time and many areas: The effects of action are always multiple.”). 
HUQ IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  12:33 AM 
2012] FORUM CHOICE FOR TERRORISM SUSPECTS 1457 
grounds.182 I take no position on the contested and difficult question 
of how much risk is necessary to warrant detention. I also assume that 
it is undesirable to detain individuals on the false belief that they are 
connected to terrorism. I rely on no assumption here about how these 
different goals should be weighted or aggregated. At the same time, I 
make no assumption that government officials are either well 
intentioned, and hence will always and necessarily reduce terrorism 
risks without unnecessary costs, or badly intentioned, such that they 
are systematically interested in empire building, shirking, or 
disregarding constitutional interests. As a matter of naïve empiricism, 
I suspect that a mixture of both good and bad types can be found 
within existing governments. The analysis instead proceeds from the 
perspective of an institution designer working behind something of a 
veil of ignorance. From this perspective, it is likely wise to assume 
that electoral competition will throw up both good and bad types. 
Hence, institutions must be designed with both the best and the worst 
of times in mind.183 
Second, a focus on the policy effects of jurisdictional redundancy 
is not unprecedented in public law. Overlap has been recognized as a 
central problem in both federal jurisdiction and administrative law. In 
the federal courts scholarship, the question of redundancy has arisen 
in debates about the appropriate scope of federal court collateral 
review of state court criminal judgments.184 Scholars such as Professor 
Paul Bator and Judge Henry Friendly disagree with Professors 
Robert Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff about the costs and 
benefits of duplicative federal review of state court criminal 
processes.185 Their debate turns on the relative costs and benefits of 
 
 182. This is not intended to be a controversial position. Our system of pretrial bail, the 
detention of an enemy state’s soldiers in wartime, and the detention of the seriously 
psychologically ill are all forms of incapacitation on consequentialist grounds that have wide 
support in principle, even if specific applications are controversial.  
 183. One might counter that electoral incentives will push even bad types to minimize 
terrorism risk. But that is not at all clear insofar as terrorism risk has a long duration, with 
harms materializing long after the salient actions would need to be taken. As a consequence, a 
rational actor may slack off knowing that her successor will pay the political price.  
 184. Such review is an exercise of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006), as modified by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
(2006). See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662 & n.4 (1996) (noting that § 2254 “specifies the 
conditions under which . . . relief may be granted” when § 2241 jurisdiction is invoked by a state 
convict).  
 185. Compare Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 454 (1963) (arguing that “if one set of institutions has been 
granted the task of finding the facts and applying the law and does so in a manner rationally 
adapted to the task, in the absence of institutional or functional reasons to the contrary we 
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sequential redundancy with a second forum that specializes in federal 
constitutional questions.186 Subsequent administrative-law scholars 
have recognized the ubiquity of overlap in the federal regulatory 
state. This overlap means that responsibility for a policy matter is 
often shared by multiple agencies.187 In the courts, judges respond to 
the resulting interagency tensions by applying a presumption that 
Congress assigned law-interpreting authority to one agency alone.188 
But administrative-law scholars have questioned this approach. They 
have developed theories of why Congress might favor jurisdictional 
redundancy.189 Their analysis, however, has generally focused on 
regulatory, rulemaking jurisdiction, not on the kind of adjudicative 
 
should accept a presumption against mere repetition of the process on the alleged ground that, 
after all, error could have occurred”), and Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral 
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 142 (1970) (arguing that “convictions 
should be subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea 
with a colorable claim of innocence”), with Cover, supra note 27, at 649–80 (concluding that 
“[i]nterest, [i]deology, and [i]nnovation . . . constitute justifications for the jurisdictional 
redundancy which characterizes our federalism”), and Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1045 (1977) 
(arguing that jurisdictional redundancy “fosters greater certainty that constitutional rights will 
not be erroneously denied”). The view of Professor Bator and Judge Friendly largely prevailed. 
See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–
108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C. 
(2006) and FED. R. APP. P. 22) (imposing multiple restrictions on federal habeas review). 
 186. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 27, at 657 (identifying “[i]nterest, [i]deology, and 
[i]nnovation” as relevant effects of jurisdictional overlap). 
 187. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 28 (enumerating areas of overlap); George Robert 
Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA 
Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (1987) (identifying workplace and mine safety as 
areas of regulatory activity “divided between two wholly separate, independent agencies”).  
 188. See, e.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 153 
(1991) (“[W]e presume . . . that Congress intended to invest interpretive power in the 
administrative actor in the best position to develop [historical familiarity and policymaking 
expertise].” ); ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 505 (1988) (examining a conflict 
between the secretary of the interior and the secretary of the army). 
 189. See, e.g., Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction, supra note 28, at 211–16 
(criticizing the exclusive-jurisdiction presumption); see also Andrew B. Whitford, Adapting 
Agencies: Competition, Imitation, and Punishment in the Design of Bureaucratic Performance, in 
POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF 
BUREAUCRACY 160, 162–64 (George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier eds., 2003) (“Agencies will 
respond to comparison, competition, and information revelation because of the real world 
implications of failure.”). A related, but not identical, variation on the overlap question inquires 
into when private actors should be able to enforce statutory commands in addition to 
administrative agencies. See generally Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the 
Private and the Social Motive To Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997) 
(examining the benefits and drawbacks of private enforcement). 
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jurisdiction at issue here.190 These advances in administrative law, in 
turn, have drawn on theories developed in the organizational-design 
literature about how to identify the optimal quantum of redundancy 
in complex administrative systems, such as public-transportation 
networks and cislunar exploration.191 Neither the federal courts nor 
the administrative-law scholarship speaks directly to the problems of 
designing a terrorist-detention system. Both though attest to the 
significance of jurisdictional redundancy in complex regulatory 
situations. Both also provide hints of how overlap might influence 
policy outcomes in the national-security domain.192 
A. Accuracy Effects of Redundancy 
Redundancy in jurisdictional specification creates options for the 
government along two dimensions. First, when the government 
initially detains a person, it might have a choice among different 
forums. Second, if a chosen forum does not yield the outcome that the 
government sought, the government may be able to employ a second 
forum. In both cases, the availability of options has an effect on the 
government’s strategy. This effect in turn influences the frequency 
and type of errors. To understand the connection between 
jurisdictional choice and accuracy, it is therefore necessary to clarify 
 
 190. See Cover, supra note 27, at 654–57 (noting that jurisdictional redundancy does not 
raise the same questions as policymaking redundancy). 
 191. Beginning in the 1960s, organizational theorists demonstrated that reserve capacity has 
significant positive effects on system outcomes. Early research focused on public-transit 
systems. One early study of redundancy demonstrated that the “loosely coupled” and 
“jurisdictional[ly] fragment[ed]” public-transit system of the San Francisco Bay area was 
substantially better able to deal with unexpected shocks, such as major accidents and natural 
disasters, than a more streamlined arrangement would have been. Martin Landau, On 
Multiorganizational Systems in Public Administration, 1 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 5, 7, 10 
(1991). Subsequent studies focused on other complex government systems, such as the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s space-shuttle program, which is also designed to avoid 
extremely costly failures. E.g., Larry Heimann, Understanding the Challenger Disaster: 
Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 421 (1993); 
see also Sagan, supra note 25, at 944–45 (questioning “the common, but false, intuition that 
actions taken to improve security will always have a positive effect”). 
 192. The question of jurisdictional overlap also arises in the literature on federal courts’ 
choice of law in diversity cases under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in 
which fairness and forum shopping are also central concerns. See generally RICHARD H. 
FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 590 (6th ed. 2009) 
(summarizing the arguments). Extended treatment of the analogy is inapt since the 
disaggregated strategic choices of multiple plaintiffs would be modeled differently from the 
actions of the unitary government actor at issue here.  
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how redundancy channels government action and to examine how the 
resulting changes in government strategy influence error rates. 
1. The Government’s Use of Redundancy.  I begin by examining 
the immediate uses of redundancy from the government’s 
perspective. Consider first how the government can employ 
simultaneous overlap to limit some errors. Despite Professors 
Chesney and Goldsmith’s claim about the convergence in substantive 
and procedural rules used in different forums,193 gaps between the 
procedural frameworks of criminal and noncriminal detention, the 
first and second columns of Table 1, remain. In addition, some 
differences remain between Article III criminal trials and military 
commissions.194 As a result, the choice of forums presents the 
government with some opportunity for positive jurisdictional 
arbitrage—the selection of the forum with the lowest costs in terms of 
the evidence and effort needed to secure detention.195 Jurisdictional 
arbitrage allows the government to match suspects to forums based 
on the kind of inculpatory evidence available or the nature of the 
charges against the person. When inculpatory evidence has been 
collected on the battlefield or from a foreign sovereign that wishes to 
remain anonymous,196 such arbitrage allows the government to secure 
detention through low-process channels on a case-by-case basis. 
Using these tactics, the government can preserve the availability of 
rigorous forms of adjudication, such as Article III criminal trials, 
without having to bear the costs of release as a result of exogenous 
 
 193. Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 1800–01. 
 194. For example, a federal court must determine that a criminal defendant’s confession was 
voluntary before admitting it. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006). By contrast, the military commissions are 
instructed not to admit confessions elicited by torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment. 10 U.S.C. § 948r(a) (Supp. IV 2010). But a military judge can admit a statement if it 
is reliable and sufficiently probative if it was made “incident to lawful conduct during military 
operations at the point of capture or during closely related combat engagement, and the 
interests of justice would best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.” Id. 
§ 948r(c). 
 195. For a similar use of the same term in the context of arbitrage at the international level 
between different jurisdictions, see Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantánamo on the Sea”: The 
Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 269 (2010).  
 196. See John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operation in 
Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law, 
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 212 (2011) (“States may capture nonstate fighters on or adjacent to the 
battlefield in circumstances where evidence collection either cannot occur or cannot be a 
priority. Sources of evidence may also include intelligence sources that cannot be subjected to 
the rigors of confrontation without compromising sources and methods.”).  
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circumstances beyond its control in cases in which those rigorous 
forms would yield unsatisfactory outcomes. 
Such redundancy may be especially important in times of 
emergency. Redundancy allows the government to parcel out tasks in 
new ways if one jurisdictional channel is overloaded or otherwise 
unavailable. Emergencies are also moments when catastrophic harms 
may be more likely. As a result, the burden imposed by reserve 
capacity in ordinary times may be offset by its heightened utility 
during emergencies. Excess capacity—such as that created in the area 
of the government’s immigration powers—provided one way for the 
government to mitigate the possibility of bad outcomes even though it 
also required bearing the long-term costs of maintaining an oversized 
standing corps of immigration officials and adjudicators.197 This effect 
of redundancy is a positive one. 
Sequential overlap has a different use: it mitigates the risk that 
the forum initially chosen will yield a false acquittal.198 It thereby 
serves as insurance. In the case of Lyglenson Lemorin, for example, 
the government turned to the immigration system after failing to 
secure its desired outcome through the criminal-justice system.199 The 
availability of immigration detention mitigated the cost to the 
government of a failure to convict on criminal charges. The trajectory 
of the Padilla and al-Marri cases illustrates use of sequential 
redundancy to mitigate a different risk of forum failure. In both cases, 
the government had transferred the suspects out of military detention 
at the cusp of Supreme Court review of their cases.200 The government 
thereby avoided the risk of an adverse legal judgment that might have 
restrained its options in future cases. Redundancy in these cases 
provided insurance not against terrorist events but against adverse 
legal outcomes. Like the option created by simultaneous overlap, this 
insurance effect may be especially important in the aftermath of an 
 
 197. Professor Cover argues that the same is more generally true with respect to the 
creation of special commissions and other bodies designed to check the results of a criminal 
process. Cover, supra note 27, at 656 (“Ad hoc ‘jurisdictional’ redundancy is commonly 
demanded when questions of factual error assume massive political significance.”).  
 198. See Landau, supra note 129, at 349 (discussing how redundancy can result in increased 
liability within complicated systems). The sequential redundancy created by habeas jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) serves the same function of error correction.  
 199. See supra text accompanying note 131.  
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 144–45.  
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exogenous shock.201 The more risk-averse a system’s designers are, the 
higher the option’s value will be. 
Commentators have noted this function of sequential 
redundancy but have not asked how its existence affects the detention 
system as a whole.202 Three complicating downstream effects are 
worth emphasizing. First, the use of sequential or simultaneous 
redundancy may mitigate pressure to ease procedural rules or expand 
the substantive reach of the first-choice forum. For example, if 
officials knew that they had the possibility of immigration detention 
or enemy-combatant detention as a backup, they would have less 
incentive to press federal judges or Congress for changes to Article 
III criminal process. In this way, the mere possibility of sequential 
overlap—even without its frequent use—provides some breathing 
room for the robust protections of rights in the Article III criminal 
context. 
Second, sequential redundancy creates a moral-hazard problem 
for prosecutors and investigators.203 By reducing the costs of failure in 
the first-choice forum, it blunts the incentive for officials to prosecute 
a case vigorously in that context. Underinvestment in the first-choice 
forum increases the need for subsequent recourse to the second-
choice forum. Because the government may not prevail in every case 
in the second-choice forum, a less-than-vigorous prosecution in the 
first-choice forum may incrementally raise the possibility of a policy 
failure overall. It is not clear how large this moral-hazard problem is 
on the ground. Reputational and normative constraints may 
sufficiently bind officials and mitigate any slackening of effort 
induced by sequential overlap.204 
Third, simultaneous redundancy opens up the possibility that the 
selection of the threshold forum will be motivated initially not by 
 
 201. See, e.g., Landau, supra note 191, at 5, 10–11, 15–16 (emphasizing the importance of 
reserve capacity in transit systems during emergencies); Staudt, supra note 28, at 1213 (making 
the same point with regard to the provision of social-welfare goods). 
 202. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 16, at 695–96 (noting the potential “perverse effect” of 
limiting counterterrorism to Article III criminal prosecutions). 
 203. “Moral hazard is the . . . tendency of an insured to underallocate to loss prevention 
after purchasing insurance.” KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL 
THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 14 (1986). 
 204. By analogy, the obligation to provide disaster relief may not be needed to induce 
optimal precautions against terrorism because such “precautions are already encouraged by 
political self-interest and, no doubt, by a deeply held commitment to the safety of the country.” 
Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism—And Crime, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
268, 311 (2003). 
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public-policy concerns but by considerations of electoral politics.205 
That is, the moment of choice for the executive can become an 
opportunity for political mobilization by critics of an administration 
who argue that a president is either too soft on terror or an incipient 
abuser of constitutional liberties. Rather than being the output of 
reasoned deliberation, decisions under these conditions may flow 
from raw partisan political calculation. And the problem may be 
endemic. That is, any kind of forum optionality creates the 
opportunity for not only rational deliberation but also distortive 
politicization. 
How important are these collateral effects of sequential 
redundancy on the ground? The data presented in Parts I and II 
suggest that these effects are real but less frequently encountered 
than might be expected. Recall that the main channel for terrorist 
detentions has been the Article III criminal process. Immigration 
detention and enemy-combatant detention were relied upon most 
heavily in the direct aftermath of 9/11. Since then, the government 
has relied on them less and less.206 The heavy reliance on alternatives 
to the Article III criminal process after 9/11 is consistent with 
organizational theorists’ insight that reserve capacity is most valuable 
in the wake of exogenous shocks and is less utilized as governance 
systems find a new equilibrium that accounts for the shock.207 Some 
evidence also suggests that the government has exploited sequential 
overlap, both to prevent the release of a dangerous suspect and also 
to forestall an adverse litigation outcome that, in its view, would have 
had costly repercussions.208 But any moral-hazard effect from the 
existence of redundancy appears to be tamped down by reputational 
and normative constraints. Department of Justice lawyers, in other 
words, still prosecute terrorism-related cases vigorously even though 
the cost of their mistakes is buffered by other parts of the 
jurisdictional system.209 Similarly, at least through the Bush 
 
 205. Cf. Kuhn, supra note 9, at 224 (“Undoubtedly, for some in Congress, detention policy is 
worth more as a political issue than as a potential policy accomplishment.”).  
 206. See supra Part I.  
 207. See Landau, supra note 191, at 12 (“Were we to remove all [redundancy] . . . we would 
get a brittle structure incapable of coping with surprise . . . .”).  
 208. See supra Part II.B. 
 209. The availability of pretextual charges may also have a buffering effect within the 
criminal-justice system. That is, prosecutors can supply their own insurance by charging suspects 
with ancillary offenses.  
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administration, initial forum selections did not appear to catalyze 
political firestorms that distorted venue choices. 
In short, redundancy provides a mechanism for the government 
to mitigate the cost of shortfalls in evidence or adjudicative failures in 
a first-choice forum. Used to this end, redundancy likely has 
downstream effects on the rate of change to procedural rules and on 
prosecutors’ incentives. Based on these mechanisms alone, the effect 
of redundancy on accuracy might be positive, especially if prosecutors 
are subject to exogenous pressures to adhere to professional norms. 
But these mechanisms alone do not provide a complete picture. 
Other connections between redundancy and accuracy cut in the other 
direction. 
2. The Complex Effects of Redundancy on Error Rates.  The 
government’s observed use of redundancy highlights one set of 
mechanisms linking jurisdictional specification and error rates. But 
more careful analysis suggests others. Simultaneous and sequential 
forms of redundancy have distinct effects on error rates. Their net 
effect can be understood only by disaggregating two different sorts of 
errors at issue. To conclude simply that jurisdictional arbitrage and 
do-overs reduce errors overall is to move too quickly. 
It is standard in the many fields of systems analysis to refer to 
two different kinds of errors that can arise in complex systems 
designed to pick out individuals with hard-to-observe traits from a 
larger population. First, in a Type I error, the government chooses to 
act when it should not have done so, generating a false positive. 
Second, in a Type II error, the government fails to act when it should 
have done so, producing a false negative.210 Simultaneous and 
sequential forms of overlap influence false positives and false 
negatives differently. The two kinds of redundancy are therefore 
worth distinguishing and considering separately. 
With the use of simultaneous overlap, error rates are a simple 
function of the government’s choice of forum. The existence of 
overlap changes error rates only to the extent that the government 
engages in jurisdictional arbitrage and that the procedures in the two 
forums are different. At the opening of this Part, I sketch an 
optimistic story of the government’s matching cases to venues based 
 
 210. Cf. Heimann, supra note 191, at 422 (“[I]f NASA decided not to launch a mission that 
was technologically sound, then it would have committed a type II error.”). I will refer for 
simplicity’s sake to false positives and false negatives for the remainder of the discussion. 
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on exogenous constraints, an opportunity made possible by the 
availability of positive jurisdictional arbitrage.211 But it is possible to 
imagine a darker story of negative jurisdictional arbitrage. For 
example, imagine the government matches cases to forums based not 
only on the strength of available evidence but also upon purely 
endogenous factors. This strategy may well have a perverse effect. 
Suspects against whom the evidence favoring detention is weak will 
be funneled to a low-process pathway. Suspects against whom the 
evidence favoring detention is strong will remain in a high-process 
forum. As a result, both groups of suspects will be detained at roughly 
equal rates, even though suspects against whom the evidence is weak 
should be detained less frequently. On the whole, the system will 
predictably have a high level of false positives and a low level of false 
negatives. In other words, procedural arbitrage made possible by 
simultaneous overlap may be either desirable or pernicious. How it is 
assessed may depend on the reasons for the government’s matching 
decision. If the government is responding to exogenous constraints, 
one might view it in a positive light, but if the government is making 
choices endogenously based on its own exertion of effort, the results 
may be undesirable. 
A further analytic wrinkle meriting notice here is that the costs 
of a false negative’s taking the form of a conviction may be greater 
than the costs of a false negative’s taking the form of a simple 
detention decision. This possibility exists because a formal conviction 
may be more difficult or more politically costly to undo than an 
ongoing detention. Perhaps offsetting this effect, there may be more 
procedural avenues built into the system to challenge false 
convictions than to challenge flawed detentions. 
The effects of sequential overlap are even more complex. It is 
worth looking first at its effect on a single case and then asking 
separately whether it has dynamic effects over time. Start with the 
simple case of a one-shot use of sequential overlap. When the 
government has the option of using sequential overlap to mitigate the 
risk of failure in a first forum, it will opt for a second round of 
adjudication only when it fails to secure detention in the first round. 
The asymmetrical stacking of processes by the government will have 
divergent effects on the rate of false positives and the rate of false 
negatives. On the one hand, false negatives will arise only when both 
 
 211. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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the first and the second process fail to produce the desired result. The 
rate of false negatives in a system with sequential overlap will 
therefore be the mathematical product of the probabilities of failure 
at each stage. For example, imagine a highly simplified situation in 
which both forums erroneously acquit with a probability of 0.5. If the 
government chooses to take two bites at the apple, the risk of a false 
negative in a given case drops to 0.25—the product of 0.5 and 0.5. In 
short, in the context of false negatives, sequential overlap will be 
considerably less error-prone than a single-shot system.212 
On the other hand, the government’s use of sequential overlap 
creates a system in which false positives may be obtained in both the 
first and second rounds. Imagine, again hypothetically, that both 
forums have a 0.5 probability of convicting an innocent person. If the 
government always turns to the second forum when the first forum 
has failed to produce a conviction, the chance of convicting an 
innocent person would increase to 0.75—the 0.5 risk of wrongful 
conviction in the first forum, added to 0.25, the product of 0.5 and the 
0.5 risk of wrongful conviction in the second forum. Rather than 
mitigating the likelihood of error, sequential overlap has the effect of 
increasing the probability of a false positive in relation to the base 
rate of error in either forum standing alone.213 
Sequential redundancy thus has different effects on false 
positives and false negatives. It increases the former at the same time 
that it decreases the latter. Assessing the desirability of jurisdictional 
overlap therefore turns on an evaluation of the relative welfare costs 
of false negatives and false positives. This comparison is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but it is worth noting that false negatives are not 
self-evidently more costly than false positives. There is a tendency to 
assume that a false negative will have a catastrophic cost—for 
example, another attack similar in scale to 9/11. But not all terrorist 
attacks are 9/11. Since 1970, only 118 incidents of terrorism worldwide 
have killed more than one hundred people. This number represents 
0.12 percent of the 98,000 terrorist events in that period.214 Although 
 
 212. For situations in which multiple venues have divergent error rates—for example, of 0.1, 
0.25, and 0.5—adding unrestrained sequential overlap among the three venues would not 
necessarily reduce error rates compared to those yielded by exclusive use of the most accurate 
forum. 
 213. For a formal statement of this point, see Heimann, supra note 191, at 426.  
 214. See Advanced Search, GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
search (open “Casualties” tab; select Casualty Type: “Fatalities Only” and Number of 
Casualties: “101+”; follow “Search” hyperlink). 
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always morally deplorable, terrorism is not categorically catastrophic 
in simple numeric terms. Furthermore, false negatives matter most 
when a terrorist organization is unable to substitute for the detained 
attacker. If a terrorist organization is able to substitute a new 
operative for a captured one, the expected value of a capture for the 
government falls. 
The possibility of a do-over in a second forum influences 
outcomes through a second, dynamic mechanism that manifests only 
over time. Previous scholarship has established that in adjudicative 
systems with asymmetrical appeal rules—such as those that allow one 
side but not the other to appeal—the structure of appellate review 
will change the substantive legal standard in a predictable direction. 
For example, in the patent context, an asymmetrical appeal rule 
governing decisions by the Patent and Trademark Office has led to a 
drift in the legal standard. This phenomenon has been termed “patent 
inflation” by one scholar.215 An analogous mechanism might result 
from the operation of sequential overlap in the context of terrorism-
related detention because only the government can choose to invoke 
the second forum’s jurisdiction. 
Here is how an analogous mechanism might work, mutatis 
mutandi, in the terrorism context:216 In a system in which one forum 
operates as a backup for a primary forum, the government decides 
which cases go to the second forum. The government will present 
there only cases that it has lost in the first forum. Its selection of cases 
in consequence will include a disproportionate number in which the 
evidence against the suspect is weak. The median case filed in the 
second forum will be weaker than the median case drawn from the 
pool of all potential cases. Consider how this dynamic affects the legal 
standard used in the second-choice forum. In each of the possible 
second-choice forums, panels of judges use a system of internal 
precedent that sets a factual benchmark for what justifies detention. 
Each of the possible second-choice forums also has a pool of 
adjudicators that is heterogeneous. In this pool, there will be pro-
detainee and pro-detention panels of judges. Assuming that panels 
 
 215. Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 470 (2011). 
 216. The following builds on Professor Masur’s pathmarking analysis, although it is worth 
noting that he identifies effects in the first-round forum that are absent here. See id. at 510–12 
(showing how a permissive ruling in the second-round forum, the Federal Circuit, allows the 
first-round forum, the Patent and Trademark Office, to further push the boundaries of 
permissive patent rulings). Further, my analysis focuses on two separate forums, not two venues 
linked by a hierarchical appeals structure.  
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are drawn at random, the joint effect of (a) an asymmetrically 
distributed stream of cases—with more hard cases for the government 
than easy cases—and (b) heterogeneous judges will be to move the 
detention benchmark in a pro-detention direction over time. Pro-
detention panels will be more likely than pro-detainee panels to 
shape precedent because more hard cases for the government than 
easy ones will come before the court, and therefore panels will hear 
more close cases in which the legal rule could be shifted in the 
government’s direction. Over time, this process will repeat as the 
government continues to exploit sequential redundancy, and the law 
will gradually shift in the government’s favor. This shift will 
exacerbate the other effects I have noted. It will, that is, further 
increase the number of false positives and further decrease the 
number of false negatives. Assuming an exogenously defined 
standard of detention, this change in the law will yield a higher 
probability of false positives than false negatives over time. How 
strong this inflationary effect may be will depend, among other things, 
on the measure of sequential redundancy and the variance in the 
government’s first-round choice of forum. 
The relationship between jurisdictional redundancy and 
accuracy, in short, is more complex than generally believed. 
Simultaneous and sequential forms of overlap have different effects. 
Their influence on false positives and false negatives must be 
considered separately. In addition to its effects in discrete cases, 
sequential overlap has a subtler effect over time via potential changes 
to the relevant legal standard. How these effects are evaluated, of 
course, depends on how false positives and false negatives are 
assessed and on which are seen as more costly. 
B. The Costs of Redundancy 
An intuitive objection to redundancy is on the basis of cost. 
Maintaining two systems is often assumed to be more expensive than 
maintaining one, if only because one system necessarily will lie fallow 
occasionally. In the jurisdictional context, this observation requires a 
caveat and some extensions. The government’s decision to maintain 
spare capacity is not always meaningfully more expensive. But 
creating new reserve capacity can impose costs not only upon 
government but also upon third parties. A full accounting of the 
social cost of jurisdictional redundancy therefore must address both 
the potential costs internalized by the government and the potential 
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externalities—costs imposed upon third parties—especially those that 
government is unlikely to account for in its policy determinations. 
1. Costs to Government.  Jurisdictional redundancy is created 
either by expanding the authority of existing forums or by creating 
new ones.217 An example of the first is the immigration system’s 
deployment after 9/11 to pick up some terrorist-detention functions.218 
An example of the second is the military-commission system. These 
two methods of creating overlap have distinct cost profiles. 
Expanding existing jurisdictions is relatively inexpensive because 
the fixed costs of running the forum have already been expended. The 
change in variable costs from the new responsibilities is not zero—
regulations must be promulgated and agency staff reassigned, for 
example—but it is likely to be low. Every time the government begins 
a new action in a forum, it incurs some costs. But again, the marginal 
cost of each new action is likely to be relatively low. Supplementing 
existing institutions with new responsibilities is therefore a reasonably 
cost-effective strategy from the government’s perspective. 
Creating redundancy from scratch is a different matter. 
Institutional innovation is typically motivated by a belief that new 
entities will yield dramatically better or cheaper policy outcomes.219 
But designing and implementing a new institution is costly. Lawyers 
and policymakers must be reassigned from their ordinary tasks and 
given new and unfamiliar responsibilities. Other policies and projects 
lose resources. Jurisdictional innovation may trigger political 
resistance by existing stakeholders based on fears that it will be used 
to circumvent binding constitutional precommitments. Adjudication 
is sufficiently complex that designers of new institutions must either 
expend considerable time and effort or live with legal uncertainty 
regarding process and outcomes. These costs create a double bind for 
institutional designers. The more effort those designers expend on 
specifying rules and resolving uncertainties, the more time and 
resources a startup demands. The less effort they expend on clarifying 
 
 217. This distinction is similar to the one drawn by Professor Lerner between “duplication,” 
which involves parallelism of functions, and “overlap,” which assumes different units assigned a 
range of functions. Lerner, supra note 127, at 336–37, 342. 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 78–84. 
 219. See, e.g., Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process Is a Strategic Choice: 
Legitimacy and the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
87, 100–04 (2008) (proposing that only a national-security court can provide the optimal mix of 
legitimacy, procedural rigor, and specialization).  
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institutional parameters, the greater the frictional costs of gaining 
institutional momentum. Borrowing rules from existing institutions is 
no panacea: the greater the borrowing, the less innovative the new 
institution will be and the less will be gained in improved policy 
outputs. The upside of institutional startups is therefore constrained 
by the attendant costs. 
Experience with military commissions suggests that startup costs 
in the context of national security can be substantial. The relatively 
slow startup of procedures in military commissions is best explained 
in terms of the tradeoff inherent in institutional startups.220 To be sure, 
military commissions had been used periodically since the 
Revolutionary period.221 But the military commissions envisaged by 
President Bush’s November 2001 executive order were in many ways 
a novelty.222 As such, they created additional uncertainty about 
procedural and substantive rules that were already subject to 
contestation under international and domestic law. Among the 
confusion-inducing procedural issues raised in early proceedings were 
fights about the joinder of different trials, the possibility of self-
representation and related questions of defendants’ competency, and 
the standard for judicial recusal.223 Initial rulings on procedural 
ambiguities seemed to be “ma[de] . . . up” as the proceedings 
unfolded;224 prosecutors protested and sought transfer on ethical 
grounds, with some accusing the commissions of lacking fundamental 
fairness;225 and commission judges evinced what one military lawyer 
labeled “an embarrassing lack of knowledge about the law of war.”226 
 
 220. Delay cannot be explained by detainees’ challenges; detainees were only assigned 
counsel in 2003 and charged before the commission in June 2004—almost three years after the 
November 2001 order. Glazier, supra note 95, at 157–58.  
 221. Cf. Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military 
Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 720–25 (2002) 
(describing Revolutionary War usage of military commissions). 
 222. To be sure, no innovation was needed to expose al Qaeda members to military criminal 
process even in 2001. Cf. 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2000) (vesting courts-martial with general jurisdiction 
over any person amenable to trial under the laws of war). 
 223. Glazier, supra note 95, at 163–66.  
 224. Deborah Pearlstein, Four Issues of Concern, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Aug. 23, 2004), 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2004/08/23/four-issues-of-concern.  
 225. See, e.g., Legal Issues Surrounding the Military Commissions System: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 16–18 (2009) (statement of Lieutenant Colonel Darrel J. Vandeveld) 
(recounting his experience as “a prosecutor in the Office of Military Commissions in 
Guantanamo Bay from May 2007 through December 2008” who underwent a “profound change 
of heart and mind when [he] realized through firsthand observation and through [his] own 
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Congressional intervention did not mitigate these procedural 
problems. In June 2007, the newly reconstituted commissions, acting 
on the basis of the 2006 statutory authorization, dismissed all charges 
against the two remaining defendants. The commissions explained 
that the defendants had been found by earlier military hearings to be 
“enemy combatants” but not “alien unlawful enemy combatants,” 
which was the category used in the 2006 statute’s threshold 
jurisdictional provision.227 That is, describing the commission’s 
jurisdiction, Congress had employed a jurisdictional neologism that 
was inconsistent with the definitions of enemy combatant that had 
previously been employed by the military. It took a costly and time-
consuming appeal to the Court of Military Commission Review to 
resolve the confusion. That court found that the jurisdictional defect 
could be remedied through supplemental factfinding by the military 
commission itself.228 The delay, uncertainty, and sheer cost of these 
proceedings could have been avoided had the government chosen to 
invoke longstanding court-martial jurisdiction over war crimes rather 
than to create military commissions from scratch. Alternatively, the 
government could have expended significant additional resources at 
the outset to generate comprehensive rules and regulations. Unlike 
military commissions, courts-martial could have drawn on decades of 
clarifying precedent about process and substance in a way that 
military commissions could not. But that path was not taken. Instead, 
military tribunals struggled for almost a decade with few convictions, 
none of which involved noteworthy defendants.229 The accumulated 
 
actions that what [he] was seeing at Guantanamo was not at all consistent with our core values 
of justice and due process of law”). 
 226. Glazier, supra note 95, at 162. 
 227. See United States v. Hamdan, No. 04-0004, slip. op. at 2 (Mil. Comm’n June 4, 2007) 
(“The 2004 CSRT determination that the accused is an ‘enemy combatant’ was made for the 
purposes of determining whether or not he was properly detained, and not for the purpose of 
determining whether he was subject to trial by military commission.” (quoting Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 3, § 948d(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2603)). 
 228. United States v. Khadr, No. CMCR 07-001, slip op. at 19–25 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. 
Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/archives/CMCR%20ruling%209-24-
07.pdf.  
 229. For an exemplary account of military commissions published in these pages, see David 
J.R. Frakt, Mohammed Jawad and the Military Commissions of Guantánamo, 60 DUKE L.J. 
1367 (2011). More generally, none of the defendants before military commissions so far, perhaps 
with the exception of Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al-Bahlul, have been alleged to have had 
substantial authority within al Qaeda. See The Guantanamo Trials, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
http://www.hrw.org/features/guantanamo (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (listing defendants who 
have appeared before the military commission and providing case summaries). 
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force of path-dependent learning, in other words, may cut against 
institutional innovations. 
The costs of creating redundancy from scratch are greatest in the 
early days of a new institution. In the terrorism context, this reality 
means that the costs are greatest when the policy need is most 
acute—in the immediate wake of a crisis. As Part I demonstrates, it 
was in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that a need for 
new jurisdictional capacity was felt. Yet that moment was precisely 
when the commissions were hamstrung and contributed little but 
legal uncertainty and fodder for law reviews. 
The perceived difficulties of terrorism adjudication have 
prompted some commentators to propose creation of a new “national 
security court” that blends traits of the Article III criminal-justice 
process with aspects of military adjudication.230 This new institution is 
lauded as a “third way” to “get us out of the quicksand we find 
ourselves in regarding detainees.”231 Proponents assert that the 
innovation would “strike the balance between national security, 
human rights, and due process.”232 Unlike military commissions, 
however, a national-security court would lack even a de minimis 
historical pedigree.233 Its designers would need to grapple with the full 
panoply of procedural and substantive questions that Article III 
courts have largely addressed and that military commissions are 
beginning to resolve. Past experience suggests that the resulting 
startup costs would be very high. A “fresh start”234 thus has a large 
price tag that advocates of national-security courts have failed to 
address. Worse, beyond platitudes about a “third way,” advocates of 
institutional innovation do not adequately explain how their new 
 
 230. See, e.g., GLENN SULMASY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM: A NATURAL 
EVOLUTION OF JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2009) (arguing for the creation of a court that 
balances national-security concerns and due-process rights); Lunday & Rishikof, supra note 219 
(proposing the creation of an Article III court to address the difficulties in terrorist detention). 
For an analysis of other nations’ experiences with specialized security-related courts, see Laura 
K. Donohue, Terrorism and Trial by Jury: The Vices and Virtues of British and American 
Criminal Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1321, 1324–29 (2007); and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and 
Balances in Wartime: American, British, and Israeli Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906 (2004).  
 231. SULMASY, supra note 230, at 157, 193. 
 232. Id. at 175. 
 233. For an argument that even the November 2001 commissions possessed such legitimacy, 
see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack A. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military 
Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249 (2002).  
 234. Glenn M. Sulmasy & Andrea K. Logman, A Hybrid Court for a Hybrid War, 42 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 299, 319 (2009).  
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forum would be a marked improvement on the existing combination 
of overlapping forums. Given the high costs of institutional startup, 
the burden should be on the advocates to show why their proposal is 
plausible, let alone justified.235 
2. Third-Party Effects.  Adding jurisdictional redundancy to the 
status quo also imposes costs on third parties beyond the sheer dollar 
price to the government. First, it imposes costs on all those exposed to 
the system. Second, it may have wider, more systemic effects on the 
general population. Such costs are often discounted or ignored in the 
public debate because they are diffuse and are often imposed on 
politically marginalized constituencies, but there is no ex ante reason 
to dismiss them as trivial. 
The most powerful objection to jurisdictional arbitrage and 
sequential overlap is that they enable circumvention of individual 
constitutional rights, a result that saps public confidence in 
constitutional constraints and thus imposes demoralization costs. By 
switching from the Article III criminal process to a less demanding 
forum, the government is able to secure detention without complying 
with otherwise-mandatory constitutional safeguards.236 Circumvention 
arguments assume a domain of cases in which a defendant is entitled 
to an Article III criminal process before suffering certain kinds of 
liberty deprivation. The Supreme Court, despite having hinted that 
such a limit might exist, has never defined the zone of exclusive 
Article III criminal jurisdiction.237 The circumvention argument has its 
greatest force in contexts in which the application of constitutional 
protections is uncontested, such as the detention of U.S. citizens 
within the United States. It has its least force when a person is seized 
in a context in which the application of domestic criminal law is more 
 
 235. The central claim of such proposals is that a new tribunal would strike a better 
“balance” between liberty and security interests. SULMASY, supra note 230, at 175. But the 
optimal balance of those values is deeply contested, and advocates of national-security courts 
fail to supply an account of the optimal balance. 
 236. Criminal-law scholars have expressed a concern that prosecutors will evade criminal-
procedure rules by turning to the civil law or broadening the substantive scope of the criminal 
law. E.g.,William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1, 17–18 (1996). The evidence compiled in Part I suggests both dynamics are 
discernible in the terrorist-detention domain.  
 237. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (noting that noncriminal detention is 
permissible only “in certain special and ‘narrow’ nonpunitive ‘circumstances’” (quoting Foucha 
v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992))); see also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 83 (invalidating a Louisiana 
statute that authorized civil commitment on a finding of dangerousness without requiring a 
finding of mental illness).  
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contested. Battlefield seizures of noncitizens overseas arguably 
exemplify this second type. 
Circumvention objections have been raised unsuccessfully 
against military detention238 and immigration detention.239 In the 
context of immigration, the Court rejected the circumvention 
argument early in the twentieth century.240 That holding seems 
unlikely to be revisited. In the context of military detention, the law 
with respect to seizures in the United States is unsettled.241 Military 
detention of suspects seized outside the United States raises no 
constitutional red flag. Lower courts also have allowed executive 
detention within the United States, although those rulings have been 
hotly contested.242 
Although they are perhaps unlikely to prevail in federal court, 
circumvention arguments identify a cost attached to jurisdictional 
redundancy. The visible use of overlapping jurisdiction undermines 
confidence in the value of constitutional rights. It may induce in the 
general public a belief that constitutional entitlements are fragile and 
easily gamed by the very government they are designed to restrain.243 
In other contexts, manifest disregard of constitutional rights has been 
thought to have demoralizing effects, as people cease to enjoy the 
possession of constitutional rights when they cease to believe those 
rights are valuable.244 
In addition, past acts of circumvention have undermined the 
government’s credibility with the judiciary. To the extent that such 
credibility is a valuable political asset to the government, 
circumvention may narrow the government’s options in subsequent 
 
 238. See, e.g., Daniel Moeckli, The US Supreme Court’s ‘Enemy Combatant’ Decisions: A 
‘Major Victory for the Rule of Law’?, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 75, 79 (2005) (arguing that 
“the designation as ‘enemy combatants’ seems to have been mainly designed to circumvent the 
procedural safeguards applicable in normal criminal procedures”). 
 239. See, e.g., Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over 
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1581 (2008) (expressing concern about circumvention risk 
through state enforcement of federal immigration law). 
 240. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913). 
 241. For example, see the fractured opinions in Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th 
Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated as moot sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009). 
 242. E.g., id.  
 243. To be sure, it is also possible that the public will feel more secure because they believe 
that the only persons susceptible to the new forms of adjudication are minorities or noncitizens.  
 244. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1210–11 (1967) (introducing 
the idea of demoralization costs with respect to owners when property is condemned and with 
respect to others who believe as a consequence that their property is less secure). 
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cases when a policy failure would be more costly.245 Consider the 
example of José Padilla, first detained as a material witness, then as 
an enemy combatant, and finally switched back to the Article III 
criminal process. When the Department of Justice sought to end 
Padilla’s challenge to his military detention and obviate Supreme 
Court review, it filed a motion for vacatur of the Fourth Circuit’s 
ruling on Padilla’s habeas petition. The circuit court declined. 
Explaining the refusal, Judge Michael Luttig expressed concern that 
“intentional mooting by the government of a case of this import out 
of concern for Supreme Court consideration” was not a “legitimate 
justification but [an] admission of attempted avoidance of review.”246 
He further warned of damage to “the government’s credibility before 
the courts” from the perception that jurisdictional arbitrage was 
based on mere “expediency.”247 That is, the exploitation of 
jurisdictional redundancy can influence judicial as well as popular 
perceptions of the legitimacy of policies in ways that limit the 
government’s future jurisdictional options. 
A second externality, also denominated in terms of public 
demoralization, is worth mentioning. Scholars of criminal law have 
observed that the growing duration and uncertainty of the criminal 
process have made the “[p]rocess . . . the [p]unishment” for those 
exposed to the possibility of criminal penalties.248 For most people, the 
uncertainty of possible criminal punishment and the anxiety 
engendered by waiting are substantial. In the national-security 
context, those costs are aggravated in two ways: First, pretrial 
detainees in terrorism cases often are held under highly restrictive 
conditions pursuant to “special administrative measures” that 
significantly limit human contact and mobility.249 Second—and more 
importantly here—sequential overlap dramatically increases the 
 
 245. See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 865 (2007) (developing the importance of credibility for an executive otherwise 
unconstrained by law). 
 246. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 247. Id. at 587. 
 248. See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING 
CASES IN A LOWER CIRCUIT COURT 199–243 (1979) (developing this argument with respect to 
the ordinary criminal process). 
 249. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2011) (authorizing the attorney general to require “special 
administrative measures” that limit human contact when it is “reasonably necessary to protect 
persons against the risk of death or serious bodily injury”); see also United States v. Hashmi, 621 
F. Supp. 2d 76, 79–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (describing the use of special administrative measures in a 
terrorism case).  
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potential duration and uncertainty of the criminal process for anyone 
exposed to the first-choice process. Defendants in criminal terrorism 
proceedings, for example, must account for the possibility that even if 
they prevail in an Article III criminal process, they still may be 
detained and subjected to another process in which they have fewer 
procedural protections. Across the board, this uncertainty imposes a 
toll on defendants quite apart from the cost of false positives. The 
shadow of sequential overlap, moreover, may induce some 
defendants to enter plea agreements accepting responsibility for 
offenses that a rational calculation of their exposure under the 
criminal law would not have induced.250 
Two objections to consideration of these costs are worth noting. 
First, some of the enumerated externalities arise even in the absence 
of formal redundancy if only a low-process venue is used. Hence, one 
might say that they are effects of opting for low process rather than 
effects of redundancy. But the analysis of institutional arrangements 
is not done in a vacuum. Rather, it requires an accounting of changes 
from the status quo. It is plausible to take the near-exclusive Article 
III criminal jurisdiction in 2001 as a baseline to evaluate changes in 
jurisdictional design. To the extent that these externalities follow 
from new and emerging forms of redundancy, it would be misleading 
to ignore them because to do so would undercount the costs of novel 
forms of redundancy. 
Second, these externalities do not necessarily arise simply 
because redundancy exists. If redundancy exists but is used 
infrequently, as was arguably the case a decade after the September 
2001 attacks, these externalities may be minimal. People are rarely 
demoralized by powers that remain latent. Process cannot be the 
punishment if it is typically in desuetude. Only as redundancy is 
increasingly used will these powers begin to be felt. Stated otherwise, 
the cost curve for these externalities is concave, with small marginal 
increases initially and large marginal increases as the amount of 
systemic redundancy increases.251 This cost curve contrasts with the 
distribution of the accuracy-related costs of increasing redundancy in 
 
 250. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, 1996 Statute Becomes the Justice Department’s Antiterror 
Weapon of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at B15 (“Mr. Brown said his client had decided to 
plead guilty after prosecutors suggested that Mr. Mosed [one of the Lackawanna suspects] could 
be declared an enemy combatant and be held indefinitely without a lawyer, or be charged with 
treason and face execution.”). 
 251. Similarly, the accuracy and start-up costs identified in Parts III.A and III.B are likely to 
have concave cost curves. 
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relation to insurance and moral-hazard effects. These costs increase 
convexly as the use of redundancy is increased, with the greatest costs 
accruing with the first uses of redundancy. This difference in cost 
curves plays a role in Part IV’s assessment of proposals to eliminate 
redundancy. 
3. The Interaction of Accuracy and Cost Effects.  Accuracy and 
cost effects may interact such that sequential redundancy is most 
likely to be invoked when accuracy costs are at their nadir and social-
welfare gains at their peak. To see this relationship, assume that the 
government incurs some minimal cost associated with adjudication. 
Trials of whatever kind are costly in terms of the manpower needed 
to gather evidence and to present it in the correct form. These costs 
plausibly influence when and how often the government considers 
invoking sequential redundancy. Provided the marginal cost of a 
second adjudication is not zero, the government also has some 
incentive to turn to a second forum when the expected value of 
detention is high rather than low. That is, there is at least some reason 
to think that the marginal costs of invoking redundancy will 
encourage its efficient use. For example, the government may use 
sequential redundancy when it has inculpatory information that it 
cannot disclose to first-round adjudicators. In this way, the interaction 
between accuracy and cost effects would conduce to a desirable 
allocation of adjudicative resources because government would 
employ the second forum if and only if it were valuable to do so. The 
force of this logic, though, depends on what the government values. If 
the government values the elimination of terrorism risk, the logic 
holds. If, however, the government values detention for some other 
reason—say, because it seeks to avoid embarrassment or to maintain 
its credibility as “tough on terror”—the salutary dynamic does not 
hold. 
4. Summary.  Accuracy and cost are typically understood to be 
important variables in the analysis of a terrorist-detention system. 
This Section has demonstrated that redundancy has complex direct 
effects on cost and accuracy. Redundancy does not always mitigate 
the risk of policy failure and increase the risk of abusive government 
behavior. And redundancy is not always associated with new 
expenses. Rather, it is necessary to clarify the precise kind of 
redundancy at issue and then to be clear about the relative costs of 
false positives and false negatives. 
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But this analysis of the direct effects of redundancy is 
incomplete. Indirect mechanisms that link jurisdictional specifications 
to policy outcomes of cost and accuracy also exist. The magnitude of 
these indirect effects, to be sure, is likely to be smaller than that of the 
direct effects, although perhaps not inframarginal. Indirect effects on 
institutional incentives and cultures may also compound over time, 
eventually working major changes to the distribution of policy 
outcomes. The balance of this Part turns to those indirect mechanisms 
and considers how redundancy influences agency relationships and 
information flows. 
C. Principal-Agent Costs 
An agency problem arises when a principal delegates a task to an 
agent but cannot fully monitor the amount of effort the agent uses to 
complete the task.252 Political scientists have pointed out that agency 
costs are a pervasive problem in government.253 To address the slack 
that results from using agents, a principal must employ some costly 
mix of incentives and monitoring. As a result, agency relationships 
create costs that limit the achievement of policy goals, and, thus, 
institutional designs that control agency costs improve outcomes. 
The terrorist-detention context does not escape the problem of 
agency costs. Adjudicators in federal courts and other forums are the 
agents of legislators and presidents who set the terms of substantive 
policy in the security domain insofar as they are tasked with the 
execution of a statutory command.254 So too are the intelligence 
agencies. Adjudicators and agencies, however, are only imperfectly 
responsive to their elected principals. In part, this insulation from 
political influences is due to Article III’s life-tenure rules and the 
regulatory protections for Article I judges. And in part, it exists 
because elected principals have limited information about their 
agents’ performance, whereas agents have their own policy 
preferences.255 Elected officials would prefer for adjudicators and 
 
 252. For a good introduction to agency problems, see generally Eric A. Posner, Agency 
Models in Legal Scholarship, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 225 (Eric A. 
Posner ed., 2000). 
 253. See, e.g., Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 203, 207, 209–10 (2005) (noting agency cost problems specifically in the context 
of presidential power and congressional oversight). 
 254. Judicial review of constitutional matters is, of course, another story.  
 255. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 40 (1993) (“[T]he conditions of judicial 
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intelligence agents to apply specific substantive criteria to evaluate 
risks when they make detention decisions and to conform to certain 
constitutional values. But elected officials cannot directly ascertain 
whether adjudicators’ or agents’ behaviors align with these 
preferences. The adjudicator and the agent have better information 
than the elected principal about whether a particular risk threshold 
has been crossed or whether a constitutional right was triggered in a 
given case. All else being equal, greater agency slack entails less 
accuracy and higher costs. 
Jurisdictional redundancy could influence agency costs in two 
ways: First, it might create competition among forums, competition 
that in turn might foster incentives for adjudicators to conform to the 
wishes of democratic principals. Second, redundancy could enable a 
form of “costly signaling” that would provide Congress with 
information about the performance of the intelligence agencies. The 
effects of redundancy on agency costs are an indirect channel through 
which institutional design influences policy outcomes. 
1. Competition Among Forums.  From an adjudicator’s 
perspective, the most important and immediately observable effect of 
jurisdictional redundancy may be that it destroys any monopoly that 
an adjudicator might claim on the novel and important subject matter 
of terrorism. Redundancy instead induces competition among forums. 
Congress, adjudicators, and government litigators may respond to this 
competition in ways that influence policy outcomes. 
Consider the matter first from the perspective of Congress. On 
the one hand, jurisdictional redundancy may make oversight more 
costly. The multiplicity of operational entities devoted to adjudication 
makes it more difficult to ascertain why policy goals are not being 
achieved.256 For example, overall underenforcement might be due to 
the rigidity of constitutional rights in the Article III context, or it 
might be a result of errors by immigration judges. Identifying the least 
 
employment enable and induce judges to vote their personal convictions and policy 
preferences—or in a word their values.”). 
 256. See Gersen, Unbundled Powers, supra note 28, at 327 (noting that “eliminating 
overlapping responsibility for a given task . . . links institutional effort to policy success, which 
provides greater institutional clarity and, as a result, a stronger foundation for electoral 
control”). 
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costly and most effective reform is also more difficult when there are 
many, rather than few, potential culprits.257 
But on the other hand, jurisdictional competition might also 
reduce the costs of monitoring.258 A multiplicity of adjudicative tools 
addressing the same task can, under some circumstances, make 
monitoring less costly by allowing “yardstick competition” among 
entities engaged in similar tasks.259 To see this, imagine a principal 
supervising the work of one administrative-law judge who handles 
benefits claims. If the principal does not have information about the 
underlying rate of valid claims or the time needed to process valid 
and invalid claims, she may have difficulty knowing when to sanction 
or praise the judge. By contrast, if the adjudicator has a dozen judges, 
a supervisor could create a data set that enabled more informed 
oversight through intragroup comparisons. To be sure, yardstick 
comparisons may be more difficult when the different forums used for 
determining terrorism status employ distinct procedures and 
substantive definitions. And the possibility of deliberate procedural 
arbitraging of cases between forums also may undermine simple 
interjurisdictional comparisons. Nevertheless, in contrasting Article 
III criminal courts and military commissions, a rational legislator 
might set aside these differences as noise and review those forums’ 
respective performances when addressing specific legal issues, such as 
the secrecy problems implicated by classified evidence or the 
handling of evidence from other detainees in military custody. Direct 
comparisons of how different forums address similar problems may 
yield evidence that informs decisions about which forums to prefer 
moving forward. In this way, yardstick comparisons are both possible 
and potentially conducive to clear judgment. 
Now consider the matter from the perspective of the adjudicator. 
Here, the effect is more straightforward: redundancy creates an 
incentive for the adjudicator to conform to the preferences of the 
principal. Some adjudicators view terrorism as a high-priority, 
prestigious bailiwick.260 Capturing that jurisdiction promotes the flow 
 
 257. This is known as a “team production” problem. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779–83 
(1972). 
 258. William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617, 636–37 (1975). 
 259. Cf. Maskin et al., supra note 25, at 360 (“[Y]ardstick competition between two regions 
will be more effective in providing incentives than that between two ministries.”). 
 260. This is not true of all federal judges. See, e.g., Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1077–
78 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring) (expressing doubts as to whether federal judges 
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of resources and prestige both to their institutions and to themselves 
individually. But adjudicators may also be poorly equipped to handle 
this jurisdiction. For example, they may lack background knowledge 
about terrorism or about the geopolitical conditions that are relevant 
to threat assessments for specific suspects.261 Or they may be ill 
informed about relevant bodies of law.262 Under either of these 
conditions, agency costs arise because the adjudicator cannot pursue 
the goals of the democratic principal without some number of errors. 
The incentives created by competition among forums can, 
however, be used to eliminate such deficiencies and thereby to reduce 
agency costs. Scholars of administrative law have observed that “the 
assignment of jurisdiction can be used to create incentives for 
[decisionmakers] to invest in the development of expertise.”263 For 
example, judges who wish to keep jurisdiction over terrorism-related 
cases may be prompted to invest in gaining expertise about the laws 
of war or the geopolitics of the Afghan-Pakistan theater to deflect 
criticism that they are ill suited to determine the status of terrorism 
suspects. Such specialization is not without precedent. In the habeas 
context, some supporters of federal habeas review of state criminal 
convictions note that it was particularly beneficial because of federal 
judges’ ability to specialize in a smaller class of constitutional 
questions. Advocates of a robust § 2254 habeas functionality contend 
that habeas “isolat[es]” federal rights “from other elements in the 
criminal process,” and thus make their vindication more likely.264 
Related to expertise is innovation. Most of the potential forums 
for terrorism adjudication, such as Article III courts and the 
immigration bench, are generalist institutions. Their procedural 
frameworks are not tailored to the terrorism context. Competition 
can be used to induce adjudicators in these forums to develop 
procedural tools specifically crafted to handle terrorism-related 
adjudication. In the Article III context, some judges have recognized 
the possibility of competition from other forums and, in the same 
 
should evaluate terrorism risk in individual cases). If more judges had Judge Silberman’s 
attitude, redundancy might have the pernicious effect of enabling shirking.  
 261. This may be particularly true of immigration judges. See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 
430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (listing twelve examples in which the Seventh Circuit criticized 
the decisions of immigration judges).  
 262. See, e.g., Glazier, supra note 95, at 162 (describing military-commission judges’ lack of 
knowledge about the law of war).  
 263. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction, supra note 28, at 213. 
 264. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 185, at 1045.  
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breath, have expressed a willingness to tailor rules to the security 
context. In a complex and controversial 2008 terrorism prosecution, 
for example, a panel of the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the wide 
disagreement over “the precise extent to which the formal criminal-
justice process must be utilized when those suspected of participation 
in terrorist cells and networks are involved” but emphasized in the 
same passage that “the criminal-justice system does retain an 
important place in the ongoing effort to deter and punish terrorist 
acts . . . [and] is not without those attributes of adaptation that will 
permit it to function in the post-9/11 world.”265 The circuit court 
thereby recognized the pressure of interforum competition and 
simultaneously signaled a willingness to innovate in response. 
A study by the Federal Judiciary Center suggests that the Fourth 
Circuit is not alone. The study enumerates dozens of procedural 
innovations developed through common-law adjudication in response 
to the distinctive aspects of terrorism cases.266 In the aforementioned 
2008 case, for example, the Fourth Circuit rejected arguments that 
statements made by the defendant to Saudi interrogators should be 
suppressed because of the presence of U.S. officials in that 
interrogation.267 The court thereby lowered the expected cost of 
international collaboration among security agencies and made it 
easier to triage terrorism cases into the Article III criminal context. In 
the same decision, the Fourth Circuit also endorsed innovative 
procedures to allow depositions of Saudi officials in Riyadh via 
videoconference with the defendant in the United States.268 The court 
concluded that videoconferencing vindicated the defendant’s 
Confrontation Clause269 interests while preserving the secrecy 
interests of Saudi officials.270 Other courts have also found ways to 
 
 265. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 221 (4th Cir. 2008).  
 266. See ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL SECURITY CASE 
STUDIES: SPECIAL CASE-MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES, at vii (2010), available at http://www.fjc
.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ts100222.pdf/$file/ts100222.pdf (indexing the procedural issues 
addressed in the cases studied).  
 267. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 228–30 & n.5. 
 268. See id. at 239–43 (approving of depositions in which the defendant participated through 
remote video link as consistent with the Confrontation Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. VI); see 
also United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (endorsing a 
streamlined suppression hearing in which the defendant’s ability to question foreign intelligence 
officials was curtailed).  
 269. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him . . . .”). 
 270. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 242.  
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accommodate confrontation rights while also honoring the 
confidentiality concerns of foreign intelligence agencies.271 Access to 
exculpatory but classified evidence in the government’s possession 
also has posed nettlesome constitutional problems under the Sixth 
Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause.272 At least one federal 
court has found a way to craft procedures that purport to enable 
constitutionally sufficient access to such witnesses without 
compromising secrecy.273 
Judges are not the only engine of interjurisdictional competition. 
Prosecutors can also elicit innovation. For example, the criminal 
division of the Department of Justice has approached Congress to 
seek amendments to substantive criminal law or criminal procedures 
that would enable more use of the Article III criminal process.274 
These officials are especially sensitive to the problem of underlap, a 
situation in which a particular jurisdiction does not encompass a case 
that officials believe should be regulated.275 As administrative-law 
scholars have suggested, jurisdictional competition can “produce 
desirable incentives” to identify and mitigate underlap.276 Hence, 
Justice Department lawyers have an incentive—sharpened by 
jurisdictional competition—to draw to Congress’s attention situations 
in which they lack the ability to prosecute persons believed to pose 
serious threats so as to maintain their institutional primacy on 
counterterrorism matters.277 For example, in December 2004, 
Congress responded to Justice Department requests to amend the 
 
 271. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145 (2d Cir. 2003); accord Marzook, 435 
F. Supp. 2d at 749.  
 272. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .”).  
 273. United States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292, 312–17 (4th Cir.) (holding that the 
defendant’s compulsory-process-right could be satisfied by his obtaining summaries of 
interrogations from the government), amended by 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 274. Cf. Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the 
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 77–78 (2005) (drawing proposals for statutory 
reform from Justice Department testimony). 
 275. See Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction, supra note 28, at 213 
(describing the concept of “underlapping jurisdiction”).  
 276. Id. 
 277. Even after a decade of expansions in the federal criminal law of counterterrorism, such 
gaps still exist. Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, Obama Adviser Outlines Plans To Defeat al 
Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2011, at A12 (describing Vice Admiral William H. McRaven’s 
statements concerning a class of terrorism suspects who are detained, initially held on Navy 
vessels while the Justice Department identifies any authority to detain, and, in some cases, 
released for absence of such authority).  
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material-support statute to encompass training in foreign terrorist 
camps, a need identified through earlier prosecutions.278 Although 
prosecutorial incentives may not always conduce to maximal social 
welfare, this instance seems to be one in which they can play a useful 
role in raising institutional-design questions worthy of congressional 
attention. 
To be sure, innovation may be undesirable. Reasonable people 
may differ as to whether the aforementioned procedural 
modifications conform to constitutional criminal-procedure 
commands. Some might argue that the compromises subtly corrode 
the Article III criminal-justice system’s hard-earned reputation for 
evenhandedness and integrity. Others would go further, claiming that 
this reputational cost may undermine public confidence in the justice 
system in a way that undermines trust in government, perhaps with 
the consequence of dampening public cooperation with police. Those 
who see such modifications as violations of core constitutional rights 
will accordingly count interjurisdictional competition as a cost and 
not a benefit. Resolution of that normative question, however, is 
beyond the scope of this Article. Whatever the case, the point here is 
that Congress can induce either more or less innovation by either 
dialing up or down the amount of jurisdictional redundancy.279 Thus, 
redundancy is a means of reducing agency costs. 
2. Informed Oversight.  Elected politicians and senior 
policymakers can use jurisdictional specification not only as a tool to 
control the agency costs associated with adjudicators but also to gain 
better insight into how well line agencies responsible for investigation 
and interdiction are performing their tasks. Changes to jurisdictional 
redundancy may also enable political-branch overseers to gain more 
confident knowledge of the threat environment. 
Politicians and senior policymakers who allocate resources and 
answer other broad policy questions have imperfect knowledge both 
 
 278. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 
§ 6602, 118 Stat. 3638, 3761 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339D (2006)) (establishing a crime for 
receiving “military-type training” from a “designated terrorist organization”); see also Aiding 
Terrorists: An Examination of the Material Support Statute: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 12 (2004) (statement of Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Criminal Division, Department of Justice) (stating that “training to commit terror under certain 
circumstances may not be a crime, which just stands logic on its head,” and urging a change in 
the law). 
 279. Whitford, supra note 189, at 164 (noting how interagency competition can “reveal[] 
information”). 
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of the scale of the terrorism threat and of the performance of line 
security agencies. Because much of these agencies’ threat information 
derives from the national-security apparatus, the two kinds of 
uncertainty are likely correlated. The sixteen intelligence agencies 
cooperate in periodic production of a National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism for the White House.280 But it may be hard for 
Congress and the White House to know whether to discount the 
claims and assessments made by the intelligence community—and if 
so, in which direction to do the discounting.281 As a consequence, 
democratic principles may be especially vulnerable to the whims of 
their putative agents in the national-security domain when it comes to 
evaluating those agents’ performances. The less trustworthy the 
agents, the less reliable the principal’s epistemic base. 
Jurisdictional design provides ways for policymakers to elicit 
information about agency performance to make more informed 
judgments. Two potential mechanisms merit highlighting here. First, 
forcing an agency to justify its initial detention decisions before a 
neutral and independent decisionmaker may supply information 
about how accurate the agency is in identifying terrorist risks.282 A 
demand for external verification also may have a disciplining effect in 
anticipation of front-end agency decisions. An agent that is aware 
that its decisions must be justified after the fact has an incentive to 
exercise more care than an agent subject to no post hoc control. To 
that end, it may be desirable to supplement the internal 
determination offered by the immigration service or the military with 
a procedurally robust forum independent of the agency making the 
threshold detention decision—such as an Article III court. Provided 
that the independent adjudicator and the investigating agency do not 
share “strongly correlated biases,” senior policymakers could secure 
some insight into how accurate the agency is in its threat assessments 
by looking at how often the agency prevails upon review.283 A high 
 
 280. E.g., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM (2011), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.  
 281. Consider, for example, the debates about estimates of Iran’s nuclear capabilities.  
 282. Cf. Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1145 (1990) (“If Congress observes that an agency has a particularly 
poor litigating record in the federal courts, it may take corrective action . . . .”).  
 283. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 1422, 1464 (2011); see also Krishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free 
Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 617, 625–30 (1992) (showing that a group of 
decisionmakers with a shared school of thought may have a lower probability of making a 
correct decision than any one decisionmaker alone). 
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rate of reversal would, all else being equal, signal a systemic problem. 
This kind of stacking of internal with external process may be an 
appropriate tactic for legislators to adopt if, for example, Congress is 
concerned that some agents are “zealots” who pursue their mission 
without regard to false positives.284 
Second, and alternatively, senior policymakers might exploit 
jurisdictional redundancy by drawing inferences from how agencies 
choose among forums. Procedural hurdles can serve as “costly 
signal[s]” to political overseers about the underlying value that their 
agencies attach to different outcomes.285 An agency decision to opt for 
the most procedurally onerous pathway is evidence that the agency 
has engaged in a diligent and thorough investigation and is confident 
about its conclusion. The choice of a costly forum thereby allows 
overseers to “draw[] inferences about the costs the agency incurred” 
in detaining a suspect and about “how valuable” the agency believes 
its detention decision to be.286 An agency’s persistent decision to 
employ more procedurally onerous pathways may suggest that it has 
greater confidence in its own detention decisions. By contrast, a 
choice to employ a less procedurally demanding path may be 
evidence that an agency is less confident about its judgment or that 
the agency is slacking in a way that may be systematically undesirable. 
Senior policymakers can make such inferences only when two 
conditions are met. Agencies must have a choice between high- and 
low-process avenues. Further, agencies also must have some motive 
to conform to elected officials’ preferences—for example, to 
demonstrate competence and thereby secure future flows of funding. 
Jurisdictional redundancy enables these conditions to be met. In so 
doing, it creates a body of evidence—the pattern of choices made by 
agencies as among different adjudicative pathways—that provides 
political overseers with useful information about whether agencies 
 
 284. See Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy 
Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 874, 886 (2007) (arguing that 
agencies will be staffed by individuals with outlying policy preferences in comparison to those 
held by members of Congress). 
 285. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial 
Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 771–75 (2006) (“[T]he costly signaling theory of hard look 
judicial review postulates that when courts scrutinize agency records, they are drawing 
inferences about the costs the agency incurred in generating the record. These cost estimates are 
useful to the court because they indicate how valuable the regulation is to the agency.”). 
 286. Id. at 775. This mechanism works when judicial and agency policy preferences are 
positively correlated. Id. at 779.  
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are expending effort on accuracy as opposed to, say, maximizing the 
sheer volume of detention.287 
Congress’s use of jurisdictional redundancy as a mechanism to 
elicit information about agency performance also has doctrinal 
implications. Many commentators have argued that judicial deference 
to agency judgments of law and fact is warranted especially in the 
national-security context.288 But this deference may have a perverse 
effect. If the political branches obtain information about the 
reliability of agency judgments through robust judicial review of 
detention decisions, judicial deference will likely align agencies’ and 
courts’ biases in a way that eliminates epistemic gain. Deference, in 
other words, saps the information-forcing effects of judicial review 
not only directly, by undermining courts’ willingness to identify 
instances in which the agency has erred, but also indirectly, by 
disabling the agency from demonstrating its own credibility through 
its choice of forum for adjudicating terrorism suspects. The 
persistence of jurisdictional redundancy therefore suggests that 
deference to agency findings in national-security cases may 
sometimes be systemically costly. 
D. Intelligence Gathering and Deterrence 
The second indirect effect of jurisdictional choice on outcomes 
arises through its effect on information flows. Institutions are usefully 
seen as “systems for managing information” because they provide 
mechanisms to aggregate information, generate incentives to gather 
 
 287. There are many contexts in which Congress expressly mandates the production of data 
about the rate at which agencies employ certain tools. See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, sec. 101, § 707, 122 Stat. 2436, 2457–
58 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881f (Supp. III 2010)) (mandating biannual reports to Congress). 
The animating logic of such reporting requirements is that Congress needs to have data about 
different statutory tools’ being employed to make judgments about how to tailor government 
powers in the future. My argument on detention is that data about the comparative use of 
different forums may provide Congress with information about the kinds of persons being 
detained and the effort being expended by agencies on such persons. This information may 
allow Congress, for example, to infer that it needs to impose more or less onerous regulations 
on the agency’s front-end interdiction powers.  
 288. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 1170, 1218 (2007) (“In our view, the executive should [with respect to the war on 
terror and the AUMF] usually be entitled to interpret genuinely ambiguous provisions as it sees 
fit, subject to the qualifications that its interpretations must be reasonable and that Congress 
must specifically authorize intrusions on constitutionally sensitive interests.”. 
HUQ IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  12:33 AM 
1488 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1415 
and convey information, and serve as platforms to disseminate data.289 
A “failure to consider how legal institutions affect incentives to 
acquire information may lead to incomplete or misguided 
recommendations for institutional reform.”290 This Section explores 
two effects of institutional design that are related to information 
flows. First, it examines the negative effect of redundancy on the 
incentives of agents to gather accurate information in timely and cost-
effective ways. Second, it discusses the inverse correlation between 
jurisdictional redundancy and marginal deterrence. In both cases, the 
effect under discussion can be discerned whenever a low-process 
venue is added to the mix. They are both properly considered 
redundancy-related effects because they arise through the addition of 
low-process venues to the status quo. Ignoring such effects would 
implausibly omit certain costs associated with creating new 
redundancy, biasing the analysis in favor of such overlap. And, to 
anticipate an argument developed in Part IV, both become acutely 
relevant in the context of proposals to eliminate jurisdictional 
overlap. 
1. Information Acquisition.  An underexplored effect of 
institutional design is its effect on the incentives of agents to gather 
accurate information in timely and cost-effective ways. The 
information necessary to create accurate counterterrorism measures 
is costly to acquire. The government’s agents must therefore expend 
effort to obtain information. But there is no guarantee that even 
experienced intelligence agencies will allocate resources wisely. For 
example, on the eve of 9/11, the CIA’s al Qaeda unit was relatively 
underfunded.291 Jurisdictional specification matters because “public 
decisionmakers’ expertise about policy decisions is often endogenous 
(produced by factors internal to the legal-institutional system) rather 
than exogenous.”292 Changes to the contours of jurisdiction have 
consequences for the stock of expertise within government because 
those contours influence the upstream incentives of investigating 
 
 289. ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT 
SMALL 9 (2007). 
 290. Stephenson, supra note 283, at 1426 (exploring connections between institutional 
design and information acquisition); see also Sah & Stiglitz, supra note 23, at 716–17 (examining 
the effects of the “architecture” of an organization—i.e., “how the decision-making authority 
and ability [are] distributed within a system”). 
 291. TIM WEINER, LEGACY OF ASHES: THE HISTORY OF THE CIA 478 (2007). 
 292. Stephenson, supra note 283, at 1426.  
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officials as to how and when to gather evidence. They do so in large 
part because different forums permit detention based on different 
kinds of factual showings of dangerousness—thereby inducing 
different levels of investment in information acquisition. 
Consider the following mechanism linking jurisdictional 
redundancy to decisions about how information is acquired. 
Government officials’ strong incentives to prevent terrorist events 
give them powerful motives to avoid false negatives. But officials’ 
attitudes to false positives are more ambiguous. It would be surprising 
if officials systematically prized liberty over security goals. It might be 
that fiscal constraints provide officials with a reason to avoid false 
positives, but this possibility seems unlikely. And officials generally 
do not share the fiscal goals of government.293 Even if they did, the 
fiscal constraints upon national-security agencies seem in practice 
exiguous. Scant evidence suggests that the war on terrorism will be 
penny-pinched to death. Several Supreme Court and appellate court 
judgments also suggest that officials have little reason to fear that 
excessive security-related detentions will result in personal tort 
liability.294 All else being equal, it therefore seems likely that officials’ 
incentives will be asymmetrical. More care will be taken to avoid false 
negatives than to avoid false positives. This dynamic will, in turn, lead 
officials to select investigative tools that err on the side of false 
negatives and not false positives. They may rely, for example, on 
coercive interrogation methods that minimize false negatives but tend 
to produce an undesirable number of false positives, rather than 
relying on more time-consuming methods that limit both. 
Jurisdictional redundancy can exacerbate this asymmetrical set 
of incentives. Consider a situation in which officials know that the 
government has the option of selecting among different forums with 
procedural constraints of varying intensity. Given that knowledge, the 
officials may opt to use methods that predictably yield high numbers 
of false positives in the expectation that the low-procedure pathway 
 
 293. See Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 370–71 (2000) (expressing skepticism about the 
incentive effects of government tort judgments).  
 294. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) (dismissing for failure to state a 
claim a damages action by a former immigration detainee against two high-level federal 
officials); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (dismissing a suit because 
of the insufficiency of the allegations and the absence of a Bivens remedy); El-Masri v. United 
States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s dismissal based on the 
“state secrets” doctrine). 
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can be used to process those cases.295 For example, if officials were to 
know that the government exercised a choice between Article III 
criminal process and enemy-combatant detention in practice—either 
as a consequence of simultaneous overlap or sequential overlap—
they would have no reason to correct for a skewed collection of 
information. They would rely on less accurate forms of evidence, 
knowing that the weakest cases will be triaged into a military forum in 
which evidentiary rules are thinner. As a result, jurisdictional 
redundancy may increase the rate of false positives indirectly by 
changing the incentives of investigating officials. This effect obtains 
only, however, if redundancy is used rather than latent. When 
redundancy largely lies fallow—as it historically has—it is not clear 
that it has a deleterious effect on incentives in this way. 
By contrast, when investigating agents know that the status of a 
suspect will likely be determined in a forum that accepts only high-
quality information, they have a greater incentive to collect 
information that does not suffer from pro-detention biases. In this 
way, the elimination of jurisdictional overlap in favor of a high-
process channel may increase the accuracy of detention decisions. 
Eliminating a high-process forum in favor of a low-process forum, on 
the other hand, has no such salutary accuracy effect. 
Jurisdictional redundancy’s effect on information acquisition 
may be undesirable even if false positives are not seen as having a 
significant welfare cost. When officials know that their judgments will 
not be subject to stringent ex post verification, they also may allocate 
their investigative resources in undesirable ways. For example, they 
may focus investigative resources not on populations that present the 
greatest risk but on populations that promise the largest number of 
detentions, understood to include both true and false positives, so as 
to demonstrate their proficiency and effectiveness. 
Furthermore, over time the absence of disciplining post hoc 
review may have the effect of corroding investigative skills. That is, 
the absence of disciplining review either by an Article III or an 
Article I adjudicator over time will result in a withering of 
investigative skills, as agencies increasingly resort to overinclusive 
 
 295. This is another example of the general problem that arises when agents are delegated 
multiple tasks and have preferences as between those tasks that are inconsistent with the 
preferences of the principal. See generally Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask 
Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 24 (1991) (analyzing an agent’s decisionmaking process when the agent 
has more than one task to perform). 
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investigative techniques. There is some evidence for this dynamic in 
the criminal law. For example, Professor Jonathan Simon argues that 
widening opportunities for severe criminal punishments based on 
possession of small amounts of narcotics has dulled police officers’ 
incentives to develop or retain investigative skills.296 Making arrests 
for possession offenses is far easier, Simon contends, than investing in 
hard and potentially unrewarding investigations. In the national-
security context, these asymmetrical preferences for investigative 
techniques may be corrected by directing cases into a forum with 
stringent exclusionary rules. For example, an absolute rule against 
evidence gained by torture or cruel and inhumane treatment by either 
U.S. officials or other states’ officials might induce long-term 
investments in intelligence relationships and methods that do not rely 
on such practices and that gain more reliably valuable information. 
Jurisdictional redundancy’s effect on information acquisition 
moves through the channels of dissipated skills and lost opportunities. 
Accordingly, this effect is hard to quantify, just like the analogous de-
skilling effect in law enforcement. Government insiders, of course, 
are unlikely to supply candid assessments of the problem. Indeed, 
they may not even discern it. Although it is hard to estimate, 
redundancy’s impact on incentives to develop and retain investigative 
skills may nonetheless undermine policy outcomes in the long term. 
2. Marginal Deterrence.  One possible function of a terrorist-
detention regime is to deter potential terrorist recruits. Jurisdictional 
redundancy can create impediments to effective marginal deterrence. 
To obtain optimal deterrence, “[a] system of punishment should 
impose heavier penalties for more serious crimes in order to coerce 
criminals into committing less serious crimes.”297 Absent the 
calibration of punishment in light of the severity of the offense, 
marginal deterrence is lost. As George Stigler famously explained, “If 
 
 296. Jonathan Simon, Recovering the Craft of Policing: Wrongful Convictions, the War on 
Crime, and the Problem of Security, in WHEN LAW FAILS: MAKING SENSE OF MISCARRIAGES 
OF JUSTICE 115, 117 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2009) (“[T]he culture of 
investigation inside American policing has become reliant on forced confessions and other 
forms of ‘junk evidence’ as a by-product of its long, dirty war on drugs.” (footnote omitted)). 
 297. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and 
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1066 (2009). 
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the thief has his hand cut off for taking five dollars, he had just as well 
take $5,000.”298 
The law of counterterrorism is already rife with rules that 
confound marginal deterrence. For example, the material-support 
statute encompasses a vast domain of conduct related to FTOs, from 
the donation of de minimis funds to the construction and delivery of 
explosive devices. The statute’s penalty provisions impose a 
maximum fifteen-year sentence.299 A potential life sentence may be 
authorized if the material support can be connected to a specific act 
of violence that results in loss of life.300 This use of a high and fixed 
penalty for a large set of varied acts has a perverse consequence. 
Those who give a small amount of material support may reasonably 
believe that because they are already exposed to such significant 
punishments, like Stigler’s thief, they have little else left to lose.301 The 
same problem arises with enemy-combatant detention. Recall that 
under the precedent of the D.C. Circuit, the government may detain 
as an enemy combatant almost anyone who acts in a coordinated 
fashion with al Qaeda.302 Potential sympathizers with al Qaeda, once 
they have interacted with the group, have no incentive to avoid 
accelerated participation with it. Paradoxically, this phenomenon 
might diminish recruitment costs for terrorist organizations that can 
generate diffuse sympathy for their ultimate aims but that have 
difficulty persuading fellow travelers to make serious sacrifices for the 
cause.303 To say the least, it is an odd result when the law works to 
encourage people to deepen their links with terrorism. 
A possible objection to this marginal-deterrence logic would 
begin from the premise that terrorists are not rational actors and so 
are not amenable to deterrence effects. Anecdotal evidence from 
terrorism cases might be marshaled to suggest the dominance of 
 
 298. George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 
(1970); see also Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as 
a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1245 (1985) (“[R]aising the sanction with the expected 
harmfulness of acts gives parties who are not deterred incentives to do less harm.”). 
 299. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006). 
 300. Id. 
 301. This holds constant the likelihood of interdiction.  
 302. See supra text accompanying notes 172–73.  
 303. Al Qaeda in particular has suffered severe “[r]ecruitment difficulties” since 9/11. 
CHARLES KURZMAN, THE MISSING MARTYRS: WHY THERE ARE SO FEW MUSLIM 
TERRORISTS 11–12 (2011). Sympathy for the organization’s goals appears to be much more 
widespread than willingness to act on its behalf.  
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ideological motives over rational strategic calculations.304 And 
translating moral antipathy toward terrorism into the assumption that 
terrorists themselves are beyond the bounds of rational action is also 
tempting. But both of these causal inferences should be resisted. 
Empirical studies of terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, show that 
the objection to the notion of terrorist rationality is dramatically 
overstated.305 Those studies demonstrate that individual terrorists are 
overwhelmingly rational, in the sense of making judgments about the 
appropriate means to their chosen ends, however morally 
objectionable their goals or methods might be. To translate 
reflexively a commonly shared moral repugnance toward acts of 
terrorism into an empirical belief about the underlying means-end 
rationality of its perpetrators is to mistake an ethical judgment for a 
judgment about the mechanisms of the social world in a way that 
hinders understanding and prediction. 
To summarize, jurisdictional redundancy can amplify and extend 
counterterrorism law’s marginal-deterrence problem. Just as the 
sweep of the material-support statute or AUMF-related detention 
blunts the possibility of marginal deterrence, so too jurisdictional 
redundancy between the Article III criminal process and military 
detention of enemy combatants diminishes marginal deterrence. 
Preservation of marginal-deterrence effects may thus provide a post 
hoc justification for the decisions of both the Bush and Obama 
administrations to rely almost exclusively on criminal law within the 
United States and to avoid the use of military detention. 
*          *          * 
In this Part, I have tried to illuminate the complexity of the 
institutional-design question in forum choice for terrorism suspects. 
To that end, I have described several direct and indirect mechanisms 
that link jurisdictional choices to socially desirable and undesirable 
outcomes. If nothing else, my aim here has been to show that a 
narrow focus on procedural detail and substantive rules is insufficient 
to understand and answer the forum-choice question. Especially to 
the extent that the procedure and substance of diverse jurisdictional 
 
 304. See Monica Davey, Would-Be Plane Bomber Pleads Guilty, Ending Trial, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 13, 2011, at A17 (recounting a plan by a terrorism defendant made in the midst of trial, 
seemingly on ideological and not consequentialist grounds).  
 305. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic 
Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 833, 879 n.243 (2011).  
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pathways appear to be converging,306 the mechanisms I have identified 
here may be the more appropriate locus of inquiry. 
IV.  DEFENDING JURISDICTIONAL REDUNDANCY 
Part III develops a typology of costs and benefits related to 
jurisdictional redundancy. This Part applies those arguments to two 
prominent proposals that were under discussion in early 2012, at the 
time of this Article’s preparation. Both proposals largely hold the 
designs of specific institutions constant but streamline forum choice. 
One would force near-exclusive employment of Article III criminal 
process, whereas the other would insist on the exclusive use of 
military commissions in a large set of cases. Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that either one or another of these proposals 
must be desirable, I suggest that both streamlining proposals have 
underappreciated costs. The dominant jurisdictional architecture 
since 9/11, in which redundancy has been rife but selectively invoked, 
may seem ad hoc, but that status quo may have considerable 
underappreciated virtues. As a result, a move toward either one of 
the two posited versions of exclusive jurisdiction would be unlikely to 
produce desirable outcomes in either the short or the long term.307 
As an initial matter, I shall state clearly the limits of the analysis 
developed in this Part. Both of the proposed reforms discussed below 
are distinctive in that they involve the almost wholesale excision of 
redundancy from the extant jurisdictional system. They are, in other 
words, corner solutions to the forum-choice problem: either no 
Article III jurisdiction or no military jurisdiction. That proposals are 
radical in this way, rather than finely tailored, creates an opportunity 
for analysis even in the absence of more comprehensive institutional 
and empirical information. Even if reaching a precise assessment 
about any and all marginal change to the detention system is too 
epistemically demanding, making a judgment about whether a radical 
 
 306. See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 1080–81 (“[T]he two systems . . . have 
converged on procedural and especially substantive criteria for detention.”). 
 307. To reach an accurate assessment of how eliminating redundancy influences outcomes, 
it would be necessary to isolate that change from other effects in order to avoid confounding 
results. One would have to alter redundancy without altering the median quantum of process 
used in the system. One of the proposals discussed below—recourse to Article III courts only—
roughly has this property. But the other—recourse to military forums only—does not. That 
alternative would lead on average to a drop in the procedural rigor of hearings. Even controlling 
for the change in median procedural rigor, however, I argue that the latter change still would be 
undesirable. 
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transformation toward either one of these two corner solutions would 
likely yield net gains or net losses is nonetheless feasible. Working 
within the constraints of available data and employing what I hope 
are plausible and uncontroversial empirical claims, I contend that it is 
possible to say, at least as a first rough approximation, whether these 
particular jurisdictional-design recommendations are likely to be 
socially desirable or not. My aim here is not, however, to provide a 
comprehensive evaluation of all conceivable adjustments to 
terrorism-related jurisdiction. I therefore make no claim here about 
optimal jurisdictional specification. 
A. Limiting Jurisdiction to Article III Tribunals 
The first, albeit less politically feasible, proposal on forum choice 
is to channel all terrorism suspects into Article III courts or, if they 
cannot be tried in that forum, to release them.308 Advocates of this 
approach tend to categorically disfavor military commissions and 
contend that the Article III criminal process is the sole legitimate and 
proper adjudicative venue. The scope of such proposals is not always 
free of ambiguity. For example, it is not always clear whether the 
proposals would apply without any regard to geographical 
circumstances and, in particular, whether they would apply to 
battlefield captures. Politically savvy proponents of “Article III court 
only” proposals, however, are unlikely to argue that fighters seized on 
an active battlefield while deploying arms against American soldiers 
must always be channeled into a civilian forum. For the sake of 
evaluating this kind of proposal, I therefore assume that these 
proponents would allow the use of military forums in a narrow class 
of battlefield circumstances. 
Would such a rationalization of extinguishing jurisdictional 
redundancy yield positive welfare effects? To be sure, the elimination 
of non-Article III jurisdiction would have benefits. It would, for 
example, reduce the number of false positives—as its advocates 
hope—and would also mitigate the demoralization costs among the 
public that are created by the specter of multiple adjudications. It 
 
 308. E.g., Ratner & Lobel, supra note 16; see also Neil A. Lewis, Try Detainees or Free 
Them, 3 Senators Urge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2003, at A14 (“They may not have any rights 
under the Geneva Conventions as far as I’m concerned, . . . but they have rights under various 
human rights declarations. And one of them is the right not to be detained indefinitely.” 
(quoting Senator John McCain) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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might even force agencies to engage in more accurate information 
gathering ex ante. 
But it is also likely that the proposal would have effects that run 
counter to the intentions of its advocates. Extinguishing the 
redundancy that obtains from military forums would eliminate the 
possibility of positive jurisdictional arbitrage and the use of a second 
forum as a safety valve, at least in the absence of an immigration 
violation on the suspect’s part. Doing so raises the stakes in any given 
trial. When there is reason to believe that a suspect presents a 
credible risk but the admissible evidence is weak for reasons 
unrelated to the government’s investigative effort, a judge is under 
implicit or explicit pressure to bend procedural rules in deference to 
the government. This situation does not necessarily generate pressure 
to innovate in positive ways. Rather, it may translate into pressure 
upon risk-averse judges to grant more leeway to the government. 
More deference from judges would undermine the checking function 
Article III judges are supposed to play in terrorism cases. It would 
also compromise the information-forcing role of judicial review. Such 
pressures also may yield procedural rollback not only in terrorism-
related cases but across the body of criminal litigation to the 
detriment of criminal suspects. Criminal-procedure rights, after all, 
are transubstantive, and courts may bend generally applicable rules 
rather than allowing suspected terrorists to evade punishment or 
crafting ad hoc terrorism exceptions to constitutional rights. Although 
causation is hard to establish, judicial changes to Fourth Amendment 
and Confrontation Clause protections after 2001 may fairly be seen as 
evidence of precisely this sort of transubstantive slackening of 
constitutional criminal-procedure protections.309 
The Article III-only proposal might be self-defeating in another 
way. By eliminating the insurance option created by redundancy and 
by streamlining existing reserve capacity, the proposal may make the 
jurisdictional system as a whole more vulnerable to failure in the 
teeth of an exogenous shock. The failure of such a system to interdict 
a terrorist who goes on to commit a serious attack would quite likely 
induce a political reaction that would undo the reformers’ goals. 
 
 309. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157–60 (2011) (interpreting expansively the 
emergency exception to the Confrontation Clause); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 
177, 190–91 (2004) (holding that statutes requiring suspects to identify themselves during police 
investigations did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
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The gain from elimination of a military option that is presently in 
rare use may be smaller than first appears for other reasons.310 Recall 
that several redundancy-related costs have concave cost curves in 
relation to the extent to which redundancy is used. Absent heavy use, 
that is, jurisdictional redundancy may not generate large 
demoralization, de-skilling, or marginal-deterrence costs. Hence, 
redundancy in relative desuetude may not be as costly as is generally 
believed. By contrast, those costs with a convex curve—such as the 
high startup costs of military commissions and any attendant political-
legitimacy losses—already will largely have accrued at the point that 
redundancy is eliminated from the system. The costs turn not on the 
use of a forum, but on its creation. Under such conditions, this second 
kind of costs represents what economists would call a set of sunk 
costs, which should be ignored for the purpose of forward-looking 
design decisions. Put these cost curves together, and it becomes 
apparent that eliminating rarely-used military jurisdiction may not 
bring large welfare gains because the costs of such jurisdiction have 
either been irredeemably expended or not yet accrued. In short, 
attention to the cost curves of redundancy-related harms suggests that 
it would likely be inefficient to expend the costs of moving from the 
status quo ante of pervasive but scantily used redundancy to one of 
exclusive Article III jurisdiction. 
At the same time that it makes only ambiguous movement 
toward its putative libertarian goal, this proposal would have several 
unintended and undesirable policy effects: First, it would potentially 
reduce accuracy by eliminating opportunities to correct first-round 
false negatives. Second, it would eliminate competition-related 
incentives among forums that have fostered procedural innovation. 
Third, it would extinguish the government’s choice as to whether or 
not to use a costly procedure in a given case. By cutting off a choice 
that has worked as a source of information for congressional 
overseers, the proposal may increase agency costs. Whereas under the 
existing scheme Congress can assess what proportion of cases are 
prepared on the basis of robust and relatively reliable evidence, as 
opposed to thinner records, in a world in which Article III jurisdiction 
were to be mandated, agencies simply would not press some cases. 
Any informational effects created by forum choice would evaporate. 
 
 310. See supra Part I.C. 
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In short, the gains from this proposed reform are far smaller than 
appear at first blush. Indeed, the proposal might even be self-
defeating along the libertarian metric that its supporters purport to 
celebrate above other values. 
B. Limiting Jurisdiction to Military Venues 
The second kind of jurisdictional reform proposal, which aims to 
mandate the use of a military forum for some class of terrorism 
suspects, fares no better.311 Like Article III-only proposals, it would 
fail to promote the security goals of its proponents while inflicting 
even more serious collateral harms on the ability of the detention 
system to promote desirable outcomes. 
Proposals in this vein differ in their proposed scope and have a 
checkered history that culminated in the 2012 NDAA. In March 2011, 
Representative Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, then-chairman of the 
House Armed Services Committee, introduced the Detainee Security 
Act of 2011.312 Section 4(a) of that bill would have required the 
president to hold in “military custody” any newly detained person 
“eligible for detention pursuant to the [AUMF].”313 Representative 
McKeon summarized his position with a slogan: “No more 
mirandizing [sic] terrorists. No more trials in downtown 
Manhattan.”314 His explanation did not, however, clarify the precise 
metes and bounds of his bill. Because there is more than residual 
 
 311. Congress has in the past made jurisdictional changes respecting detainees’ access to 
federal court. See, e.g., Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. X, § 1005(e), 
119 Stat. 2739, 2741–43 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)) 
(stripping statutory habeas jurisdiction in challenges of Guantánamo detentions). The proposals 
discussed here would limit the choice set of the government and not the choice set of the 
detainee.  
 312. Detainee Security Act of 2011, H.R. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 313. Id. sec. 4(a), § 130e(a). Representative McKeon also introduced the Enemy Belligerent 
Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of 2010, H.R. 4892, 111th Cong. (2010). Section 4 
of that bill would have barred the use of any “funds appropriated or otherwise made available 
to the Department of Justice” to prosecute a person falling into a category roughly homologous 
to enemy combatant. Id. § 4; see also id. § 6(10) (defining the category of “unprivileged enemy 
belligerent”). 
 314. Daniel Halper, Rep. Buck McKeon’s Foreign Policy Address, WKLY. STANDARD BLOG 
(Nov. 15, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/rep-buck-mckeons-foreign-
policy-address_516881.html.  
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uncertainty about the scope of the AUMF, the domain of cases that 
the McKeon proposal would have encompassed is not clear.315 
A variant of the McKeon proposal was introduced in the Senate 
in October 2011. Senator Kelly Ayotte unsuccessfully proposed a 
floor amendment to then-pending military-appropriations legislation 
that would have barred any appropriations for the criminal trials of 
individuals “determined to be” either members of or part of al Qaeda 
or an affiliate or otherwise a participant in “an attack or attempted 
attack” on the United States.316  
Both the initial McKeon and the Ayotte proposals would have 
eliminated all jurisdictional redundancy in some class of cases—and 
my aim here is to analyze the welfare effects of such a move. It is 
worth emphasizing that subsection D of the 2012 NDAA, in which an 
eventual compromise was struck, has a very different effect from 
either the McKeon or the Ayotte provision. Section 1022 of the 2012 
NDAA, to be sure, appears to be a mandatory-military-detention rule 
on first reading. But this impression is misleading. That provision 
instead imposes procedural obligations on the executive, but it does 
not, in fact, require long-term military detention in any case. For this 
reason, that provision leaves open the central questions discussed in 
this Article. 
Section 1022 applies to a subset of individuals who may be 
detained in military custody under the AUMF if they are “captured in 
the course of hostilities” authorized by the AUMF.317 It commands 
 
 315. See supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text. The McKeon proposal recrafts the 
scope of the AUMF in section 5 but does not, in so doing, resolve the question of geographic 
scope.  
 316. 157 CONG. REC. S6729–30 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 2011) (amendment text); see also 157 
CONG. REC. S6845–46 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 2011) (vote count). The Ayotte amendment is poorly 
drafted even if one agrees with its policy goals. For example, its reference to 
“attack[s] . . . against the United States,” 157 CONG. REC. S6730 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 2011), could 
be read to reach any assault on a federal official, whether a postal worker or an FBI agent. 
Senator Ayotte has defended her proposal on the ground that “informing an enemy combatant 
of his or her ‘right to remain silent’ is contrary to the essential goal of obtaining critical 
intelligence necessary to finding other terrorists and preventing future attacks.” Kelly Ayotte, 
Opinion, Job 1: Stopping Future Terror Attacks, CONCORD MONITOR, Oct. 27, 2011, http://www.
concordmonitor.com/article/288349/job-1-stopping-future-terror-attacks. It is hard to see how 
an objection to the rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which operates before a 
trial occurs and which has a public-safety exception, conduces to a categorical objection to 
Article III trials. Senator Ayotte’s justifications for her proposal also entirely fail to address why 
it is desirable to eliminate optionality from the existing system. 
 317. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA 2012), Pub. L. 
No. 112-81, § 1022(a)(2) (2011), PL 112-81 (Westlaw) (defining the scope of application as 
reaching anyone who is “a member of, or part of, al-Qaeda or an associated force that acts in 
HUQ IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  12:33 AM 
1500 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1415 
the “Armed Forces of the United States” to “hold” that person “in 
military custody pending disposition under the law of war.”318 A 
separate statutory provision defines “disposition under the laws of 
war” to include “[d]etention under the law of war without trial until 
the end of the hostilities authorized by the [AUMF];” military-
commission trial; “trial by an alternative court or competent tribunal 
having lawful jurisdiction;” or “[t]ransfer to the custody of control of 
the person’s country of origin, any other foreign country, or any other 
foreign entity.”319 The provision directs the executive to promulgate 
procedures for accomplishing such disposition, but it also contains 
three caveats. First, it “does not extend to citizens of the United 
States” or to “a lawful resident alien of the United States on the basis 
of conduct taking place within the United States, except to the extent 
permitted by the Constitution of the United States.”320 Second, the 
president may waive the mandatory rule by filing a written 
certification with Congress that the “waiver is in the national security 
interests of the United States.”321 Finally, § 1021 does not “affect the 
existing criminal enforcement and national security authorities of the 
[FBI].”322 
Section 1022 does not accomplish the McKeon-Ayotte goal of 
mandating military detention, even setting aside its exceptions for 
citizens and some lawful resident aliens, for at least two reasons.323 
First, § 1021 defines “disposition under [the] law of war” to include 
triage to any of the forums discussed in this Article and includes 
 
coordination with or pursuant to the direction of al-Qaeda” and who has also “participated in 
the course of planning or carrying out an attack or attempted attack against the United States or 
its coalition partners”). Section 1022(a)(2) thus describes a subset of the persons who can be 
detained under the detention authority listed in section 1021(b), which is drafted in the 
disjunctive and not the conjunctive. 
 318. NDAA 2012 § 1022(a)(1). The term “hostilities” is defined in the Military Commissions 
Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948a–950t (Supp. IV 2010), as “any conflict subject to the laws of war”, 
id. § 948a(9). This definition is ambiguous because it is not clear what the relevant unit of 
analysis is for conflicts. For example, should one look at the Afghan theater as a single conflict, 
as the Supreme Court did when considering the lawful duration of a battlefield detention? 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that Hamdi could 
be held only until the end of the Afghan conflict in which he had been seized). Or should one 
consider all U.S.-al Qaeda interactions as a single conflict? The statute is not clear on this point. 
 319. NDAA 2012 § 1021(c)(1)–(4). 
 320. Id. § 1022(b)(1)–(2). 
 321. Id. § 1022(a)(4). 
 322. Id. § 1022(d). 
 323. I set aside here the possibility that the term “hostilities” should be read narrowly. See 
supra note 318. 
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immigration proceedings and Article III criminal trials as “competent 
tribunal[s] having lawful jurisdiction.”324 This definition means that a 
person can be designated as fitting under § 1022 and immediately 
funneled into a nonmilitary forum without having spent any actual 
time in military custody. In effect, all Congress has done in these 
cases is to interpose another level of bureaucracy in the detention 
process. Although bureaucratic controls or procedural rules can 
sometimes be justified as means of eliciting information or preventing 
arbitrary actions, § 1022 has neither of these effects.325 To the 
contrary, it is hard to see it playing any useful function warranting its 
costs in cases in which Article III trial is the chosen disposition. 
Second, there is no reason that a § 1021 determination need ever 
be made in some significant number of cases. Critically, the statute 
does not impose a temporal constraint on how quickly the 
determination needs to be made once a suspect has come to the 
government’s attention. To read the statute to implicitly impose such 
a time limit would not only supplement the text with an atextual 
triggering rule, but it would also undermine “the existing criminal 
enforcement and national security authorities of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation [and] other domestic law enforcement agenc[ies].”326 
Many suspects who fall within the scope of § 1022 inevitably will have 
been identified in the course of FBI investigations. To require the 
Bureau to cease abruptly an ongoing investigation, detain a suspect, 
and hand him over to the military, even if agents reasonably believe 
that pursuit of the investigation will lead them to more important 
suspects, is to compel an obviously counterproductive result. The 
ability of agents to pursue such investigations to the point of 
negotiating plea deals with such persons obviates the need for a 
§ 1022 determination. Rather, civilian law enforcement would move 
directly to an enumerated “disposition under the laws of war”—i.e., a 
plea colloquy before a federal judge. Assuming compliance with the 
statute’s ultimate command of appropriately disposing of suspects in 
an enumerated fashion, it is hard to see why the statute should be 
read in such cases to impose a mechanical “determination” that can 
only have the effect of disrupting the successful attainment of law-
 
 324. NDAA 2012 § 1021(c)(3). 
 325. No argument was made during the legislative debates over the 2012 NDAA to the 
effect that government choices to use Article III should be made marginally more costly 
through the imposition of a layer of bureaucracy. Nor is it easy to discern any colorable policy 
justification for section 1022’s effect along these lines. 
 326. NDAA 2012 § 1022(d). 
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enforcement goals. In sum, mandatory military detention is not yet 
the law of the land for any given class of suspects. 
But would such a mandate of military detention improve net 
social welfare by increasing the accuracy and reducing the cost of 
terrorist-detention systems? The answer is no. Like proposals to 
channel all cases into Article III forums, proposals to make military 
detention exclusive would generate perverse and self-defeating 
results. Several negative downstream effects of mandatory military 
detention are worth stressing to illustrate this point. 
First, it is ironic that one of the most important effects of 
mandating a military forum would be to eliminate the existing 
measure of sequential overlap that insures against false negatives. 
The evidence presented in Part I suggests that sequential overlap has 
been a largely successful strategy for eliminating false negatives. In 
tension with its advocates’ goals, mandatory military detention may in 
this way eliminate a design feature of existing forum-choice 
arrangements that dampens the risk of a false negative. Oddly, 
proponents of military forums would eliminate the insurance effect of 
redundancy on the basis of precious little evidence that the Article III 
criminal system generates a significant rate of false negatives and 
some evidence that military adjudication has failed to sort accurately 
the pool of captured detainees, leading to the release of persons who 
have gone on to commit further acts of violence.327 That is, there is 
very little evidence that Article III forums have failed to supply 
convictions in appropriate cases, and there is some evidence that 
military screening techniques have been inaccurate. 
Second, eliminating sequential overlap would vitiate the salutary 
function played by redundancy as insurance against underlap. Even 
when a military forum has been used initially, Article III criminal 
jurisdiction can still play a backstopping role against legal risk, as 
demonstrated in the Padilla and al-Marri litigations. The history of 
military commissions to date suggests that this kind of legal risk is 
 
 327. For a careful analysis of evidence of recidivism by enemy combatants suggesting that 
the worry is somewhat overstated, see Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Guantanamo: 
Who Really ‘Returned to the Battlefield?,’ NEW AM. FOUND. (July 20, 2009), http://
counterterrorism.newamerica.net/publications/policy/guantanamo_who_really_returned_battle
field (discussing recidivism rates among enemy combatants who have been detained). It is also 
important to observe that what is commonly called recidivism may be nothing of the kind. 
Instead, it may be evidence of what might be termed a criminogenic effect from enemy-
combatant detention. In other words, the fact that those who are erroneously detained at first 
are exposed to radicalizing influences within a detention facility and then released. 
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hardly minimal. That is, it seems plausible to imagine that a 
significant number of al Qaeda suspects who are alleged to have had a 
leadership or logistical role in past terrorist attacks, but not an 
operational role, will be amenable to trial in a military commission 
only for inchoate offenses such as “providing material support” or 
“terrorism.”328 Significant uncertainty remains and has been flagged 
by a plurality of the Supreme Court, as to whether these offenses are 
indeed violations of the laws of war that may be tried by military 
commissions.329 Although the Court of Military Commissions Review 
has held that material support is a war crime, its opinion may be 
vulnerable.330 Proponents of exclusive military-commission 
jurisdiction thus press their case at a time when the constitutionally 
permissible ambit of those tribunals is unclear and when it is possible 
that the latter will be circumscribed to exclude the allegations against 
many detainees. In the absence of certainty that a single forum can 
constitutionally adjudicate all known terrorism cases, mandating that 
cases be tried in one forum seems singularly unwise.331 
Third, the proposal would mitigate the epistemic benefits of 
existing simultaneous redundancy much in the same way that Article 
III-only proposals would. It would eliminate the information-forcing 
effects of forum choice, undermining the ability of Congress to draw 
inferences from the jurisdictional options selected by its agents in the 
bureaucracy. And it would furthermore extinguish competition 
among forums that has previously fostered procedural innovation. 
Fourth, mandating use of a military forum would directly and 
immediately amplify the rate of false positives by exchanging the use 
of a lower-process forum such as enemy-combatant detention for a 
 
 328. See 10 U.S.C. § 950t(24) (Supp. IV 2010) (defining the “material support” offense); id. 
§ 950t(25) (defining the “terrorism” offense). 
 329. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 611 (2006) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that 
conspiracy offenses are not violations of the laws of war).  
 330. See United States v. Hamdan, No. CMCR 09-002, 2011 WL 2923945, at *44 (Ct. Mil. 
Comm’n Rev. June 24, 2011) (holding that material support was a violation of the laws of war 
prior to the enactment of military-commissions legislation in 2009); accord United States v. Al 
Bahlul, No. CMCR 09-001, 2011 WL 4916373, at *29–53 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. Sept. 9, 2011). 
These opinions rest their conclusions largely on evidence of international treaties that urge 
states to enact municipal criminal statutes and on various domestic criminal laws. It is not clear 
that independent evidence of the status of material support under international law is strong, or 
even tenable. 
 331. A more cynical view may be that it is precisely in order to impose moral and 
psychological pressure on judges to find military commissions capable of prosecuting material-
support offenses that proponents of the military-only route are now pressing their case.  
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higher process forum such as Article III criminal process. Strictly 
speaking, this effect is not a consequence of the loss of redundancy 
per se. Rather, it follows from the diminished median level of 
procedural robustness in the detention system.332 But it is nonetheless 
a consequence of the mandatory-military-forum proposals in relation 
to the status quo. In the longer term, the inflationary effect of 
mandating military process on false positives may be even greater. 
Such proposals undermine investigating agencies’ long-term 
incentives to preserve investigative expertise and to gather accurate 
information. They do so by effectively scaling back restrictions on 
morally dubious investigative shortcuts such as the use of cruel and 
inhumane treatment in interrogations.333 It is no small irony that what 
is touted as a pro-security move would likely inflict serious harm over 
time to the government’s capacity to meet security goals through 
targeted and effective investigations. 
Fifth, mandatory military detention would eviscerate what 
remains of marginal deterrence, with similarly perverse 
consequences. Rather than dissuading fellow ideologues from more 
active support of terrorism, it may well be that the effect of 
mandatory military jurisdiction would be to extinguish incentives to 
refrain from terrorism once any expression of support had been 
made. Strategic terrorist groups will leverage this leveling effect by 
broadening the ideological grounds of their appeal. They will seek to 
persuade a greater number of potential recruits that their existing 
political sympathies already expose them to military detention. This 
hypothesis is not wholly without support: studies of past 
counterterrorism efforts link the militarization of counterterrorism 
policy to boosted terrorism recruitment.334 And a moment’s reflection 
 
 332. I am grateful to William Hubbard for pressing me on this distinction.  
 333. Such methods obviously may raise normative concerns. Without detracting from those 
concerns, I mean to set them aside for the purpose of this analysis.  
 334. A study of British counterterrorism policies in Northern Ireland found that of six high-
visibility initiatives, one had had an observable deterrent effect, whereas five had had no 
discernible deterrent effect. Two others had had no statistically significant impact, whereas 
three of the intrusive policies had been associated with significant increases in violence. Gary 
LaFree, Laura Dugan & Raven Korte, The Impact of British Counterterrorist Strategies on 
Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models, 47 
CRIMINOLOGY 17, 25–35 (2009). Similar effects have been identified in the aftermath of the 
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. See Ronald Fischer, Charles Harb, Sarah Al-Sarraf & Omar 
Nashabe, Support for Resistance Among Iraqi Students: An Exploratory Study, 30 BASIC & 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 167, 173 (2008) (“The data presented here suggest that support for 
violence is strongly influenced by a national struggle against a foreign occupation force.”).  
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on the moralistic arguments made on behalf of terrorist causes 
suggests that it would be hazardous to assume that a strictly inverse 
relationship exists between the state’s use of force and the proclivity 
to turn to arms. 
Finally, such proposals would impose high demoralization costs 
and extinguish constitutional rights related to the criminal process in 
at least some class of cases arising in the United States, further 
reducing recruitment costs for terrorist groups. 
In sum, it is hard to see many, or even any, compensating virtues 
of proposals that would eliminate all jurisdictional overlap in favor of 
a military venue. Such proposals might provide their advocates in 
Congress with a warm glow from the sense of being tough on 
terrorism. But the proposals will do little to improve security in the 
short term, and in the long term are likely to impose large welfare 
costs on future political generations. 
C. In Defense of the Status Quo 
Change is fashionable for politicians and pundits. But in this 
case, the conventional wisdom about the dysfunctionality of existing 
forum choices for terrorism suspects may be off the mark. A 
comprehensive assessment of the status quo, to be sure, rests on 
difficult empirical assessments beyond the grasp of this Article. But 
preliminary grounds can be offered for believing that the post-9/11 
jurisdictional status quo leverages many of the advantages of 
redundancy without incurring some of the related costs. At least in 
comparison to corner solutions mandating a single forum, the status 
quo does not look so bad. 
It is worth recalling that the jurisdictional status quo has largely 
endured through both a Republican and a Democratic presidency.335 
Both administrations converged on a status quo in which redundancy 
exists but is invoked only infrequently. Both made vigorous use of the 
federal criminal and immigration systems. And both preserved the 
military option, although neither relied upon it much after 2004, 
outside of the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan. Notwithstanding 
its aggressive, unilateralist image, the Bush administration did not 
push the boundaries of jurisdictional choice as far as it could have. It 
employed military detention in the United States for only two 
 
 335. See Jack Goldsmith, The Cheney Fallacy, NEW REPUBLIC (May 18, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/the-cheney-fallacy (“The new administration has copied most 
of the Bush program, has expanded some of it, and has narrowed only a bit.”). 
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suspects and exposed only a handful of suspects to military tribunals. 
It thus preserved the benefits of Article III while maintaining military 
detention in reserve.336 
Notwithstanding its libertarian rhetoric, the Obama 
administration has not abandoned the Bush administration’s 
jurisdictional claims. To the contrary, the Obama White House has 
been careful to preserve operational flexibility.337 In a September 2011 
speech at Harvard Law School, President Obama’s assistant on 
homeland security and counterterrorism endorsed not only Article III 
courts but also some “reliance upon military detention” and 
emphasized the “place in our counterterrorism arsenal” of “reformed 
military commissions.”338 A former assistant attorney general for 
national security also has opined that although “[t]here is no inherent 
tension between national security and the criminal justice 
system . . . our criminal justice system has [its] limits, and is not always 
the right tool for the job.”339 Although the government has not 
specified all the boundaries of these tools’ usage with precision, it 
appears that at least some forums overlap with the scope of other 
forums.340 The Obama administration also has been complicit in the 
preservation of military commissions. Its lawyers have continued to 
defend aggressively the military detention of enemy combatants in 
terms only slightly at odds with those offered by the Bush 
administration. Rather than retiring immigration and criminal-law 
powers, the White House in Democratic hands has preserved and 
 
 336. For an endorsement of the use of criminal process from a former official in the Bush 
administration, see Charles D. Stimson, What We’ve Learned About Terror Trials from the 
Underwear Bomber, FOXNEWS.COM (Oct 12, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/10/
12/weve-learned-about-terror-trials-from-underwear-bomber. 
 337. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,492, 3 C.F.R. 203, 205–06 (2010) (requiring the secretary 
of defense and others to participate in a detainee review process to determine, among other 
things, “whether it is possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent with the national 
security and foreign policy interests of the United States and, if so, whether and how the 
Secretary of Defense may effect their transfer or release”).  
 338. Brennan, supra note 6. 
 339. David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 1, 78 (2011); see also Jeh C. Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Speech to the 
Heritage Foundation 3–5 (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/
uploads/2011/10/20111018_Jeh-Johnson-Heritage-Speech.pdf (arguing that “[t]he military 
should not, and cannot be, the only answer [to al Qaeda]” and defending the use of Article III 
courts).  
 340. The exception is the Obama administration’s commitment to process “suspected 
terrorists arrested inside the United States . . . through our Article III courts.” Brennan, supra 
note 6.  
HUQ IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  12:33 AM 
2012] FORUM CHOICE FOR TERRORISM SUSPECTS 1507 
defended those powers, for example by defending their aggressive use 
before the Supreme Court in cases such as Humanitarian Law Project 
v. Holder.341 Yet at the same time, and like the Bush administration, 
the Obama administration generally has refrained from stretching the 
boundaries of military detention beyond its postemergency uses. 
Given this de facto, if implicit, consensus between two 
administrations of dramatically different ideological stripes on the 
utility of jurisdictional redundancy, it may be that arguments in favor 
of preserving the forum status quo are not quite as outlandish as they 
may appear at first blush. Equally, the reliance of both 
administrations on established forums, rather than novations such as 
the much-hyped national-security courts, counsels against high 
expectations for entirely novel forums.342 
The fact that two administrations with strikingly divergent 
normative commitments and distinct political constituencies 
converged on an approach involving significant, but sparingly used, 
redundancy is telling. The combination of excess adjudicative 
capacity and cautious usage may indeed maximize the advantages of 
redundancy while minimizing its costs. On the one hand, the 
government benefits from the possibility of procedural arbitrage and 
from the safety net supplied by sequential redundancy, allowing it to 
minimize false negatives. On the other hand, it does so without 
incurring the fiscal costs of creating new forums or imposing 
demoralization costs associated with visible circumvention of Article 
III. As to agency costs, judges operate under the shadow of 
jurisdiction flight, and they thus have persisting incentives to innovate 
in ways that accommodate the complexities of terrorism cases. At the 
same time, even when they perceive no way of innovating without 
violating core normative commitments, those judges are not in a bind. 
They need not fear catastrophic harms from the rigid application of 
constitutional rules because of the system’s reserve capacity. 
Investigating agencies also have some choice between low- and high-
process channels such that their forum-choice decisions convey 
information to political overseers. At the same time, the employment 
of Article III as a strong default jurisdictional option preserves 
marginal deterrence and generates incentives for investigators to 
obtain good information and maintain their investigative skills. 
 
 341. Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 342. For a fuller development of the grounds for this skepticism, see supra text 
accompanying notes 230–35. 
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Attention to the full spectrum of costs and benefits associated 
with forum choice, in sum, suggests that the status quo of pervasive 
redundancy is surprisingly attractive.343 At the very least, proponents 
of reform have not identified and analyzed all costs and benefits in a 
way that can justify their proposals for change. They have failed, in 
other words, to ask the right institutional-design questions in thinking 
about forum choice. 
CONCLUSION 
The choice of forum for terrorism suspects is usefully conceived 
as a question of institutional design rather than as a matter of legal 
doctrine. It is not sensible to craft policy in this domain simply by 
applying cumbersome tools of legal doctrine while ignoring the 
complex effects of jurisdictional specification. Nor is it sensible to 
craft policy by focusing on individual cases, like Warsame’s, as 
opposed to attending carefully to the complex direct and indirect 
effects of institutional-design choices embedded in existing structures. 
The right question to ask is not “Where should Warsame be tried?” It 
is “What options should the government have ex ante in dealing with 
his case?” That is, the right question focuses on how the legal 
framework of adjudicative institutions defines and channels the 
government’s choices—a question that must be answered long before 
Warsame’s shallow dhow comes into sight. Attention to this 
institutional-design question suggests that the existence of 
redundancy in Warsame’s case—exemplified by his seriatim exposure 
to military and then civilian detention—may have desirable net 
consequences. 
Failure to attend to institutional-design effects, by contrast, has 
blinded commentators to important questions. Leading reform 
proposals on the left and the right are consequently myopic and rife 
with unintended and unanalyzed effects. Partisans on both sides of 
the aisle focus on one variable in a complex optimization puzzle with 
many moving parts. They fail to see how jurisdictional redundancy 
influences, among other things, error rates, innovation, investigators’ 
incentives, marginal deterrence, and information flow. Taking 
account of these complex effects suggests that the considerable 
jurisdictional redundancy that characterizes the status quo, if not 
 
 343. This tracks one analyst’s conclusion in the administrative-law context. See Marisam, 
supra note 28, at 183–84 (“[T]he costs of avoiding duplicative delegations ex ante are too 
great . . . . [I]t is efficient to let some duplication persist.”). 
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ideal, may still be relatively desirable as one of the better possible 
frameworks for dealing with the nettlesome problems of forum choice 
for terrorism suspects. 
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